Haig's notes on Churchill's "The World Crisis", 1926. Reference: Churchill Papers, CHAR 8/204/112-13. Reproduced with the permission of Lord Haig. (scan and transcript)
Note on situation on Sunday Evening 24th March 1918
My Intelligence reported to me that 62 German Div[is]ions had already been identified in the Battle - Of these 48 are fresh from Reserve - Enemy has still 25 in Reserve - at least 12 of these latter are on the front of the British Third and Fifth Armies.
Yet, Petain still maintained that the German main blow was yet to fall, and that it w[oul]d fall on his troops in Champagne.
But, he promised to give Fayolle (.. French Reserves then collecting about Montdidier) all available troops. But he added that he had seen Fayolle that day, and had ordered him to withdraw on Beauvais in the event of the German advance continuing on Amiens. Petain's main care how was he .. (in accordance with his Gov[ernment]'s orders) to cover Paris.
Here was a complete change in the basic principles of French strategy . . . No longer was the aim to be "keep united at all costs", but it is now "cover the French capital, Paris" and "never mind about the British Army".
I at once motored to G.H.Q. (General Headquarters) to request the S.of S. (Secretary of State for War, Lord Milner) and C.I.G.S. (Chief of Imperial General Staff, General Wilson) to come to France to bring the French back to sound strategical principles and find a French General who was prepared to fight. Petain struck me as unbalanced and quite done up as the result of these anxious nights and days.
My orders from the British Gov[ernmen]t (given me personally by Lord Kitchener) were, put shortly, to "keep united with the French Army at all costs".