- Britain can rely on naval blockade to defeat Germany [This is not quite what alternative (3) says]
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- Britain can afford to do little or nothing [This is a highly unfair version of what alternative (3) says]
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- Allied forces should be withdrawn from other fronts and sent to France and Belgium [This is the suggestion in alternative (1)]
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- The Allies should prepare for a German attack in the west [This is not said in any of the alternatives]
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- The Allies should launch a major attack in the west [This is implied in alternative (1) but it is not stated]
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- The Allies should do nothing major until American forces arrive in strength [This is the suggestion in alternative (3)]
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- The British and French should attack in force before the Americans arrive in large numbers [Nowhere is this said or implied]
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- The British should leave the French to their defensive tactics [Nowhere is this said or implied]
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- The war can best be won by knocking out one of Germany's allies [This is the suggestion in alternative (4)]
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- The British should use the troops on the Western Front, suitably reinforced, to win the war [This is the suggestion in alternative (2)]
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Explain what is meant in alternative (3) by the "Pétain Scheme".
How convincing is French's objection to Haig's assertion that "the first factor. . .
terms of peace"?
Which of the following is the most accurate paraphrase of Haig's question "Are
we justified . . . breaks down?"
- Are we right to believe that the Allies can withstand German attack without breaking down?
- Are we right to believe that the Allies can attack and defeat the German army in the field?
- Are we right to believe that there is no possibility of the Allies withstanding a German attack?
What does French mean by
"The "belief . . . 1916"?
"We know the results and can test them"?
Comment on the tone and language of this section of French's memorandum.
a) In what ways is this document good evidence of the problems facing Lloyd George and
Haig by late 1917?
b) In what ways should a historian use this document with care before making
judgements about the situation facing Lloyd George and Haig by late 1917?
Now read these extracts from the diaries of
Sir Maurice Hankey,
who was Secretary to the War Cabinet and a strong supporter of Haig.
Document C: Hankey's diary for 24 October 1917.
Document D: Hankey's diary for 26th March 1918.
In the light of these extracts how (if at all) should we change our evaluation of French's memorandum?