Memorandum by Lord French to the War Cabinet, 1917.

Reference: Churchill Papers, CHAR 8/185/52-4. Crown copyright.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE WAR, THE FUTURE PROSPECTS, AND FUTURE ACTION TO BE TAKEN.

"Having regard to the fact that, after more than three years of war, no decision has been reached, how should the Allied forces in the field be best directed and employed to bring about a satisfactory and lasting peace?

"The Prime Minister (Lloyd George), in his address at the meeting of the War Cabinet on the 11th instant, laid down four separate alternatives which in his view presented themselves for consideration.

1. A complete concentration on the Western Front, as advocated by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig in his memorandum of October 8th.
2. The adoption of the proposals in (1), but leaving the forces which are now operating in other theatres where they are, such forces to do what is possible with the means now at their disposal.
3. That which was termed by the Prime Minister the "Petain scheme", namely to stand everywhere on the defensive, only resorting to such offensive action as will render the defence effective. To await the development of the forces of the United States; and in the meantime to rely upon a drastic economic war to weaken the enemy.
4. A concentration of force on some theatre of operations other than the Western Front, against one or other of Germany's allies; for instance, in Syria and Palestine against Turkey, or on the Italian front against Austria.

"I propose to divide this memorandum into two parts. In the first I will deal with the memoranda of the Commander-in-Chief (Haig) in France and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Robertson) in connection with various documents which have been submitted to me. In the second part I will express the opinion I have formed as to the reference submitted to me.

"The Commander-in-Chief in France advocates the first alternative, and his views are fully expressed in his memorandum of October 8th addressed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who, in his minute to the War Cabinet of October 9th, practically concurs in these views. On a close examination of Sir Douglas Haig's memorandum I find that some statements are made and conclusions drawn from them which I think are open to question.

"On the opening page he says that "the first factor to be taken into account is that not only Germany but her Allies rely primarily and practically entirely upon the invincibility of the German Army to secure for them favourable terms of peace."

"In reply to this I have to remark that Germany is carrying on an economic war with her U-boats, upon which she has publicly stated she relies for victory. And further, by the many air raids which she is sending she hopes to spread such alarm and despondency throughout the population of this country as will bring about favourable terms of peace. I think we have every reason to believe that she trusts to these methods quite as much as to the invincibility of her Army.

"On page 2 the Field Marshal says that the first question to be answered is as follows:- "Are we justified under the conditions postulated by the Prime Minister in basing our plans on a belief in the feasibility of overcoming the resistance of the German Army by direct attack before the endurance of the British Empire and its Allies remaining in the field breaks down?"

"The "belief" referred to in Sir Douglas Haig's query has really been at the root of our military policy ever since the beginning of 1916. That policy was commenced in practice with the battle of the Somme on the 1st July, 1916, and has been continued ever since. We have waged war on these principles for 15 months. We know the results and can test them.

"Do they show that we are still justified in retaining this belief and continuing to act on these principles?

"I will endeavour to answer this question later, so far as my own judgment goes."