Churchill College invited Sir John Major to give the 16th biennial lecture in memory of Captain Stephen Roskill. I am speaking in his place.

Sir John much regrets that he cannot be here this evening as a consequence of a recent hip operation. He has a great affection for Churchill College; for the outstanding Archives Centre, so ably led by Allen Packwood and now the home for Sir John’s papers; and for the College’s fine achievements in modern history.

Captain Stephen Roskill made a shining contribution to that historical record in the College’s early years. Roskill was – and still is, 34 years after his death – our best-known naval historian. It is a great pleasure to see three generations of his family here this evening, and an unexpected and undeserved honour to be asked to speak in his memory.

The Obstacle of History

I want to start with history, and then offer a few thoughts on the 1990s “Peace Process”.
Gladstone once said, “Just when you begin to understand the Irish Question, they change the question.”

The history of that Question was, and perhaps remains, the biggest obstacle to peace. The Irish know their history too well. The English don’t know Irish history well enough.

In a lecture for the Liverpool University Institute of Irish Studies in 1996, the late Sir George Quigley, the far-sighted Northern Ireland businessman and public servant, observed that:

“We are a long way from having any sense of shared community in Northern Ireland. Our divided history precludes us from deriving it from an emotionally shared past.”

In the same lecture series, Senator George Mitchell said that his negotiations in Northern Ireland had been the longest and most difficult that he had ever been involved with.

Why was it so hard to broker any movement in negotiations with the parties in Northern Ireland?

In most negotiations there is a stronger side, a majority, which can be persuaded to give ground. But in Northern Ireland we were dealing with two minorities – the nationalist and Catholic minority within the North, and the Unionist and largely Protestant minority within the island of Ireland – each of which felt threatened.
This is what the journalist, Harold Jackson, writing in 1971, called the double minority model.

Each minority was determined to defend every last inch of historical turf.

I was reminded of the old Russian anecdote of the dirt-poor but pious peasant who was offered one wish by the Archangel. He looked across to the paddock of his wealthy neighbour, who sold milk to the entire village, and uttered his wish: “May my neighbour’s cow die!”

The long history of sectarian competition had bred a zero/sum mentality.

By the 1990s, the leading figures in Northern Ireland politics had been engaged in the Troubles for close to a quarter of a century. There was no new generation. Each was dug into a deeply entrenched position. Each carried into any discussion a groaning backpack of historical baggage. Getting the pack off the back was no simple matter.

Between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, however, the situation was different. The cast of leaders had changed, not once but several times. If the title of this lecture implies that we had to overcome enmity, it is wrong.

We had to overcome the legacy of Partition – a legacy which was still reflected in Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution.

When countries separate, it takes generations for attitudes to change and relations to rebalance. Look at India and Pakistan; look at Russia and Ukraine; and at many of the conflicts in the Middle East and Africa.
The UK and the Republic have had their ups and downs, their grievances. At times we could have been better friends.

Our history might have been different if Taoiseach John Costello had not taken Ireland out of the Commonwealth in 1948 and launched an onslaught on Partition, thereby triggering a sectarian response in the North and the cry of “No surrender, we are King’s men” in the 1949 election in Northern Ireland.

Despite that, the Attlee government reacted with generosity, giving the nationals of the newly-proclaimed Republic full citizenship rights, including the vote, if they chose to live in the UK, as so many have done over the years.

Nevertheless, despite our closeness, our shared cultures, our huge trade; despite our common membership of the European Union since 1973; despite the misnamed Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, Northern Ireland until recently stood as an issue between us.

Within the Republic of Ireland, there is no shortage of historical grievances, as we shall be reminded at the centenary of the Easter Rising later this month – the subject of your conference.

But I think the British have been slow to appreciate changing attitudes there, slow to understand the old quip: “How do you terrify a Dublin politician? … You tell him that the North has decided to join the South.”
The vision that republicans and nationalists have of a united Ireland is not irrational or illegitimate. As a vision, it is not of itself a threat to Northern Ireland or to the United Kingdom.

There are many different ways in which Ireland could become more united over time and there are many ways in which Ireland is united now – whether through Tourism Ireland or the rugby team.

What matters is how that vision is promoted – whether through violence and threats or through consent and mutual benefit.

Fianna Fail remains avowedly a republican party – but it is a party which now stands for constitutional republicanism, the Good Friday Agreement and the principle of consent.

The 1990s “Peace Process”: How did it succeed where Sunningdale had failed?

Let me turn now to the “Peace Process”. In a way it started in 1969 and it has yet to finish, but I shall just pick out some of the things I observed from the worm’s eye view of a Downing Street functionary in the early 1990s.

Seamus Mallon, the former deputy leader of the SDLP in Northern Ireland, famously described the process as “Sunningdale for slow learners”.

Why did the process move forward in the 1990s where previous initiatives on broadly similar lines, from Ted Heath’s 1973 Sunningdale Agreement onwards, had failed?

1. The Conflict

The first reason was that the conflict had become a stalemate. In the words of former Senator Maurice Hayes – the war was “both unwinnable and unlosable by both sides.”

With hindsight, we had reached the Shakespearian point where:

“There is a tide in the affairs of men
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune.”

The security forces – the RUC and the army, much assisted by the intelligence services and benefiting from vastly improved cross-border cooperation with the Garda – had achieved a large measure of control. Lessons had been learned from mistakes made early in the Troubles. But control came at a heavy cost. Nearly 800 military personnel and 300 RUC officers were killed during the Troubles. Among a population of one and a half million, the RUC and the army were having to deploy around 40,000 police and soldiers. Security measures alone were not going to eradicate violence.

By the early 1990s, it had become obvious to at least some in the leadership of the Provisional IRA that they could not win. They were never going to achieve their aims by terrorism. Living as a fugitive and in fear cannot be a lot of fun. There were attractions in a legitimate existence in the political arena.
Moreover it was no longer a conflict between two sides. The Loyalist paramilitaries had become more aggressive and more effective, and were taking a significant toll of Republicans – as well as increasing the complications for the security forces.

So it was against that background that in February 1993 a message reached Downing Street through intelligence channels, apparently from the Provisional Army Council, which began:

“The conflict is over, but we need your advice on how to bring it to a close.”

A common perception of deadlock had created an opportunity.

2. Bottom Up: The “Third Arm”

Second, the opportunity had arisen after years of work from the bottom up.

Political talks take the headlines, but, in a sectarian or ethnic conflict over finite territory, there can never be a perfect agreement which satisfies all.

As Professor Richard Rose observed of Northern Ireland in 1971 (and the same could be said of Palestine): “The problem is, there’s no solution.”

In Northern Ireland, the bottom-up was as important as the top-down.
In the words of Richard Needham, the longest serving Minister in the Northern Ireland Office under direct rule, the “third arm of the British government’s strategy” was the “little-known story of the economic and social war against violence.”

The aim was to provide hope: to drain support for violence by showing that there was the real alternative of a peaceful and more prosperous life for all sections of the community. Thereby to make politics the continuation of conflict by other means.

This meant job creation. Attracting investment. Developing infrastructure and public services, including an education system which has produced the best A-level results in the UK. Extra funding from the Treasury, well over what was due under the regional block grant. Important legislation on civil and political rights, on fair housing and fair employment – the first such law having been passed by Brian Faulkner through Stormont in 1971.

This had an effect. As the Peace Process developed, it had enormous support from ordinary people, desperate for an end to violence. Some had been working courageously for years in local organisations. Some just came out onto the streets. This put pressure on the paramilitaries.

It also encouraged the politicians. John Major was never going to gain any votes in Northern Ireland, but he was lifted by his encounters there.

I vividly remember the 21st of December 1995, his 13th visit to the province, at a time when the ceasefire was under threat.
His day began in the company of enthusiastic nationalists in Belfast. He was then mobbed on a walk-about in Unionist Ballymena, with the local MP, Dr Ian Paisley, at his side.

The day ended in Dublin. John Bruton took his guest to a performance of the Messiah in the city where the oratorio was first heard. The audience rose in applause as the Prime Ministers entered, and at the end clapped them down the stairs and out of the theatre.

That was three very different constituencies in three parts of Ireland expressing the same support.

It wasn’t something that tended to happen in England!

3. The willingness to take political risks

Third, the process could not have advanced without the willingness of leaders on all sides to take risks. If I focus on those I personally witnessed, and particularly on the 1993 Downing Street Declaration, it is not to diminish the risks taken by others.

In 1990, Peter Brooke had taken the risk of reopening a secret channel of communication to the leadership of the Provisionals; and of declaring in his “Whitbread” speech that Britain had “no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland”. “Selfish” is a key word in that phrase.

In March 1991, Brooke launched new talks with the four constitutional parties and the Irish Government. The process had three strands: political
development within Northern Ireland, North/South relations, and the relationship between the UK and the Republic.

The three-stranded process, then taken over by Sir Patrick Mayhew, was the train which the Provisionals and the Loyalist paramilitaries were invited to join. Brooke and Mayhew had both declared that Sinn Fein’s inclusion in talks would become possible if violence ceased.

For seven years the train ran over hill and dale and was frequently derailed or stuck in a siding. It ran through the Joint Framework Document of 1995, rejected by the Unionists; the “issues paper”; the “building blocks”; and the “Twin-Track Process” – before finally reaching its destination in 1998, with Tony Blair and Mo Mowlam now in the driving cab, in the Good Friday Agreement.

The task we had was to get Sinn Fein onto this train without the Unionists jumping off.

In 1993 John Major took a risk which could have ended his Premiership after less than three years.

After much agonised debate within a very small circle of Ministers and advisers, he authorised a response to the February message from the Provisionals saying that the conflict was over. Some argued that this was a trap; that there were powerful elements within the IRA which could never be reconciled.

Major judged that it was right to test the IRA’s position and see if it could be nudged forward.
The authenticity of the message has since been disputed and different versions of its provenance put forward. This is beside the point. The message led to a short series of exchanges which was one of the precursors to the eventual negotiations.

The risk for the Government – and indeed for Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams, to whom credit is due – was laid bare when the messages were leaked to the press late in 1993.

The British Government had set out its position in a way that was completely consistent with its public stance. It had not offered any secret deals. But it was accused of negotiating with terrorists who had not given up violence. This almost forced the resignation of the Northern Ireland Secretary, Sir Patrick Mayhew. He was saved, rightly, by his reputation for integrity.

John Major’s second risk was to engage in talks with his Irish counterpart, Albert Reynolds, on a Joint Declaration.

This idea was viewed with the deepest suspicion by Unionists and their supporters in the Conservative Party – in part because it was seen to have originated in John Hume’s dialogue since 1988 with Gerry Adams, but to a large degree also because of historical Unionist fears that any involvement of Dublin would be the thin end of the wedge.

It had been Unionist and Loyalist opposition which in 1974 brought down the power-sharing executive. That opposition was focused particularly on
the Council of Ireland, a purely consultative body proposed in Ted Heath’s Sunningdale agreement.

And the Unionists had come out in huge numbers against Margaret Thatcher’s 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement with Garret Fitzgerald, and its Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference – again, purely consultative – with a small joint secretariat at Maryfield.

They did this despite the fact that the agreement was opposed by Sinn Fein and by Fianna Fail (and also by Jeremy Corbyn MP) as constituting formal recognition of Partition and British jurisdiction in Northern Ireland.

These agreements have been described as building blocks for the Peace Process, which in a sense they were; but they were also road blocks, leaving a legacy of Unionist opposition to cross-border talks which John Major and Patrick Mayhew had to overcome.

Major had agreed with Charles Haughey in 1991 that the two Prime Ministers should meet every six months; but the personal relationship with the Taoiseach really developed after Albert Reynolds took over in February 1992.

Major and Reynolds were completely dissimilar characters. Major was a ferocious auto-didact who always insisted on doing his homework. He wanted to go into any negotiation feeling that he knew more than the person across the table.
Reynolds was the opposite. He was loquacious and emotional. He had spent most of his life as an entrepreneur, running businesses from dance halls to pet foods. He worked off the cuff, by instinct. His staff had a mantra: “Albert’s a bottom line man”, they kept saying. He was endlessly looking for a deal.

But one thing connected them. They were both outsiders – one from Brixton, one from remote Roosky in the middle of Ireland. Both had risen on their abilities from humble origins. Neither had been to university. Neither was part of the Establishment. Before the dance halls Reynolds had started in clerical work, as did John Major. Political opponents derided Reynolds as a country bumpkin. Some of his officials made fun of his lack of formal education.

These two outsiders had bonded as Finance Ministers in the late 1980s. As leaders, both saw and were determined to seize the opportunity to change the situation.

Negotiating the Declaration, however, was no easy process. At times tempers rose. With each version of the text, Reynolds would declare that he couldn’t budge another inch. If Major didn’t agree, he would be held responsible, said Reynolds, for missing an historic chance for peace. He would hype up expectations through the press.

When Major responded by sending a new British draft to the Taoiseach in November 1993, to show what he could and could not accept, Reynolds was furious. I know because I was the unfortunate bearer of the message and was battered by a Taoiseach made all the more angry by being kept waiting in his office late on a Friday evening.
The deal was largely done in seven hours of talks in Dublin Castle on 3 December 1993.

That Summit began with the angriest conversation between two leaders that I ever witnessed.

Major and Reynolds went into a room alone, bristling for a fight. Major slammed down a sheaf of press cuttings which had inflamed opinion in the North and the UK, with the Taoiseach’s fingerprints all over them as Reynolds tried to sell the deal to his domestic audience and put pressure on the British.

Reynolds tore into Major for using a back channel to the Provisionals – not that Dublin didn’t have a much more active channel of its own.

No one sitting outside that door and hearing the shouting would have imagined that the two men inside were friends who would pull off an historic agreement twelve days later. But the catharsis worked. Trust was re-established.

Their friendship remained through and beyond the end of Reynolds’s premiership in November 1994. John Major visited Albert Reynolds and his family in Dublin a few months before Reynolds died in 2014 and attended his funeral. He was said to have been the last politician to visit Reynolds.

After Reynolds, John Major enjoyed another close working partnership with John Bruton, as then did Tony Blair with Bertie Ahern. This
sustained collaboration between successive Prime Ministers and Taoiseachs was critical to the process.

Another risk-taker, rather surprisingly, was the low-visibility UUP leader, James Molyneaux.

Major constantly warned Dublin that the Joint Declaration would fail, like its predecessors, if the Unionists came out against it. He warned that it was completely erroneous to think that the British Government could “deliver” the Unionists while Dublin “delivered” the nationalists.

The Declaration had to spell out that the status of the North could not be changed without the consent of the people of the North. It had to address the need to change the Irish Constitution. Major adamantly rejected the suggestion in early drafts that the British Government could become “persuaders” for a united Ireland. This was a position which the British Labour Party had adopted in 1981, and from which Tony Blair was later to unhook it. It would have guaranteed Unionist rejection.

It was certain that Ian Paisley and the DUP would oppose the Declaration. Despite that, Major made a point of giving Paisley a hearing whenever he requested one. Their personal relations were surprisingly friendly.

But the crucial position was that of the Ulster Unionist party, then in the majority. In 1985 the UUP had not been consulted, and their leader, Jim Molyneaux, had lined up with Paisley in a joint “Call to Action” against what they called a “blueprint for an All-Ireland”.

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John Major knew that Molyneaux could not afford to be seen in open consultation with him on the draft Declaration. He would have had to take a text back to his colleagues, who would have published the bits they didn’t like and shot it down.

Instead he held private meetings with Molyneaux to keep him abreast of the process and test out language without – by mutual consent – handing over text. They developed what we called a “non-expostulation” test. If a passage passed without Jim expostulating, we could reckon that the UUP could live with it.

James Molyneaux was as good as his word. Ian Paisley denounced the text before he had even seen it. Molyneaux came under heavy pressure to do likewise, but he held his party in line and eventually steered them towards it. That was brave leadership. He used up his political capital to make peace, as David Trimble was to do at a later stage.

The Downing Street Declaration of 15 December 1993 led eventually to paramilitary ceasefires in the autumn of 1994 and then to over a year of peace but increasingly fraught negotiation with Sinn Fein before the IRA reverted to violence in February 1996.

4. The End of the IRA Ceasefire

I should say something about the end of the ceasefire.

One version of why it broke down is that the British Government – now dependent on Unionists for its Commons majority - had misled Sinn Fein and deliberately delayed its entry into all-party talks, by introducing a

Mayhew had said that “there must be a willingness in principle to disarm progressively”, agreement on how this was to be done, and a start to the process as a “tangible confidence-building measure”. This was represented, or, rather grossly misrepresented, as a demand that the IRA should make a humiliating surrender of its weapons before talks.

Ironically, Mayhew’s position was attacked by the Unionists as a capitulation to the IRA.

Let me give the Downing Street view.

Self-evidently, possession of unlicensed arms and explosives is incompatible with the democratic process. The IRA had not declared a permanent end to their armed struggle. Their paramilitary organisation remained very actively in being, carrying out so-called punishment beatings and reconnoitring targets.

Neither the British Government nor the constitutional parties – and Seamus Mallon of the SDLP was as strong on decommissioning as anyone – could tolerate a negotiation in which Sinn Fein could threaten a return to violence if it didn’t get its way.

The Unionists, in particular, were simply not going to sit down with Sinn Fein without some clearer evidence of a real commitment.
There was nothing new in the position that Mayhew had set out in Washington.

The 1993 Downing Street Declaration had required a “commitment to exclusively peaceful methods.”

On the following day, the Irish Deputy Prime Minister, Dick Spring, had told the Dail:

“We are talking about the handing up of arms and are insisting that it would not be simply a temporary cessation of violence... There can be no equivocation in relation to the determination of both Governments in that regard.”

Spring later repeated that “There will have to be a verification of the handing over of arms.”

John Major had made the same point, in public and in private, including to John Hume.

Decommissioning was clearly on the agenda. How and in what circumstances it was to be done was for discussion. But Sinn Fein simply refused to discuss the subject. When proposals were tabled in the Government’s talks with them, the Sinn Fein representatives would not take them off the table.

The two Governments worked together on possible ways in which decommissioning could be handled, leading to the announcement in December 1995 by John Major and John Bruton of the International
Decommissioning Commission under George Mitchell. Sadly, the Commission was too late. The IRA had by then decided to end the ceasefire.

I believe the point was well understood by Provisional leaders: indeed, Martin McGuinness reportedly told an Irish official that “we know the guns will have to be banjaxed.”

The fundamental problem was that the Provisionals were split.

The Canary Wharf attack of 9 February 1996 and the bombings which followed showed that the Sinn Fein leadership did not, at that time, have sufficient control to carry the whole republican movement into the democratic process.

The end of the ceasefire was a massive blow to ordinary people in Northern Ireland. Notwithstanding Sinn Fein’s attempts to lay the blame on the British government, it showed how little support there was for a return to armed conflict. The bombings only reinforced the view of both Governments that Sinn Fein could not take part in talks while using or threatening violence. John Bruton declared in the Dail on 13 February:

“Killing is not an acceptable passport to negotiations. A government cannot allow murder, or the threat of murder, to set the political agenda.”

The bombings of 1996 proved the need for progress towards decommissioning. Thanks to the patient and heroic efforts of George Mitchell and General John de Chastelain, this eventually happened.
It took time and tragically it cost more lives to achieve, but without it the process could not have succeeded.

5. The American Dimension: Opening Both Eyes

Time does not permit me to say much about the American dimension. Whole books have been written on how the United States delivered peace in Northern Ireland.

Here, too, history was a problem.

As David Bleakley put it (in his book “Peace in Ireland”):

“In America ... the intellectual benchmark for Irish debate is too often fixed in the famine period of the 1840s.”

John Major was stumped for an answer when asked by a Congressman what he was doing about “the enclosures”.

America was seen by Unionists as aligned against them, and far too indulgent of the IRA’s terrorist campaign – and not without reason. Some IRA members, convicted or indicted on charges of terrorism, had found safe haven there. The US authorities had not prevented open fund-raising for the IRA and the supply of guns and explosives (including by a notorious crime boss in Boston, “Whitey” Bulger, who is now serving life terms for 11 murders.)
To attract the votes of Irish Americans in the 1992 election campaign, candidate Clinton had announced that he would appoint a peace envoy to sort out Northern Ireland, had supported the “MacBride Principles” (a campaign for disinvestment in Northern Ireland) and had criticised the security forces in the North.

Once elected, Clinton retreated from this position. In its first year in office, his Administration was barely involved in Irish affairs. I struggle to recall the subject even coming up in the many conversations between Downing Street and the White House in the course of 1993. We were much more preoccupied with Bosnia, the Middle East and multilateral trade negotiations.

In general, the Clinton Administration was friendly, open to debate, and on many key issues was a tremendous force for good in the world.

However it was not always easy to deal with, because of the President’s tendency to flip his position at the blink of an eyelid, or perhaps the sight of a lobbyist. The Administration’s stance on Bosnia shifted this way and that, before the late Richard Holbrooke took a grip of it, joined up with the Europeans and the Russians, and led a united front into the 1995 Dayton Accords. Clinton worked very hard for free trade and personally drove the NAFTA Agreement through Congress in 1993; but the Administration stood on its head in 1999 (a pre-election year) and torpedoed the WTO’s Seattle summit.

So it was on Northern Ireland. We could agree a position one day, and discover on the next that the White House was pointing the other way.
Struggling to explain one of these flips to the Prime Minister, the US Ambassador, the late and very straight Admiral Bill Crowe, memorably said: “The trouble with the White House…is that the right hand…don’t know …what the right hand is doin’!”

Our task was to harness the American force for good, to secure support from the White House for what we and the Irish Government were trying to achieve, and to use that support as one of the instruments to press and incentivise the Provisionals to give up violence.

The Clinton Administration had come in with a one-eyed stance on Northern Ireland, and little understanding of its complexity. We worked hard to open the other eye. We needed the USA to be a help, not a hindrance.

We had not needed American help over the Joint Declaration, but we were happy to see the Administration list it as one of its major foreign policy successes of 1993.

We did want help over the cessation of violence. There were a couple of famous occasions before and during the ceasefire on which we sharply and publicly disagreed over tactics; but overall the Clinton Administration came good.

They collaborated on conferences for US investors in Belfast and Washington.

They opened up to the Unionists, with the leaders of the UUP and DUP for the first time being treated even-handedly by the White House.
Clinton applied his huge political skills to an unequivocal message for peace when he visited Northern Ireland in December 1995.

Most crucially, the United States lent us George Mitchell, who stuck doggedly to his task for six years.

**Conclusion**

To conclude:

Any notion of “enmity” between Britain and Ireland was put way in the past when The Queen was welcomed in the Republic in 2011 and President Higgins came here two years ago. 89 years from Partition, we had reached what Enda Kenny called the “conclusion of centuries of division.” Our relations had at last become “normal”.

I also believe that the notion of enmity between the Republic and the majority community in the North is on the way out. Historical fears are being laid to rest.

I do not believe that the conflict within Northern Ireland will ever resume in its previous form. There are still small groups of irreconcilables prepared to use criminal violence for criminal ends. There are still acute tensions around power-sharing, and the political process has been erratic and unstable. But nearly two decades without armed struggle, two decades of relative peace, have had a transformative effect.
Take the example of the City of Newry, on the borders of the North and the Republic and also of South Armagh and County Down.

Newry was an IRA stronghold. One of the remarkable events of 1995 was seeing John Major able to walk the streets of Newry to the warmest of greetings from ordinary people.

Newry has since flourished as a centre, not of terrorism, but of cross-border trade. Between 1996 and 2006, house prices there rose more rapidly than in any other town in the UK, by 371%. Unemployment fell from 26% in 1991 to 2% in 2005.

Peace, however, has yet to bridge the divide between the communities.

As Sir George Quigley observed, the Good Friday Agreement required “enforced fraternity at the top while there was a serious lack of fraternity at the base.”

The Troubles caused a massive population movement and drove mixed communities apart, and the process of segregation has continued since 1998. New “peace walls” have been built since then. Over 90% of pupils are still in denominational schools.

Having led the Ulster Unionists into Partition in a highly confrontational way, Sir Edward Carson called on the future Parliament of Northern Ireland to show: “a tolerance, a fairness and a justice towards all classes and toward all religions of the community. They must forget faction and section...”
Sadly, that precept was not followed.

The “Peace Process” is far from over. It will not have succeeded while sectarianism remains. The desegregation of Northern Ireland cannot be done from outside.

It is a slow and challenging task for the people of the North over the next generation, but in conditions of peace it is doable.