

LORD GREENHILL OF HARROW (Sir Denis Greenhill)

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BRITISH DIPLOMATIC ORAL HISTORY PROGRAMME

Interview with Lord Greenhill of Harrow on 14 February 1996.

Recorded by John Hickman.

JH. Lord Greenhill's career is already recorded in Who's Who and other reference books and he has written his memoirs entitled *More by Accident* so that there is no need here to repeat that information. The purpose of this interview is to ask him to expand on some of the things he has recorded there and to add anything new that he wishes.

I don't know whether you'd like to comment at all on the questions I suggested to you in advance or whether you want to say other things first of all, Lord Greenhill.

LG. I think that if you ask the questions that you had in mind, I'll see how far I get on.

JH. Well, after reading your memoirs I was interested in the fact that a great deal of your career was spent in the United States or concerned with transatlantic relationships in the broadest sense. Of course there are nowadays critics who take the view that we really allowed ourselves to concentrate too much and to devote too much energy and attention to the US/UK alliance in the postwar period and that perhaps we did not serve our own interests as well as we might have done by this. I wonder what you think about that?

LG. Well, I think that it can easily be argued that we did, in the light of events which happened subsequently, that we did devote too much time to our American relations.

Why did we spend so much time dealing with the Americans and thinking what the Americans were doing and could do, instead of looking into the future? I think there are very real reasons why we followed closely with the Americans. I will list them here. The first one was our own financial position and there is no doubt that when war came to an end and Harry Truman stopped the Marshall plan [?

Lend Lease] our financial position was appalling. It was kept really very dark, because it was so bad. But the only place from which we could get money was the United States of America so that we were bound to take a favourable attitude towards the Americans and to get the loans from America which we eventually did. But the extent of our financial plight I don't think was well understood. Another reason was that the threat from the Russians in Europe was absolutely clear and the only people who could stop the Russians would be forces assisted by the Americans. That was why we wanted to keep the Americans in Europe and do nothing that could cause them to withdraw an unreasonable amount of their troops. Their presence in Europe was absolutely essential.

The third thing was that you have to think how France was regarded immediately after the war. First of all it was a communist country very largely. There was a very strong Communist Party and we had to consider that in relation to what the Russians might do. Our relations with the French were not good; there was the communist element and there was the Gaullist element so that we could not rely upon French assistance. So it was natural that we responded more keenly with the Americans than we did with the Europeans. And the other thing, of course, was that those who had participated throughout the war and had fought alongside and worked with the Americans in the latter part of the war, obviously it was very much in the forefront of their minds, and most of the people one worked with in the United States and in this country were people who had taken part in the war.

Another factor which didn't come into prominence immediately, but gradually became more and more emphatic in guiding British policy, was the question about what to do with the Commonwealth; how to manage the Commonwealth and meet the requirements of the Commonwealth; and we were understandably very anxious not to lose the advantages, such as they were, that the Commonwealth countries gave to us. So we had to bear in mind not only our relations with the Europeans, but the complicated new relations with the Commonwealth countries, and very importantly was that when the Marshall Plan was put up, which was essential for the recovery of Europe - it was headed by Oliver Franks - and it would not have happened without the Americans; so there were several very strong reasons why we should feel closer to the Americans than we were to the Europeans. There was a new German State and then, as I said at the beginning,

certainly the French were unreliable. That's, I think, all I want to say at the moment.

It was natural for a few years immediately after the war that the Americans were very much in mind, both from a financial point of view and a military point of view, and from a natural point of view.

JH. Yes, I think that is very clear - until we got to the point in 1956 when our Suez adventure happened. We found that this American relationship, which we had come to rely on so heavily, was not to be relied on in all circumstances. You wrote about that in your memoirs and I think you say at one point that there was a lot of talk about resignations in the aftermath of the Suez affair but not much action. What was your own view of it at the time?

LG. Now we are talking about Suez?

JH. Yes.

LG. Well, it so happened that I was in Paris at the delegation at the beginnings of NATO. Kit Steel was the boss of that office. I came into the office early one day and to my amazement I heard talking going on in Kit's room. Normally he used to come in about 10.30 or 10.45 saying I am going to play golf with an Ambassador and if you want me you know where I am.

JH. This was in the Delegation to NATO?

Yes, the beginning of NATO. So I heard this talking going on in his room. I went in and there was Pat Dean from London. Kit said I'll come in later; and when Pat Dean had gone Kit came in and said "under no circumstances are you to say to anybody whatsoever that Pat Dean was here this morning". I said that there was not much I could do but I quickly learnt what was going to happen. It so happened that I was being invited to leave the job in Paris and go to Singapore. I had been to the Imperial Defence College and they badly wanted somebody to go out and take part in the developments that were going on in Singapore. They said to me that as you have only been in Paris a short time we don't mind if you say you don't want to go to Singapore, but we would like you to go. I don't know why, but I said that I would go to Singapore and from that moment onwards I was taken up with all the preparations to go to Singapore and I didn't know about the

attack on Suez and all that sort of thing at all until it happened. I was not in the picture.

In retrospect, was it a good idea or wasn't it a good idea? The answer was that it was not a good idea. I knew Suez and the Canal and all that quite well. The problem was that Eden was very windy about the American reaction - what the American reaction would be. The great error that was made from my information is that Macmillan who had been, of course, with Ike in North Africa - and he said in the typical Macmillan way to Eden, "don't worry about the Americans because I can fix the President; as you know President Eisenhower and I are as thick as thieves and there is no need to worry about that, because I will square him". Of course, that's just what he couldn't do when the time came; and then he panicked and Ike who was approaching an election became hostile and that was the end of the thing. The Americans were not taken into our confidence. They were not taken into our confidence because Macmillan said that he would be able to square the President.

JH. Is it known whether he actually attempted to do that?

LG. No, it was too late.

JH. To the best of my information, Macmillan was the person who said to the Cabinet we have got to stop.

LG. Yes, but you see when the Americans were told what was happening all hell broke loose and then Macmillan realised, having not secured American support, that the effect on our financial situation would be disaster and then he back pedalled.

JH. Can I ask you another question about Suez? The crude view might be that the Americans really let us down over Suez. They used their financial power to stop it but may well have regretted it afterwards when they had to reap the whirlwind of the situation in the Middle East. Do you think that's a correct view or not?

LG. I don't think I ever heard an American or any American diplomat say that they had made a great mistake and that they ought to have helped us; I can't remember ever having heard that; I don't know whether they did. I have never

seen it written that they regretted the action that they took, but they may have done. They rather enjoyed in a way the action that they had taken because they thought that it was not the way to do business. I didn't know enough about it at the time and I haven't read anything about it since which suggests to me that they either let the Israelis or the British or anybody down.

JH. The next thing I wanted to ask you about was some of the Foreign Secretaries that you have known and served with - served under - and what's your considered view of them now. For example, although he was really before my time, one always hears that Ernest Bevin was regarded by many as the best post war Foreign Secretary and was very much loved and admired by the Foreign Office.

LG. That was naturally true. I only saw him closely when he was dealing with some visitor; I remember once when some leading Egyptian came over and he talked to him. I was one of those taking notes. He was a formidable man and he reminded me very much of one or two of the people I had seen in the north of England when I was working on the railway and had visited mines and other places like that and met the boss Trade Union man at the pit and so on. Bevin was a very tough, straightforward chap; he was formidable and impressive and there is no doubt that a lot of his colleagues were extremely scared of him; he wasn't afraid of being rude to them. He was a very splendid figure and he was quite unimpressed by others. He didn't hesitate to speak his mind and he had a wonderful facility, which I only saw in one other person, when in the course of conversation with somebody he was reminded of things that had happened in his youth and he used to tell these marvellous stories about what had happened when he was a roundsman delivering material to houses when I think he was a milkman. One could be proud of him and he wasn't put off by anybody.

JH. Was it partly because he was such a powerful figure in the post war Labour Cabinet (we were then after all one of the victors of the war and our weakness hadn't become entirely clear) and we carried more weight in the world then and the Foreign Office liked that; or was it more personal?

LG. We are talking about Bevin. I think his colleagues were very scared of him.

JH. I never met him but I suppose George Brown was the nearest to being an equivalent.

LG. I want to talk about him too. A Labour Minister was sent to Israel to make a report which was very favourable to Israel - Bevin was absolutely furious about it and this man - I forget who it was - and this man just got no other jobs; he was an important Labour politician but he was just struck off the list by Bevin and his colleagues were really scared of him. One felt proud of him - he said what he thought. He looked in the eye of people he was negotiating with.

JH. To some people Eden was the beau ideal of a Foreign Secretary, perhaps more pre-war than post-war. What about him?

LG. Eden - it is very interesting to read Eden's performance in the war as a soldier - Macmillan used to talk a lot about what happened to him on the Somme. If you read Eden's performance as a soldier it's amazing because he took with him a groom who had served the family. He used to climb out of the trenches with this man behind him inching along and Eden signalling with his feet to the chap behind - his physical bravery in the First War was really astonishing. When I had dealings with him he veered from praising one very fulsomely and so on - on the other hand he exploded. I gave accounts in my book about that.

JH. You were left to take the blast.

LG. Yes, I really didn't have a lot of detailed contact with him but enough to see what a sort of strange, tense person he was. Then there was the question about his marriage. I think he was a jealous person about his position and his anxiety to be Prime Minister and the problems he had with Churchill and so on. But he was not a man I would have liked to have gone around with, as I did with Lord Home and George Brown and others later on.

JH. I wonder what your judgement with hindsight is on George Brown. You tell some stories about his eccentricities in your book.

LG. George Brown is another person whose childhood and self education is worth knowing about and there is no doubt that he was tremendously ambitious; he

educated himself; he was convinced that he deserved to be Prime Minister and that he would be Prime Minister and he considered that he was betrayed by Wilson - and who was the other man? - the man who combined with Wilson to keep George Brown from being made the leader.

JH. Herbert Morrison?

LG. No, no. Who was the man from the University of Oxford ?

JH. You are not thinking of Richard Crossman?

LG. Yes. So I think that George Brown considered that he had been cheated of the prize he had obviously yearned for. He thought he would have ultimately got it but he was, you know, temperamental and when he was on form, for example, if one had a meeting and discussed some incident or some steps to be taken in the future he would then rehearse the speech that he would make in front of everybody brilliantly. On the other hand, I remember going with him to the United Nations to make his maiden speech to the United Nations Assembly and we walked up and down outside. He kept on fretting about it. I kept on saying that he had made heaps of speeches before and then he rushed off and was sick at the prospect of making it. Well then, people will say what's new in that, because Macmillan also was said to be sick before - although I never saw that. But, generally speaking, the jealousy of George Brown vis à vis Harold Wilson and others was intense. He used to come back from Cabinet meetings, having put some proposition to the Cabinet which in the FCO we had all agreed; then it was rejected by the Cabinet and he would come rushing back in a fury saying how can we get round this and how can we avoid this nonsense - "that man", he kept on saying - referring to Wilson. One day he told me he was going to make me Permanent Secretary; I was totally surprised. Then suddenly he resigned and I assumed that that was the end of that but, happily from my point of view, Michael Stewart said he wished to do the same. I found Michael Stewart a very agreeable man to work for; but his wife was very hostile to the Foreign Office in many ways.

JH. I remember her sending down little notes to the Departments asking aggressive questions about all sorts of things. At a humble Desk Officer level one was at

the receiving end of this.

LG. She thought that everybody in the Foreign Office was the son of a Duke or something even greater. But she was undoubtedly helped into a proper sense of proportion by having Toni Bridges as the minister's Private Secretary. Here was a man who was not only a Lord but was shown to be [a] extremely clever, [b] very polite and very nice, very thoughtful and so on. But it was rough going with George Brown and I don't think that internationally he was very helpful.

JH. On the whole, foreigners didn't succumb to his charm?

LG. That's true. They were rather mystified by him and of course when his reputation was sneered at one was able to hear it reflected on; but one wants to take his career from childhood.

JH. You have recently spoken in the House of Lords about Lord Home and that's on record; but you must have a lot of things you could say about your experiences with him for quite a few years.

LG. Yes, well he was really charming and all the time I was with him we never had a hard word. Not that I never made a mistake or anything like that; it was the way he conducted business. He had a friendly and delightful way and I quoted in my book knowing that the speech I made in the House of Lords. There were two aspects of his work, one was the Rhodesian problem, which disappointed him, but he did what he had promised to do and then the other was when he expelled the 105 Russians which was a great success. I attended the Cabinet meeting when it was discussed.

JH. The 105 Soviet Bloc spies?

LG. Yes. He was the sort of perfect boss and the whole thing was harmonious and agreeable with him and what was of course striking and made one very proud of him, was that it was quite clear that everyone from foe to friend respected him completely and admired him. When talking to Gromyko, talking to the Chinese or anything he was held in respect. He was helped enormously by his wife who was equally charming.

JH. I wanted to ask you about Alec Douglas Home and Peter Carrington. They were two a little bit similar in character and in the way they were admired and respected. Was it in part, do you think, because they were people of assured positions in the world who didn't need to take on the burden of being Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister and therefore were more relaxed and less driven by personal ambition; personal factors like that?

LG. I think that what is extraordinary about Alec Home was the illness episode, you know, when he was in bed for two years. At the memorial service at Westminster Abbey the Prime Minister read out a thing that Lord Home had written about life and the object of the exercise and all that sort of thing. I think he had carefully thought out what was good and what was evil; and I don't think that there was anything priggish or uppish about what he thought about life, what one should do, and how people should be treated.

Carrington was a more devil-may-care person; and there is the wonderful story about him while serving in Europe after the invasion, when the war was still going on, and the British troops were in the group that were resting, and at the same time as the Americans were going into Paris and Paris was being liberated, Carrington and one or two others had a jeep (they were up by the Channel) and Carrington said that they heard about the entry into Paris going to take place and he said to his chums, we have got nothing better to do so we will drive down to Paris and see it take place and we will have dinner in the Ritz. All the American troops were moving up and he drove all the way down, saw what was happening in Paris, had lunch at the Ritz, talked to the head waiter and drove back again - I mean he was a fearless man.

JH. What about the Permanent Secretaries you have served under; who was the outstanding PUS, including yourself, you remember?

LG. Well, the first one I ever met was a man like myself, the only one who had never been an Ambassador?

JH. Sir William Strang?

LG. Strang, yes; well, he was a pleasant man, brisk - not a terrifying person, he was

agreeable to deal with. When I got expelled from Bulgaria, when I got back he sent for me and asked me why I thought I'd been expelled and so on and he couldn't have been more pleasant and agreeable; he was not a scary man; he was a nice man. The others I knew - Hoyer Millar. You see there was this great battle between Gladwyn Jebb and Roger Makins and I don't know how it came about but they decided to have Hoyer Millar. Well Hoyer Millar was a very courtly sort of person and a very very perceptive and very attractive man really. Harold Caccia; I was with him in Washington when he was Ambassador and he was a very boyish man; for instance if you went into his office and if you said, there is this awful business about such and such happening somewhere or other - what are we going to do? Oh, he'd say, kick it into touch. I didn't know Kirkpatrick at all and Tom Brimelow I explained in my book about him.

JH. He was very well known in particular fields and probably one of the world's leading Soviet experts but he always struck me as an unlikely choice for PUS. I was going to ask you if we were right, after the decision to enter the Common Market, to really turn our faces away from the Commonwealth. We had in effect sacrificed Commonwealth interests, and to some extent our interests in the Commonwealth, to the over-riding purpose of getting into Europe.

LG. I think that it was a pity that the Commonwealth Relations Office was a separate Ministry and that it was -, it seemed to have no heart of its own. It was a superfluous Ministry; and I think Michael Stewart appreciated that. He was the man who decided to unite the two Departments. I think, until the departments were united the Commonwealth was a useless department although there were some very good people like the man who became Cabinet Secretary.

JH. John Hunt; and the other Hunt - David Hunt.

LG. John Hunt took a year off whilst his wife was had a fatal illness. That was a gallant performance on his part. Of course, he has been happily married ever since to a delightful Roman Catholic wife; but it was not a good Ministry and it was right of Michael Stewart - the initiative came from him - to join the two into one. The members of the Commonwealth Office were pretty miffed by it really and Joe Gamer was made Head of the Diplomatic Service.

JH. Well, I was brought up in that and I agree with you that it was a Department, which had as its main purpose just to maintain good Commonwealth relations without any deep base in the British interest.

LG. That's right, yes. But I think really they had a tough job at the UN; the fun of the game in New York was to knock hell out of the UK.

JH. But do you think it went too far? I mean I, at the time, wasn't one of those who regretted the amalgamation; for me it opened up much more interesting prospects and I welcomed it. But, looking back on it now, I think we went almost too far in the other direction and have rather lost something, particularly in our relationship with the old Commonwealth, by not making a bigger effort to nourish those relationships.

LG. And if you remember you'll see that over Rhodesia Harold Wilson was far too sensitive, you know, to the feelings of other Commonwealth countries and that made it very difficult to get a settlement really, by being wholly hostile to the South Africans. I think it was difficult.

JH. If one thinks of the immense benefit we derived from relationships with Australia and New Zealand, for example, in the post war decades and compares that with the situation now, where the Australian government appears to be more concerned to prove that they have grown out of their relationship with Britain and are not interested any more, one wonders if we ourselves have encouraged that.

LG. I think we have, although I remember a Commonwealth conference meeting in Singapore where Australia was very helpful. Heath was our Prime minister, who was the Australian?

JH. Was it Gorton?

LG. He put up a wonderful show, didn't he? And think how bloody minded they all were, or some were, but the Australians helped in that meeting .

JH. Well, as you point out in your book, Gorton certainly did. Obviously you don't think that it was premature in any way to amalgamate the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office; it should have been done years before.

LG. I think so and I think that Michael Stewart was very alert to the right relationship.

Of course he was very badly treated by his colleagues and they hated him over Vietnam and things like that. He had a rough ride and he was very, very upset because they made it absolutely clear that if the Labour Party got back he wouldn't be given a job; and he was very very upset. It was very hard for a man who had spent his whole life working for the Party, to have all sorts of people indicating that they thought he was some sort of traitor to the Party, and they would see to it that he didn't get another job. He was very very upset about that. They disliked him because he did have unpopular views in the Cabinet, right views as was proved to be the case. He was a very likeable man and a very good speaker.

JH. I re-read the other day Nico Henderson's book *The Private Office* in which he has a chapter about Michael Stewart, for whom he had great admiration, and a long description in it of his performance in the Oxford Union debate on Vietnam.

LG. Yes, he did. He did a splendid job there and he was quite sort of fearless about that, but you see his party never forgave him.

JH. When you say 'they', you mean the Labour left?

LG. Yes. I went to his funeral or perhaps it was a Service about his life, I can't remember which, and his cousin spoke from the pulpit and he said what a remarkable man Michael Stewart was, and how the first day he went to school and came back after the first day and said it was alright; and the next day, when they were getting ready for school, he said to his father, 'I am not going to school', so they said, 'why aren't you going to school? You said you had a good day yesterday', but he said, 'I'm not going', they said 'whyever not?' and he said, 'they don't give you enough time to yourself'.

JH. He must have had a nice life up to then!

LG. Yes. Oh dear!

JH. As you look back now on your career, do you regret never having been an Ambassador?

LG. No, I don't. Alec Home said when I was retiring, he said: would you like

your name to go forward as Ambassador in Washington? and I spoke to Angela and she said 'No'; and I said 'Well, that's exactly what I think'. I don't think I could have done the job well and I wasn't passionate to be an Ambassador anywhere in particular.

JH. Is that because, having been PUS, you would not have had anything like the influence in any Embassy that you had had?

LG. Partly, but my great good fortune was that I was nine continuous years in Whitehall. That was extremely interesting; different Ministers, different everything, and I really knew what was going on in the country and all that sort of thing; and that was much much more interesting than wherever you had been sent as an Ambassador. That was the right place to be for those nine years and there was a sort of subsidiary advantage, because at the end of the nine years I was known to a whole lot of business people, so I was inundated with offers of employment when I retired. I could not believe it. But I am sure in retrospect that nothing could have been as interesting as the nine years that I was in Whitehall with a succession of changing Prime Ministers and other ministers.

To go right back to coming out of the army; when I came out of the army in 1945 except for two weeks I'd been overseas and the thing that I found coming out of the army was that, when you were in the army, you knew what the object of the exercise was and you knew what the target was, and why you were supporting this; and you had no doubt that what you were doing was the right thing to be doing. I had several opportunities when I came out of the army to go into various companies and I thought then, and I think now, that why I went into the Foreign Office was that I shall know what the object of the exercise is, and it will be clear what we are trying to do. We were not trying to sell better toothpaste than everybody else. In a way it was a continuation of the objectives one had in the army when you knew what the object of the exercise was and going into the Foreign Office, it seemed to me that you would never be asking yourself all the time whether what you were doing was worthwhile or desirable; that was why I decided to try for the Foreign Office before I got deep into other things.

JH. Yes. Did it seem like that 10-20 years later? Was the object of the exercise still as clear?

LG. Yes, yes and the other thing, I don't know whether you found it the same.

JH. Yes, I did.

LG. Yes, well that's it. What was pleasant in the Foreign Office was that the object of the exercise was the same for both. The other thing, I think, attractive about the Foreign Office and what I believe is nowadays being rapidly destroyed, driven away, and certainly if they get all the recruitment change and everything like that. You knew so and so and his wife and his children and you meet them now; there was a sort of camaraderie which was genuine and worthwhile.

JH. You belonged to a Service.

LG. Did you know John Killick? After his first wife died he married a lady who worked in the Private Office - Bill she was always called - and she died the other day, but there was a Memorial Service down in Tonbridge, but what was really quite moving was that there was a terrific turnout of people, who had not just come from across the road but from all over the country; man and wife came to the service. And you know I can't imagine people assembling for a Memorial Service for a director of such and such a company ever turning up in that way.

JH. This was the reason many generations of people joined the Service and the Public Service, but I must say I wonder whether it will last. Would you join or would you advise a son or grandson of yours to join the Diplomatic Service or Public Service?

LG. Nowadays the means of communication are so rapid and so direct that a lot of the drama of the work has changed completely. All I would say is that I never said to myself, you bloody fool joining the Foreign Office in 1945, why didn't you do something else? I never regretted being a PUS, although I know that my appointment was not the most popular one. I know Lord Gore-Booth and others thought it was a mistake. Perhaps it was. I thoroughly enjoyed it and so did Angela and we know you don't have wives either helping now, or they are doing some other jobs or something like that. I think the only regret I have over having been in the

Foreign Office was that it was costly as far as our family was concerned. When we should have been in London - they were both scholars at Westminster - we were sitting in Singapore.

JH. My children still say now, and I think have never said anything else, that they didn't regard it as a disadvantage to have parents abroad when they were at home at school, but that it was an advantage. Though I think there were a few moments when that wasn't true, they don't see it badly now.

LG. I think ours - my younger son killed himself and I always, when I am in a sad mood, I think that if we had been home more, it wouldn't have happened.

Well, there always is a price for any decision one makes; I suppose there is always some disadvantage. And we laugh about it now but often thank God that Angela's mother was here. She was a widow and was a very good instrument for keeping the boys under control; but often my son says, you know, refers to somewhere they went to stay during the holidays, where we thought they were having a marvellous time, but they weren't, and so on.

JH. Of course, it is better now, much better. In my time it improved. When my children were at boarding schools, it got better quite perceptibly during the ten year period that they were separated from us.

Somebody said, I don't know who it was, that the business of the British Government since the war has been the elegant management of decline. Was it a Cabinet Secretary? William Armstrong, I'm not sure.

LG. I don't know. No.

JH. Whoever said it, is it true? I sometimes think that we managed our affairs less well with hindsight than the French, who were going through rather a similar process.

LG. I don't know. I don't think so. I think the French were very very smart in getting the Germans into their grip so quickly; and sort of using their position and managing the Germans in an extremely clever way; and every now and again they

had a narrow escape; and I'm not sure if they have got the right answer yet. But, you see, they busied themselves and, of course, they had a sort of 'commonwealth' that was different with them, their old colonies were entirely different. No, I don't think we, I am not convinced, (but then I am entirely out of date) that the plans for Europe are necessarily a good thing at all and I think, you see, if the French and Germans succeed in preventing the European Union expanding. I am all for having the European Union numerically expanding to make it sort of not exactly unworkable but to allow ...

JH. It would have to be looser.

LG. Yes, much looser than people think it ought to be nowadays. I don't know whether I can picture? Supposing the Labour government gets in and the development of Europe goes along on the Franco/German lines what the reaction in this country will be? I don't think people have the faintest idea.

That may cause a massive upset; or, I suppose, the whole project that the French and the Germans seem set on will explode in their faces.

I think it may and I hope it will, because I mean, I am sure, that they are doing it for their own purposes; and I don't think people will take kindly to the sort of regime which the European enthusiasts foresee coming, do you?

JH. No, I think it is very doubtful.