BDOHP Biographical Details and Interview Index

LOGAN, Sir David Brian Carleton (born 11 August 1943)
KCMG 2000 (CMG 1991)

Career (with, on right, relevant pages in interview)

Joined Foreign Office, 1965 pp 2-3
Language training Istanbul and 3rd Secretary, Ankara, 1965–70 pp 3-15
FCO, Defence and Intelligence department, 1970 pp 15-17
Private Secretary to Under Secretary for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs [Anthony Royle], 1970–73 pp 17-24
First Secretary, 1972 -
FCO, Personnel Operations Department, 1977–80 pp 30-37
FCO, Assistant to Defence Department, 1980-82 pp 37-45
Counsellor, Head of Chancery and Consul-General, Oslo, 1982–86 pp 45-48
FCO, Head of Personnel Operations Department, 1986–88 pp 48-50
Senior Associate Member, St Antony’s College, Oxford, 1988–89 pp 50-51
Minister and Deputy Head of Mission, Moscow, 1989–92 pp 51-57
FCO, Assistant Under Secretary (Central and Eastern Europe), 1992–94 pp 57-62
FCO, Assistant Under Secretary (Defence Policy), 1994–95 pp 62-67
Minister, Washington, 1995–97 pp 68-71
Ambassador to Turkey, 1997–2001 pp 71-77
Today is 9 March 2017. This is the first interview with Sir David Logan for the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, Catherine Manning recording.

CM: David, we’re going to start in 1965 when you joined the Foreign Office. The very first question I want to ask is what made you think of the Foreign Office as a career?

DL: In those days many people, probably mistakenly, but I was one of them, thought that commerce or business wasn’t the thing. I didn’t want to sell toothpaste and I was seriously interested in public service. I think a lot of my friends and contemporaries at university applied for the BBC or the civil service or something similar and public service was the driving force. I did this straight out of university, where I had read Greats at University College, Oxford. I didn’t really consider the Home Civil Service very seriously and I’m not sure why. When you went through this process then, they asked you what departments you were interested in and I did say, I think, the Treasury. Taking the civil service exam was slightly fraught to start with. In those days it was a three stage process. The first stage was called the qualifying test, for which you turned up at a building belonging to the Civil Service in Savile Row. I was directed into a room and I sat down and looked round. In the room were a lot of people who seemed to be quite a lot older than me; they were entirely men and a lot of them had moustaches. I thought this was strange. I spoke to one of them, and he said, ‘This is an exam for civil airline pilots.’ I left that room rather quickly. I got through the second stage and was told that I could go to the Final Selection Board for the Foreign Office or a Clerkship of the House of Commons. I wasn’t interested in that. So it was the Foreign Office and I joined in 1965.

I was sent to a department called Central Department. Central Department once might indeed have dealt with the central countries of Europe, like France and Germany, but by then they had all generated their own, more specialised, departments. So Central Department dealt with the non-central countries of Western Europe, namely Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Scandinavia and Portugal, Spain and Gibraltar. I found myself in the Turkey, Greece &
Cyprus Section and I was given to read the volumes of the official diplomatic history that were due to be published before long, covering the early years of the twentieth century. My task was to see if there was anything which was likely to offend the Greeks or the Turks. My knowledge of what was likely to offend the Greeks ended in about 404 BC and I had no idea of what would offend the Turks.

CM: I can see that you went abroad for language training after only a month in Central Department. Did you have any training at all?

DL: There was an induction course which lasted for two weeks. It was run by a wonderful man called Sir David Scott who had retired many years before. He was famous in the Foreign Office for having been the first person, in the Thirties, to wear a soft collar. By the 1960s he was wearing his suit and his soft collar and had moved on to sneakers instead of leather shoes. I can’t remember much about the course, but there was a stage when the High Commissioner of what was called Ceylon in those days came to lecture us on the Commonwealth. Sir David said, ‘For heavens’ sake, stay awake this time. It would be very disrespectful for you all to go to sleep again’. Of course, within five minutes, he’d fallen asleep. He was charming but our two weeks of training was distinctly basic. The Commonwealth Relations Office had just amalgamated with the Foreign Office and was connected by what was known as the “Hole in the Wall”. Since both Ministries had previously had departments dealing with Cyprus, there was a good deal of going and froing between the two. Much of the two weeks was spent trying to find the hole in the wall.

Then there was hard language training. No attention was given to whether you spoke European languages. This had been an entry requirement until the late Forties or early Fifties. However, this biased entry in favour of people who had enough money to go abroad after university to spend a year in France or Germany. So that was abolished and Language Aptitude Tests were introduced which were taken after entry. Quite rightly, these proved that I would be no good at learning difficult languages like Chinese or Japanese. Ewen Fergusson, who was in charge of us new entrants, was keen that I should learn Amharic. He’d been in Ethiopia and had a wonderful time. I thought it sounded terrific. Then he said that to learn Amharic you’d got to go to Manchester for two years. Here I was, just having arrived in London from Oxford, and the thought of two years in Manchester - I am afraid you’ll find a lot of unseriousness like this throughout my career - was too much. Then it
was either Persian or Turkish. I was a Classicist and there’s lots of ancient Greece and Rome in Turkey!

CM: Was there an element of choice or did they just go down the list and say you’re down for Turkey?

DL: Of course, the Service needed to generate the necessary number of speakers of a range of languages, but there was some choice. As I say, I was offered Amharic and then Farsi and Turkish. What I didn’t have at that stage was any idea - I couldn’t have cared less anyway - of what this meant in career terms. As it turned out, the people who learned Farsi and went on to work in Teheran could never go back later as ambassador because of the breakdown in relations after the fall of the Shah. So there was a generation of Farsi-speakers who could go to Kabul but whose careers were otherwise frustrated. On the other hand, if you learned Arabic, there was a big range of posts you could go. Some able Arabists, and other hard language specialists later moved over to Europe, because of the increasing importance of the European Union. But I suspect that few of us thought in terms of a future career structure at the outset.

I have no idea why I spent only a month in Central Department. I eventually took over from John Goulden in Ankara and he didn’t leave early. Going abroad after a month was unusual and I never acquired much of a collegiate sense with my fellow entrants at the time, as many of them did.

**Served Istanbul, Ankara and FCO, 1965–70**

To learn Turkish, I was directed towards SOAS, where I was told that I could study fifteenth-century Ottoman land tenure systems, but not Turkish. So I went to Istanbul to be taught by a wonderful teacher who had been found by Kieran Prendergast. Thirty years later, I awarded her an honorary MBE for her contribution to generations of Turkish linguists. I went to stay with a Turkish family. They were very nice. But the mother was English; they had small children and they were really only interested in the children learning English. So I found myself a flat in central Istanbul, in a spectacular position, about the size of this room, overlooking the Bosphorus and the Golden Horn, by now worth millions. In those days the thing to do was to build a block of luxury flats and then add what was called a çatkat, an illegal little flat on top which the authorities couldn’t see and from which you got extra income. That was my flat.
Turkish is quite hard. If you came down from Mars, you wouldn’t think it was a particularly difficult earth language, but it is alien for West Europeans. However, it has two great advantages, one is that it doesn’t require you to make any strange noises that anyone who can speak French can’t manage; and it is absolutely regular, unlike English. Moreover, because Turks introduced the European alphabet in the twenties, it is entirely phonetic. They coped with the problem we have in English of having to make lots of different sounds with only five vowels by introducing additional ones.

CM: Fifteen months sounds quite a generous time. I’m not sure if the Foreign Office nowadays would allow so long for language training.

DL: I’m sure they don’t. It was driven by John Goulden’s departure date. I must have taken the Higher exam well before I finished. With this amount of time to learn, even a non-linguist like me could pass Higher Turkish and persuade Turks that you were Turkish with an odd accent

CM: But fifteen months must also have given you wonderful experience and insight into the country and the people.

I hitchhiked all over the country. Turks are amazingly hospitable. It was extremely difficult to go anywhere and spend any money at all, because when you arrived anywhere at lunch time and went to a restaurant, someone would give you lunch and when you arrived in the evening, someone would say, ‘Come and stay.’ It was heart-warming. There was one occasion when I got bored with hitch-hiking. I was going to Afyon. I got on a train quite late in the evening and started talking to the man sitting opposite to me in the compartment and he said, ‘Come and stay the night.’ We got off the train in the middle of nowhere, and I stayed the night. It’s a part of Turkey where they have many hot springs and inevitably his village had a hamam. We went to the hamam and looked round the village. About the middle of the day I said, ‘I really ought to be getting on to Afyon. What time’s the next train?’ He said, ‘It’s the same time next week. You’ll stay, won’t you?’ So I walked. At least I walked part of the way - it was about forty kilometres - and then I was caught up by a man with a horse and cart who was taking his veg to market. We slept that night underneath the cart. That world has completely gone now. Even when we were in Ankara a year later and were whizzing across the Afyon plain in our MGB, we were covering in an hour and a half distances across that plain which the man with the veg had taken two days to cover in
order to take his vegetables to market. And of course I met Judith who was working in the
Consulate. That was the best of all. A very happy time.

CM: In 1977 you took up your job as Third Secretary in Chancery in Ankara. Did that seem a very different place from Istanbul?

DL: Yes, it’s New York-Washington. Ankara in those days was just a government city and pretty provincial, small and dusty, entirely different from Istanbul. In that sense it was a big change. It was so small; we had a flat in a three-storey house from which I could walk to work, past the President’s Palace and it would take fifteen minutes. But it was on a dirt track; it was actually off the end of the built up part of the town and it was the only house on the road. We had the top floor, which was lovely. Beneath us was an American colonel and on the ground floor - we hadn’t realised this at the time - was a brothel. We only discovered that later. Occasionally people would come banging on the door saying, ‘Where’s Fatima?’ It must have been quite classy being so close to the President’s Palace!

Atatürk, the great architect of the Turkish Republic had died in 1938. After the war Turkey established a multi-party democracy and had an election, the immediate result of which was that Atatürk’s party lost power to the Democrat Party, essentially the people whose successors are now in power as the AKP, the people whom Atatürk had left behind, if you like. The DP ruled until 1960, but they increasingly violated the constitution and suppressed freedom of speech. A familiar contemporary resonance here! In 1960 the military intervened. But after a year they handed power back to the civilians. In 1965 there was a general election in the framework of a new constitution which was won by the Justice Party, the successor to the DP as the representatives of the unmodernised majority. The military in Turkey – I hope I won’t turn out to be an apologist for them – regarded themselves as guardians of Atatürk’s reforms. They would intervene because they thought there had been a departure from Atatürk’s principles but then gave the ball back to a non-military parliamentary structure when they believed it was reasonable to do so. So there was never a military regime on the Latin American model, although the behind-the-scenes influence of the military was always strong. During our time in Ankara, Turkey had a liberal constitution, with all the right checks and balances (even if the military were in the background) and it was peaceful domestically
CM: Speaking to others who were trained as language speakers, it’s clear that even though they were the bottom of the heap as Third Secretaries, the interest in the job was considerable, because their language skills were so essential.

DL: Yes, absolutely right. You were paid more attention to, just for that reason. There were few other Turkish speakers. The Ambassador turned to you and asked, ‘What’s happening on this or that?’ The Third Room was me doing domestic politics and a wonderful woman called Margaret Mackie (who was a chain smoker and sadly died quite young) doing external. External in those days meant mainly Cyprus. I spent a lot of time in Parliament drinking tea with senators and members of Parliament and trying to meet as many Turks as I could, and travelling whenever possible. Because I could always say to the Ambassador that something deeply important was happening a long way away, I’d go off to the provinces and see what was happening. We went to every province then, usually in our battered old car, occasionally in an office Land Rover. Judith and I used to get away whenever we could together. There is a wonderfully romantic han in a place called Divriği which was quite hard to get to. We got stuck on a mountainside before we got there and had to spend the night in the car. There were wolves wandering round the car, which was faintly unnerving. The following morning some villagers appeared, about eight or ten of them, who lifted the car up and put it back on the road.

We had lots of good Turkish friends. In those days, other embassies tended, as they often do now, to talk only to each other or to Turkish foreign embassy groupies. But we didn’t, we had really good contacts. I think only the Americans, with whom we got on very well, did as well.

We were friends with Rauf Denktaş, who was tremendously popular in Cyprus. But the Turks regarded him as a troublemaker and he was not allowed to leave Ankara. This was the period when the Greek Cypriots had driven the Turkish Cypriots into enclaves. We hear a lot about the awful things about the Turks did later, which is of course true, but at this point the Greeks had brought down the constitution, killed Turkish Cypriots and driven them into enclaves. Rauf used to come and have supper with us. He came round one night, just Judith and me, had supper at the kitchen table and at the end of the evening we said, ‘Bye, Rauf, good to see you. See you soon.’ He said, ‘See you again soon.’ However, he had made arrangements to escape from Ankara, get down to the south coast and get a fishing boat over to Cyprus. So he disappeared that night. The following morning I got a call from the
Turkish Foreign Ministry, who apparently knew we knew him, and they said, ‘You haven’t seen Rauf Denktas by any chance, have you?’ So I said, ‘Yes, he came to supper last night.’ They said, ‘He didn’t say where he was going, did he?’

Rauf Denktas, you probably know, was almost as wide as he was high, deeply unfit. At a certain point the captain of the fishing boat said, ‘Right, Rauf, you go over the side and row from here.’ Rauf said he couldn’t possibly row from here. They were still two miles off shore. So more lira changed hands and a mile offshore the captain said, ‘This really is it. Off you go.’ Rauf got into a little dinghy and rowed and rowed to where he thought were the Turkish Cypriots. But he rowed straight into a Greek Cypriot patrol and was arrested on the spot. He was very lucky, I think, not to get murdered, because that would have solved a lot of the Greek Cypriots’ problems. Anyway, he wasn’t. He was arrested and put in prison.

Denktas was a sort of Ian Paisley, if you like, a hard line extremist who frustrated progress later, but was a tremendously popular Turkish Cypriot nationalist.

CM: Cyprus must have been one of the biggest issues of the day. Did it affect bi-lateral relations between Britain and Turkey?

DL: Yes, because Britain is a guarantor power of the Cyprus constitution which had been adopted on Independence in 1960, so not long before the time I’m speaking of, along with Turkey and Greece. Violations of the constitution entitled intervention by the guarantor powers. That was the justification that the Turks used in ’74 when they invaded. Of course, the constitution also says that in such circumstances a guarantor power has to restore the status quo ante, not that they can stay there forever, as the Turks have done since 1974. However, as I say, in the 1960s the situation was serious because the Greek Cypriots had within two years of its adoption effectively brought down the constitution which was intended to ensure careful balance between the two sides.

CM: What did the Turks think about the British as guarantors? That we should do more? That we were on the Greeks’ side?

DL: Probably, but I’d like to think the Greeks thought we were on the Turks’ side. Later on, David Hannay devoted much time and effort to the Cyprus problem. He was unbiased, independent and single-minded: both the Greeks and the Turks always regarded him as on the other’s side.

CM: Did the Cyprus issue affect your work and your relations with the Turks?
DL: Not much, though there was what you might call collateral. I remember walking out of the Embassy at lunch time one day – those were the days – and was stopped by the security guard, who said, ‘There’s a phone call, David. Would you take it?’ On the line a voice said, ‘This is the Base Commander at Akrotiri. I’ve got Turkish fighters in my airspace and if they’re not out of here in fifteen minutes, we’re going to shoot them down.’ I said, ‘You can’t do that. It’s lunchtime. Could you wait a bit?’ Many, many years later I met a retired Turkish Air Force General who said, ‘Yes, it was a great game. We’d got better kit than you had on the base and we could get out of the way’.

There was a small war between Turkey and Greece while we were there, over a Turkish oil-prospecting ship which the Greeks thought was operating in their territorial waters. We all had to put brown paper over our windows, turn car lights off etc., because it was thought that a Greek bomber could just about get to Ankara (but not get back again!) We were close enough to the President’s Palace for them to put up an anti-aircraft battery in our yard. It was a bit like having the builders in. They had nothing to do and Judith had to take them out cups of tea. The crisis was defused by the Americans by means of what came to be known as shuttle diplomacy. It must have been one of the first examples of that. Cyrus Vance, who was then the Under Secretary for Defense, shuttled between Ankara, Athens and Nicosia for a couple of weeks, building on a very small base of common ground. Eventually a solution was agreed. This process, typically conducted by the Americans, of course became much more common later. I remember being tremendously impressed at what Vance had achieved.

There was a larger than life American Ambassador, called Bob Komer, who also later became Under Secretary for Defense. He was known as Blowtorch Bob. I could be walking along - from our flat to our office you had to walk past the American Embassy as well as the President’s Palace, and he’d lean out of his car and say, ‘Jump in, David, I’m going down to the Foreign Ministry.’ I would say, ‘Don’t you think you should take somebody from your own Embassy, Ambassador?’ When war broke out, he had a Jeep and wore khaki instead of using his Cadillac.

The American presence was extremely visible, which I suppose must have been replicated in many countries in those days and now seems extraordinarily heavy-handed. There were American bases in different parts of Turkey with signs over the entrance saying things like ‘Defending the freedom of the Western World’. In Ankara there was a cinema on a main
street which was simply for Americans and an office called JUSMMAT (Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey) occupying a five-storey building in a very prominent place. It was simply the Americans’ administrative base, but sited as if in the middle of London. This high profile was inevitably resented by most Turks.

In June 1964 President Johnson wrote to the then Turkish Prime Minister a letter saying in effect ‘Keep out of Cyprus’. The ‘Johnson letter’ became a focus for anti-American feeling, aggravating the effect of their big military presence. Turkey was quite a left-wing country, and certainly anti-imperialist. There were demonstrations from time to time. In 1969 the then American Ambassador went to speak at the Middle East Technical University. While he was there his car was set on fire by students. I know some twenty Turks who said, ‘I did that.’ They can’t all have done so, but setting set fire to the American Ambassador’s car was certainly good for your political credentials.

CM: Now we think a lot about the Kurdish element in Turkish politics. Did you visit the Kurdish parts of the country?

DL: Yes, and what is so extraordinary is that it barely occurred to me that they were Kurds. They were known as Mountain Turks. The words Kurd and Kurdish weren’t used. There was a banned Kurdish language. But surprisingly, indeed shockingly, I don’t recall this striking me as odd or interesting. Atatürk had betrayed the Kurds in the Thirties. He recruited them in the fight against imperialists, and having used them, suppressed them. Atatürk was a towering figure, but also ruthless. However, like the people who are now in power, whose grandparents were poor, ignorant, powerless peasants, Kurds in the twenty first century too can prosper too. If you are a Turkish Kurd, as long as you don’t say, ‘I support an independent Kurdistan,’ you can succeed in most walks of life. There was a Kurdish Foreign Minister of Turkey; currently a Kurdish Deputy Prime Minister; business success stories; and Kurdish millionaires. But the passage of time and development which has achieved this has also strengthened resentment of the nationalist state which recognises no one who is not a Turk as a citizen of Turkey. This has led to the years of violence between Turks and Kurds and loss of thousands of lives to which there is, of course, no military solution.

Atatürk wrenched the country into the twentieth century but he did so in a dictatorial manner, with results which were often admirable but sometimes were not. The disestablishment of religion was achieved in a way which made Turkey the most aggressively secularist country
in the world, even by comparison with France. Even now in theory at least, a group of more than three people are not allowed to get together to discuss religion without a licence. Until recently, you were not allowed to wear a headscarf in school or university or to pray in working hours in the office, if you were a state employee. The deep state – the Turks originated the phrase ‘the deep state’ - was secularist, so all institutions were secular. No one wore headscarves in the 1960s. You’d see women in the fields with their heads covered, because that protected you from the sun, but they were not covered for religious reasons. All the men wore cloth caps, because this is what Atatürk told them to do, so it looked like Britain in the Thirties.

CM: And the people you were friendly with, who came to dinner were absolutely secularist?

DL: Absolutely. Secularist, well educated. None of them would have known what happened in a mosque. It was deeply uncool to go to a mosque. They were brought up effectively as atheists. And they drank and might even eat pork. These children of Atatürk regarded themselves as missionaries for the future of the country. If you were a doctor, the first job you had was in the east, because poor and ignorant people there needed hospitals and clinics. If you were a teacher, you went east to bring enlightenment to the country and turn it into a modern society. There was a terrific sense of mission. This was a new republic, a new country. Retrospectively, it looks almost colonialist, these missionaries of modernism going off to bring the country into the twentieth century. But we certainly didn’t see it that way in those days. On the contrary it was inspiring. The Ottoman Empire was something modern Turks didn’t want to think about: it was cosmopolitan (a term used pejoratively), corrupt and old-fashioned. Everyone threw away their lovely old Ottoman furniture and ornaments, because everything had to be western and modern. You can see how alien these people, people we loved and admired, must have seemed to the people they went to “civilize”. Atatürk, this is a joke really, but when he was busy reforming everything, including making Islam a department of state, said, ‘In churches they have seats, pews, so much more comfortable than standing around like we do in mosques. Couldn’t we have pews? And what about music?’ He was told he would have a revolution on his hands if he went down that track. But he did get as far as having the muezzin calls made in Turkish, though that was changed back to Arabic after his death.

Going forward, I’d like to tell a story to illustrate the drive for secularism in those days. There was a prominent Turkish diplomat called Ilter Türkmen who was their Ambassador to
the United Nations, Permanent Secretary etc. During the period the Army were in power in 1980, there was a technocrat government. Ilter was made Foreign Minister. The Turks decided to try to mediate in the Iran-Iraq War. So Ilter went off to Teheran with his team to see the Ayatollah. They were told that the Ayatollah was in Homs. They got to Homs and found the Ayatollah praying in a tent. The Ayatollah said, ‘Do you come in the name of Allah?’ Ilter said, ‘I come in the name of the Republic of Turkey.’ The Ayatollah said, ‘I think we’d better pray.’ Ilter looked round at his crew and said, ‘Does anyone here have any idea what to do?’ One of them said that he had once been to a mosque with his grandparents and others said they’d seen people praying in films. So Ilter said, ‘Anyone who knows what to do stand in front and the rest of us will copy what you’re doing.’ This went on for two hours at the end of which they were allowed to get on with discussions. They got back home and Ilter said, ‘We really need to improve our religious credentials. We’d better do the haj before the next round of talks.’ The Turkish Foreign Service Association entered a formal protest, saying this was a violation of the rights of its members, freedom of thought and so on. The members of his team said that their friends would never talk to them again and their spouses might divorce them. But Ilter insisted. So they had to find someone who had some idea what to do once they got there, because the Turkish Embassy in Riyadh certainly didn’t. They got in touch with the Pakistani Ambassador who said, ‘As it happens, I have a new Defence Attaché who’d quite like to do the haj, so he’ll take you all round.’ So they went round with the Pakistani Defence Attaché who said, ‘Do exactly what I do, because you’ll get lynched if you’re not taking this seriously. Afterwards, we’ll go back to my house. I’ve got some really good 15 year old Scotch in and we’ll have a nice drink.’ I’m sure the Iranians must have been impressed!

We went back in 1997. What struck you then was that what had seemed in the 1960s like a democratic political framework now seemed very old fashioned because in Western Europe we’d all become pluralist, individualistic, with rights of this kind and that, and political parties were participatory. But in Turkey the State ran everything. The French use the term, don’t they, les administrés? We administer them; we’re not the people’s servants. So it looked very heavy handed and dirigiste and, of course, it was. The methods used by those secularist governments were in some ways as oppressive and harsh as those used by the current regime. They maintained control in ways which was unacceptable. It was striking to go back after thirty years and see that what had once appeared rather wonderful, had failed to maintain the process of development.
CM: When you were first there, was there an opposition that you were in contact with?

DL: Oh, yes, Turkey has never been that sort of country! When we were there, the opposition was the People’s Republican Party, the party of Atatürk. As I’ve mentioned, there had been an election in 1965 which had been won, not by them, but by its opponents who represented the majority of people, those who had been left behind by his reforms. But until the 1990s these parties were generally careful to operate within the guidelines, spoken and unspoken, of the secularist establishment. However, as time passed, these people, the left behind, gradually became richer, empowered, and educated. Eventually a party was founded by the present President Erdoğan which said that its objective was to join the European Union, and that while it was conservative and devout, it was also secularist and democratic, not Islamist.

Unlike other Turkish parties, AKP activists went out and worked with people. Turkey has a proportional representation system in which the party central offices simply nominate parliamentary candidates. So unlike in the U.K., where the constituency chooses its candidate, the candidate’s connection with the people he or she represents is often slight. In the case of the secularist parties, the MPs often barely left Ankara. These new people, on the contrary, tramped the streets of slums and suburbs, ‘Can we help? What do you need? Can we help with your housing, with your children’s schooling?’ in a way which was entirely new to Turkey. They were swept to power in 2002, and part of today’s problem is that the old secularist parties have never caught up. They’ve never understood what is required of them to win support on the streets and it is an important reason why they’re ineffective.

Gradually, the strikingly secularist provisions of Turkish law, for example on headscarves and praying, have been relaxed, in some cases in highly charged circumstances. At one stage the European Court of Human Rights turned down an application by the Turkish government to allow people to wear headscarves in schools. Now it is commonplace. I don’t believe that Turkey is going to become an Islamic state, but Erdoğan, who is primarily interested in remaining in power, knows that religion has resonance with his supporters. The question of how the secularist elite handle the new reality of their displacement from power is a very interesting story. Do you continue to resist or do you somehow rebalance?

CM: What about inward visits to Turkey when you were there?

DL: It’s interesting how things have changed. The Foreign Secretary had come just before we got there, in 1965 (I think) and there was a state visit by the Queen, immediately after
we’d left. I can think of only a single ministerial visit while we were there. That is a very striking contrast with today. In the late 60s, Turkey was relatively unimportant and the region was frozen into stability by the Cold War. The Turks barely spoke to the Arabs or the Israelis, so the Middle East situation in the traditional sense didn’t have much impact in Turkey.

In the opposite direction, the President of the day paid a visit to the U.K. in 1967. He was a retired general with a rather homely wife. Prince Philip sat next to her at the Embassy’s banquet. I have a friend who was in those days a junior member of the Turkish Embassy. He was given the task of being the interpreter; he sat behind. The Duke asked my friend, ‘What does she like to talk about?’ He said, ‘You could try asking about her family, or maybe cooking.’ So the Duke of Edinburgh asked all the right questions and after a time he noticed that my friend and Mrs Sunay were conducting a conversation without involving him. The Duke asked, ‘What’s all this about?’ and my friend said, ‘It’s so boring that I thought I could just do this without bothering to translate it to you.’

I said that Ankara was a small town, a small community and that was really nice. İltür Türkmen, whom I mentioned just now, was then the Head of Department dealing with Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, by my standards a pretty important official. Joanna was born and his lovely wife appears with flowers for Judith in our flat. Can you imagine the wife of the Head of Southern European Department going to see the wife of the Third Secretary in the Turkish Embassy in London like that?

CM: And inside the Embassy itself, did you have a nice Ambassador?

DL: No, I was very unlucky to miss Denis Allen, who was there when I was a language student, and who was terrific. He had been offered the job of High Commissioner to Delhi, but had turned it down, because he didn’t want to be far away from his elderly parents. He was succeeded, rather confusingly, by Roger Allen, who’d been a Deputy Secretary in the Foreign Office and had had a row with George Brown. They’d both allegedly been at a dinner at the Iranian Ambassador’s house, and George Brown had got drunk and said, ‘It’s because of shits like Allen that we have such lousy relations with you.’ That was the end of his job as a DUS and he was sent off to Ankara. He was just dull; though he did think I was a communist and had to be dissuaded by the Head of Chancery from writing to Security Department about me. Eventually, he was succeeded by Roderick Sarell, who was interested in partying. Those were the days when you had to stay until the Ambassador left his own
parties. You’d get home at who knows what time and stagger in to work the following
morning. These parties were a great success with the Turks; it was just his wretched staff
who couldn’t keep up.

I should have said something about NATO and CENTO (the Central Treaty Organisation).
This was the Cold War, and the Soviet Union was just over the border. The concept of
containment of the Soviets involved NATO defending the western and south western flanks
of Western Europe and CENTO defending the south eastern and eastern flanks. CENTO’s
members were the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Its headquarters were in
Ankara. CENTO is footnote in history because it was never really credible. By the ‘60s it
was already sufficiently far downhill that the Brits and probably the other member states sent
officers and officials whom they didn’t know what to do with off to work at CENTO. The
Embassy had assorted people with a lot of gold braid who were perfectly jolly but ... NATO
of course was serious and Turkey was its southern flank. We had relatively senior attachés
for that reason.

**FCO, Defence and Intelligence department, 1970**

CM: We’ve just had a short break and we are now in 1970 when you came back to London,
your first time proper in the Foreign Office.

DL: Yes, I worked for a short time liaising with an intelligence agency and then as Private
Secretary to an FCO Minister. For the first of these, I was based in Century House, an ugly
concrete construction where however everything worked, unlike the Foreign Office in those
days. Even better, it was in The Cut. Unlike boring Whitehall, here was real life - lots of
nice pubs, and a vibrant market. It was supposed to be secret, of course, but the bus
conductors were alleged to say ‘Cloaks and daggers alight here,’ at the bus stop. The
Russians of course knew where it was, and in the entrance hall there was a notice which told
you which pubs the Russians were patronising each week. The theory was that the Russians
pursued you to the pub in case they could overhear you saying something deeply secret.
However, they were always at the pub you had been at the week before, so you had to keep
ahead! For ‘cover’ Century House had a petrol station at street level. I’m surprised that the
IRA never put a bomb into it. Perhaps the petrol pump attendants were intelligence agents in
disguise.
I was about bottom of the heap in the department. My contact in the Foreign Office was the Deputy Secretary for Defence & Intelligence, so someone terribly grand for me in 1970. He was a lovely man called Ted Peck. Ted had been posted in Ankara. I called on him my first day and sat down in front of his desk. Ted said, ‘David, you realise that these issues we’re going to deal with are of deep sensitivity and national importance’. ‘Yes, Ted, I understand that.’ He said, ‘I think to make things particularly secure, we should have all our conversation in Turkish.’ Gulping hard, I said, ‘Fine, Ted.’ It wasn’t until our third meeting that he said, ‘Didn’t you realise I was pulling your leg?’ I have very warm memories of Ted, a distinguished and delightful public servant.

Our purpose was to act as liaison, transmission belt and clearing house for proposed operations. If an operation needed to be cleared politically, the Ted Peck of the day would put a submission to the Foreign Secretary saying that the proposed operation was in the national interest, could not be achieved in any other way, and should therefore be authorised. Before that point was reached, we would discuss the proposal with its initiators. If we were convinced by it, we turned the proposal into a form suitable for the FCO and sent it to the DUS. We worked in the same offices as the agency, understood each other, talked things through, and developed mutual confidence. But it worked, I think, as a matter of loyalty and commitment to shared national interest rather than because we could guarantee to the Foreign Office the significance to the national interest or the claimed level of risk in what was planned. All the facts of a proposal which we might consider relevant were not necessarily accessible to us. On the other hand, both sides had a strong interest in making the system work. If mutual confidence had broken down, the consequences could have been very serious. So I think a lot depended on respect and trust.

There was an even more junior member of the Department who one day didn’t come into work. We got worried. Here’s this Department dealing with the most sensitive secrets of state. So the head of department said, ‘David, see if you can find him in his flat.’ Judith came round in our Renault 4 and we drove off. He lived in a mansion flat in Wandsworth. I rang the bell. There was no reply, so I shinned up a drain pipe and peered in. There didn’t seem to be anyone there. Then I waited outside and eventually somebody from the block of flats opened the door and I dashed in after him. I banged on the door. No reply. Judith drove me back to Century House and I reported. The Head of department said, ‘We must inform the airports and ports immediately’. The following morning in he walked. Where had he been? The test match! I mention this in because of the striking contrast with the
recent case when the body of an SIS officer was discovered in a sports bag. No one reported his absence for three days. Even post-Cold War, that seems to reprehensible in the case of someone occupying a sensitive post such as he was.

Another lighter moment. Anguilla declared itself independent in 1970. It was taken over by a reggae king who became the Prime Minister. The radio station broadcast reggae all day. I was the junior member of the Psychological Warfare Committee. Our cunning plan was to jam the reggae and to broadcast Workers’ Playtime and the football results twenty four hours a day. That brought them down!

Private Secretary to Under Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1970–73

CM: You were then transported into another unusual role: you went to be the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary, Anthony Royle, a junior minister in the Foreign Office, without ever having worked in the Foreign Office before, apart from that one month when you began. What was it like?

DL: Yes, I never worked in a geographical department throughout my career apart from my one month in Central Department and at this point in 1970 I had never even worked in the Foreign Office apart from that month. I had only the haziest idea of how things worked, who was who, what colour paper was used for what etc.

All these people with grand titles came in and out. I had an assistant, who fortunately knew more than me. In those days, that Parliamentary Under Secretary’s office was next to the office of the Parliamentary Clerk, a significant job whose incumbent had to know a lot about the workings of the office overall because his Unit handled relations with Parliament and PQs. Mike Howell, who ran it, was very supportive. I was also given a lot of help by Robin Renwick. He was Private Secretary to a minister of state, first of all Joe Godber and latterly Geoffrey Rippon who was in charge of EU accession. Robin was of course tremendously competent, and also gave me much invaluable advice. The learning curve was quite steep, but it was quite short. I think I learnt how things worked fairly quickly.

Anthony Royle was terrific. He looked like a caricature of a rich Tory, which to some extent he was. He had always wanted to go into politics, but he thought he needed a lot of money first, which he made pretty quickly. He entered Parliament when he was thirty two. He had a glamorous wife who had been a model, called Shirley Worthington, a smart flat in Cadogan Square and a manor house in South Cerney. He lunched at White’s. All this was a bit
daunting to start with. He was what we would now call a social moderate and a financial
conservative. In the office, he was responsible for the Far East, which he knew well, and for
Europe as deputy to Rippon. He devoted a lot of time to Hong Kong, including, for example
the elimination of capital punishment there. He worked hard when he needed to, but if he felt
he’d got nothing to do on a Thursday evening, would say, ‘David, I’m off for the weekend.
Just call if there’s anything...’ And he’d appear again on Monday. He thought style was
very important. He used to take me to lunch at White’s occasionally and we’d walk out past
the office of Anthony Kershaw who was another Parliamentary Under Secretary. Anthony
would be sitting there eating a sandwich and my boss would say, ‘Anthony, you’ll never get
into the Cabinet, sitting there eating a sandwich for lunch.’ He spent dizzying amounts of
money on entertainment. A foreign dignitary would arrive, thirty people would be taken to
Annabel’s and I’d get a minute from the Chief Clerk saying, ‘Your Minister is only allowed
£10.00 per person and he has spent £250 (or whatever the figures were in those days). What
are you going to do about him?’

Anthony was very kind to me. He was a great friend of the Soames’, then in Paris. When
we went to Paris, we’d usually stay in the Embassy. Sometimes Anthony would say ‘We
don’t want to bother them. We’ll stay in the Bristol; you can stay too and I’ll pay’. Fast
forwarding, I don’t know how far he would have got in government, but he was a one nation
Tory and about the only thing that put him in a bad mood was coming back from a Cabinet
committee when he would say ‘That bloody woman’s done this; that bloody woman’s done
that.’ ‘That bloody woman’ was, of course, Mrs Thatcher. The moment she came to power,
he was booted out. He was made a peer and became Lord Fanshawe. Judith and I got on
very well with them and we used to go to dinners at their flat where one nation Tories would
sit round the table saying, ‘that bloody woman’.

I travelled with him on trips to the Far East and he always insisted on taking Shirley (another
row with the Chief Clerk ...) He would say ‘she can do things I can’t.’ I wouldn’t entirely
disagree, but can you imagine that these days?

In June 1972 I went with him on a visit to China. This was the first visit by a European
minister since the Cultural Revolution. The Vietnam War was still in progress. Off we went
in a VC10 with a large number of people, not just officials and journalists, but also, because
the RAF had no idea what was going to happen when we got there, an entire ground crew to
service the aircraft. The official who met Anthony was introduced to the pilot and said
‘You’re a very young man to be piloting such a big airplane’. That seemed to me very Chinese.

We were installed in a hotel which looked like a 1930s Cunard liner which had somehow got beached, with gloomy red flock wallpaper. Anthony’s counterpart was the Senior Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ch’iao Kuan Hua. He had been educated in Germany and was deeply impressive. Unlike the East Europeans at the time, with whom any discussion of Vietnam quickly became on their side a tirade about filthy capitalist dogs, this man was ready to talk in practical terms about the next steps. I can’t remember exactly how long we were there for, but discussions with him might have gone on for two whole days. He spoke without notes; he didn’t repeat himself; he didn’t contradict himself; he was tremendously fluent. It was really, really fascinating, mainly to be able to talk to a Communist who was prepared to be pragmatic, which the Eastern Europeans weren’t.

We went to call on the Governor of the Central Bank of China. It was lunch time and the entire Bank seemed to be playing ping pong, as recommended by Chairman Mao. Those were the days of discussion in Peking of the colour of traffic lights. Should red signify “go”? We went to the Forbidden City and the Great Wall. We were taken to an opera called The Red Detachment of Women. Bright lights, explosions, vivid colours. The red detachment of women was of course overthrowing the beastly landlords.

We also visited Eastern Europe, Bulgaria and Hungary for example, which were interesting, not so much for the discussions, but for what you saw. Hungary seemed the most detached from the Soviet Union, in spite of 1956, with something resembling a market economy. Bulgaria, on the other hand, seemed almost a caricature of a communist state, with hostile and uncommunicative interlocutors and people queuing at a shop for left shoes in the hope that they could buy the right one later on.

We went regularly to Strasbourg. The junior Europe Minister had to attend the Western European Union and the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assemblies. Neither of these was of much interest at that period (though later of course the Western European Union was used by France and separately the U.K. for their own political purposes). The British delegation to these assemblies consisted of parliamentarians in numbers proportional to their seats in Parliament. This was a Tory government, so the Tories had six or seven, Labour four or five and the Liberals one. The Liberal was Lord Gladwyn. Each delegation was allotted a car, so Lord Gladwyn had a car to himself; but the Tories had one car between seven. My job
seemed to consist of defusing rows with the Tories and Labour. ‘Why can’t we go with Gladwyn?’ Because, Gladwyn would say, ‘I’m the Liberal delegation and I don’t have to share.’

One more story typical of Anthony. These meetings took place in Strasbourg which was quite a difficult place to get to. You couldn’t fly directly from the UK. One option was to fly to Berne. On the road from Berne to Strasbourg, which took two and a half hours say, there was a three rosette Michelin restaurant at a place called Illhausern. We always lunched there on the way, paid for by Anthony. That was far the best thing about the Council of Europe.

He was extremely good at picking issues on which he would be given autonomy, which is important if you are a junior minister; otherwise you get squeezed out. As I mentioned, he knew a lot about the Far East, and particularly about Hong Kong, but there was also Brunei.

At this time the government had decided that Brunei, a colony, was an embarrassment, and should be decolonised. But the Bruneians liked things as they were. Negotiations took place in London and in Brunei. Anthony led for the U.K. and the Sultan, who was aged about 25, nominally led for Brunei. He had replaced his father, who had abdicated, but who was actually was still in charge. Both attended and were accompanied by British QCs who worked for them. They’d arrive in London and we’d sit on either side a long table. Anthony would say something and one of the QCs reply, ‘His Highness’s royal father takes the view that ...’ so the interlocutor was neither the Sultan nor his father. You spent a lot of time trying to work out what actually mattered to the Bruneians. In the end it was agreed that the British should devolve everything except defence and foreign policy. We went to Brunei, where these conversations continued. The Sultan’s Cabinet ministers consisted of Brits dressed in sandals and grass skirts. They were all called Dato this and Dato that. The Minister of Education was Dato Bumstead. We were taken out by the Bruneian Navy which consisted of a retired British Commander with three motor torpedo boats. At one stage the Commander said, ‘Make Smoke!’ A sailor at the stern stuck a marlin spike into a tank of oil and poured it into the gas turbines’ exhaust behind the boat where it caught fire. There was certainly a lot of smoke.

The Sultan was a great admirer of Churchill, and decided to build a Churchill Museum. Mary Soames was invited out to open it. I accompanied her all the way and she was absolutely charming to me, this junior Foreign Office official, on a long trip with a change in
Singapore. The museum was an ugly concrete building which the Sultan had filled with odd bits of Churchill memorabilia. It was opened with great ceremony by the Sultan, Mary and Anthony. It has now been pulled down.

Anthony was also in charge of the South Pacific, and we visited Fiji and Tonga. In those days, if you diverted from your route by 10% on long journeys, it didn’t cost any more. Anthony said to me, ‘I’ll go and stay for a few days in Geoffrey Rippon’s flat in Acapulco.’ Acapulco in those days was rather fashionable, unlike now. ‘You can go where you like and we will meet in Fiji.’ So I went and stayed with our best man, an American who lives in Michigan, spent a few days there, and then flew down to San Francisco, for the flight to Fiji. Fiji airport is in Nandi, four or five hours’ drive. I booked into the airport hotel. The following morning when Anthony was supposed to arrive, the Fijian Cabinet came out to meet him, headed by Ratu Mara, the Prime Minister and a rather distinguished Commonwealth figure. The plane landed and there was no Anthony. Of course, it was before mobile phones. I said, ‘I’m really sorry.’ The Cabinet got into their cars and drove five hours back to Suva. Anthony had simply missed the plane and arrived the following day. You can imagine, the Cabinet did not come out again to meet him. The visit was rather strained.

Then we went on to Tonga. The High Commissioner was called Humphrey Arthington-Davy, who’d been High Commissioner in more than one place like Tonga. He’d been given an official bicycle by the Foreign Office, not a car. The first day the King gave a picnic for Anthony. We all sat round on a big lawn under palm trees and ate bits of pig and tropical vegetables. I sat next to the Queen, who said, ‘I’m very worried about the King’s weight. I make him run up and down stairs in the palace with stones in his pockets. But he’s got a new Mini which he really can’t get into.’ It was delightful. Shirley came on this trip too and at one stage wanted to send some postcards. I found the Post Office. It was closed. The man in the shop next door said, ‘Ah, the Postmaster General is at a Cabinet meeting.’ He was also the postman.

A group of hippies had recently taken control of one of the King’s islands and established what they called the Republic of Minerva. The King was not at all happy about this. He’d got a navy which consisted of one or two motor boats. He had a brochure of missiles which he was planning to install on his motor boats to blow the Republic of Minerva out of the water. He said, ‘Don’t you think this would be a good one?’ We said, ‘Well, actually, your
Majesty, we really think that is not the best way to deal with the Republic of Minerva. Why don’t we go and talk to them and tell them this is not a good idea and that this island belongs to someone else.’ He said, ‘I think a missile’s the thing.’ In the end, of course, he didn’t buy a missile. I don’t remember what happened to the Republic of Minerva.

We went to Nepal where the East-West Highway in Nepal was being constructed by the Russians, the Americans and the British. Needless to say, the British bit was behind schedule and over budget; the rest had all been finished. Eventually, Anthony went to open the British section. We got to Kathmandu. We had some press people and others with us and we had to get to the place where the ribbon was to be cut by helicopter. There wasn’t room for everyone in the helicopter, so Anthony said ‘David, you go on with the baggage and one or two others and send the helicopter back.’ We got into the helicopter and the nice Australian pilot said, ‘I’ve only been here a week. Do you know where we’re going?’ I said, ‘Not really.’ He got a chart and I said, ‘That’s the place, there.’ It was in the south of Nepal which is jungle. We counted valleys going westward and eventually he said, ‘I haven’t got an awful lot more petrol. How far is it? We ought to stop and ask.’ We landed in a clearing apparently in the middle of nowhere. In no time at all we were surrounded by children and others. We said, ‘Which way to so and so?’ They said, ‘It’s just over there. Can’t miss it.’ So we took off again and landed where there were construction huts but it seemed to be deserted. We banged on a few doors, and eventually a man opened up. We said who we were and he said, ‘It’s great to see you. We’ve been in here sometime. We’ve finished the road. But we’ve been employing four hundred Nepalese women to plant grass on the verges, blade by blade as we go forward. But we’ve finished and they’re now they’re in uproar because they don’t want to stop; they want more money. But there are only ten of us and we had to lock ourselves in here.’ Anthony arrived by the next helicopter flight and cut the ribbon. Next stop was a Gurkha re-settlement Centre where Gurkhas were being taught how to grow apple trees. That was further north in lovely, rolling country. We landed on the side of a hill. We went round the centre and were shown everything. Then we wanted to leave, and the pilot said, ‘I can’t take off because the wind has gone round and is in the wrong direction’. The helicopter was on a ledge on the side of a hill. Twenty Gurkhas appeared, lifted up the helicopter and turned it round.

CM: I want to ask you about Europe, because this was the moment of our renewed application and negotiations to join the Common Market. Did that impinge?
DL: Yes, I ought to say something about that. As I mentioned, Anthony was the junior minister for Europe and he was tremendously pro-Europe.

During this period Anthony worked with someone called Geoffrey Tucker to coordinate the campaign in favour of EEC membership. Geoffrey Tucker was an advertising man, a famously successful networker and deeply pro-Europe who co-ordinated an extraordinarily disparate group of pro-Europeanists in every walk of life. Willie Whitelaw, and under him Anthony Royle, were in charge of government input. The purpose of the Tucker network was to achieve exactly what was not achieved with the Brexit referendum, namely to get public opinion on side in sectors of society where there was opposition. Anthony was not involved in the negotiations themselves. I very occasionally saw Heath, which was hard going. But Anthony Royle got on well with him, and particularly with Willie Whitelaw, who is in charge of the domestic opinion challenge at Cabinet level.

CM: Were you aware of anti-Europe feeling at the time? In 1974 most Conservatives were pro-European.

DL: No, I wasn’t, perhaps I should have been more perceptive. The very fact of the Geoffrey Tucker operation demonstrated that it was needed and I believe that the Tucker operation drove up the positive numbers by means which governments didn’t usually employ and which, I have been told, weren’t found on the files by their successors in 2016.

The IRA was active during this period. I remember walking down Whitehall one day when there was an explosion behind me. Another day in the office my assistant, Mark Forrester, got a call from the IRA saying the Foreign Office was going to be blown up in an hour’s time; get out. We had instructions that if you got a call from the IRA, you should keep them on the line, so that they could be located. I said to Mark, ‘Keep them on the line.’ But no one had told us how to do this. Mark said, ‘How’s the weather where you are? We are really having an exceptional day here.’ Not surprisingly, this conversation lasted for less than a minute. Then the Office had to be evacuated. It was a hoax.

We had a great group of friends who were our neighbours in Stockwell, some of whom we remain in touch with and some of whom became quite eminent. They included Virginia and Peter Bottomley. Anthony and Shirley Royle came to supper with us one evening. Peter and Virginia came too. Peter was already a prospective candidate by then. Anthony was Deputy Chairman of the party in charge of recruitment as well as a Foreign Office minister. He said
to Judith and Virginia, ‘We really need women in the party. Do either of you want to become MPs?’ Virginia said yes; the rest is history.

UK Mission to United Nations, 1973–77

CM: We’ve got to 1973 and you’ve had three fun years with Anthony Royle. Then you get a posting to UKMis New York, that is as First Secretary at the UN.

DL: We had two small children and we went by sea, on the France. The France was so big that when we were about half way across, Matthew said, ‘When are we going to get on this ship you told me about?’ The arrival by sea under the Verizzano Bridge is of course legendarily dramatic. We had a four bedroom flat at 350 East 57th Street. Fortunately for us, the rule was that if you dealt with Security Council issues you had to live in Manhattan, so that you could get to the UN quickly. The children couldn’t go to a state school because of the homicide rate in Manhattan. It was rougher in New York in those days. So they went to the Dalton School, a very good but also fashionable school where we think our children were admitted because they improved the ethnic minority statistics. Paul Newman used to arrive with his children. New York was of course a tremendously stimulating place to live.

The Ambassador was briefly Donald Maitland, until there was an election in February 1974 and Labour came to power. Labour in those days always appointed a politician as Permanent Representative to the UN with the rank of Minister in the government, as a mark of respect in which the Party held the UN. This time it was Ivor Richard who was terrific. As a former barrister, and Member of Parliament, he had a capacity for ex tempore debate much greater than most diplomats. He dominated the Security Council, and invariably came out on top in exchanges with the Soviet Permanent Representative, Troyanov. He was a very big man who didn’t read briefs with too much attention. You’d sit behind him in the Security Council and he’d intervene. At the end, he’d say, ‘Was that all right, David?’ ‘Yes, Ivor.’ He had great confrontations with Pat Moynihan, who was the American Permanent Representative. The New York Times quoted Ivor as saying to Pat, ‘This isn’t the OK Corral and you are not Wyatt Earp’. No career Ambassador could have risked public spats like this with his American counterpart.

During this period the CPRS (Central Policy Review Staff) was undertaking a review of foreign policy conduct (The Review of Overseas Representation). Ultimately, it was to recommend the abolition of the Diplomatic Service. Tessa Blackstone from the CPRS came
out to New York and spent a week with us as part of the Review. She was taken round by Jeremy Thomas, the Head of the Political Section. At the end Jeremy took her to see Ivor, to report on what she had seen. She said, ‘Ambassador, you’ve got very able staff. It’s a Rolls Royce operation. They represent British interests very effectively. However, it’s a waste of resources. They should be working at home on serious domestic issues’. Ivor said to Jeremy, ‘Get this woman out of my office, would you, Jeremy.’ Politically incorrect, and probably didn’t improve the report. But we all, women included, applauded then.

My routine job was to represent the UK in the First Committee which dealt with disarmament. The main aim for the British - and for the other nuclear weapon states - was to keep the United Nations out of this. We important people do the serious arms control stuff; we don’t want little countries telling us what to do. I also handled Cyprus in the Security Council and represented the U.K. in the Special Political Committee.

My first job on arrival in New York was in connection with Law of the Sea. A remarkable Maltese diplomat, Arvid Pardo, was committed to the prevention of the future exploitation of the sea in the manner in which the land had been colonised, exploited and polluted. The sea should be held in trust as the common heritage of mankind. Pardo’s vision gathered tremendous support. A Seabed Committee was established at the UN to prepare for a Conference on the Law of the Sea. The first round of this was held in a specially constructed conference centre in Caracas. The conference was vast by the standards of the day because delegations contained experts on every conceivable relevant issue: fisheries, maritime trade, the environment, meteorology, defence, seabed resources, maritime law, etc. The 200-strong American delegation notoriously spent more time coordinating internally than negotiating. The head the British delegation was Roger Jackling, previously Ambassador to Germany who had a very useful legal background, and was calm, acute and twinkly. I was there only for a short time as part of a hangover of the Seabed Committee, which was still writing the rules for the Conference when it began. This was less boring and more political than it sounds because as usual the P5 wanted to ensure that we were not overwhelmed by the non-aligned majority.

The key British concern was freedom of the seas; we are a trading nation whose interest was to ensure that the seas were safe and unobstructed. Others with big continental shelves wanted these for themselves; states with important international straits off their shores wanted control of these; landlocked countries wanted guaranteed access to the sea etc. There was to
be a Seabed Authority, based in Jamaica, which would be in effect the United Nations of the
Sea. It was ambitious, inspired and inspiring for many of us. There was a lot of
commitment. Sadly, over time, idealism was degraded. Powerful countries didn’t like the
idea of a Seabed Authority, which would be outside their control. National interest prevailed
over international. The consequence over the last forty years has been pollution, overfishing,
and piracy. Pardo’s idealism is a sad lost cause.

Sometimes, things which seem important at the time later disappear from view. An example
at the time of the Conference was manganese nodules which lie on the seabed and in those
days were regarded as an important strategic mineral. Who remembers manganese nodules
now? In any event they were difficult to get at but for many represented the very idea of the
common heritage of mankind which should be used in the interests of all, and not exploited
by marauding ruthless tycoons. However while the Conference was in progress, Howard
Hughes launched a ship called the Glomar Explorer specially designed, we understood, for
hoovering up manganese nodules. The first betrayal of the common heritage, we thought. In
fact, however, the Glomar Explorer was built for the CIA, in order to recover a Russian
submarine which had sunk in the North Atlantic. Manganese nodule harvesting was a cover.

Cyprus in 1974. The Turks invaded Cyprus. The proximate cause of the invasion was a
coup by Nikos Sampson, an EOKA terrorist leader, who took control of the government of
Cyprus. The Turks took the view that the Treaty of Guarantee justified his removal by force.
They were actually quite unsure of their capacity to invade successfully, so they established a
bridgehead and when all went well, took over some 30% of the island. In fact, as I said
earlier, they never subsequently left, and so didn’t restore the status quo ante, which was the
only basis on which military intervention was permitted under the Treaty. Should the British,
also a Guarantor Power, have tried to stop them invading? It would have been extremely
difficult. The Turks were on the spot and had considerable armed forces. As for the UK,
we were in a deeply post-imperial phase; we were loath to throw our weight around in a
“colonialist” manner. In the event, the Turks advanced towards Nicosia airport. The British
decided that they should be stopped there and reinforced from the UK at very short notice.
War would presumably have broken out between us and Turkey if the Turks had advanced
beyond the airport perimeter. My job was to sit up all night with a letter to the President of
the Security Council calling for a meeting if they did so. However, dawn came, and the
Turks had advanced no further. Then of course the Security Council became heavily
involved. As I’ve mentioned, since the breakdown of the Constitution the Turks had been
gradually driven into enclaves which were mainly in the north. At the time of the invasion, those Greeks who were still in the north fled south, and vice versa for the Turks. It is of course that legacy, comprising complex ancestral property rights, restitution and compensation, on top of the serious political, economic and military aspects of the dispute, which make a settlement so hard to achieve.

I recall working very closely with the French and the Americans and the Turks, the Greeks less so. I and my French, American and Turkish counterparts seemed to spend every day together for months. We thought we achieved a lot in terms of getting the right resolutions adopted and establishing a peace keeping force. Ilter Türkmen, whom I’ve mentioned already, was by this time the Turkish Ambassador there. He and his wife invited Judith and me to a dinner. We were terribly excited by this, a Permanent Representative inviting a First Secretary. I got into my black tie and Judith put on a very smart dress and off we went. You know how in New York the elevators open straight into the apartments. The door opened and we went in. There were a lot of other people there in black tie, but no one we recognised. We thought this a bit strange. Eventually, someone came up and said, ‘Are you the pianist?’ We’d gone to the wrong floor. Later, Ivor was giving a dinner for Ilter. Judith was sitting on the other side of him. She was very pregnant with James. Ilter said, ‘When’s your baby due?’ And Judith said, ‘I think actually pretty imminently.’ She left the table and went straight to New York hospital.

We worked hard but I have the impression that now the UN is hard work all the time. In those days there were times when we relaxed, usually in the summer. We had a lovely house upstate, where Judith and I and the children had a very happy time when we could get away.

The Special Political Committee was a bit esoteric, but is worth mentioning, because its task while I was the UK representative on it was to write the rules for peacekeeping operations. The political genesis lay in the tussle between the West and the Soviet Union over the extent of the personal responsibility and authority of the Secretary General. The Soviet Union wanted him (certainly not her, in those days!) to be entirely dependent on the Security Council, and to have very limited personal discretion. The West wanted the SG to operate to a considerable extent on his own authority, and for that reason always backed candidates of independence and distinction (and hopefully pro-Western views too) for the post, while the Soviet Bloc backed candidates who could be relied upon to do what they are told. This was the legacy of Hammarskjöld, a deeply reflective, driven man of very great distinction, who
had taken the independence of Secretary General to an entirely new level. He regarded himself as authorised by the Charter to act independently of the Council. His plane was of course ultimately shot down over the Congo probably by Belgian mercenaries who had mining interests in secessionist Katanga. But this was not the only example of him, and other Secretary Generals, taking actions on their own account of which the Russians disapproved. So they were determined that peacekeeping operations should be based on rules which ensured that the Security Council was firmly in control. The Special Political Committee’s task was to write the rules.

There were about five of us first secretaries in the Political Section with responsibility for different UN committees. We had a lot of autonomy. The ambassador or anyone else more senior didn’t often get involved, so that you were in control of British policy making in your committee, in my case the SPC. I used to have tremendous rows with the Russian representative, on occasion calling for the tapes to show that he was lying. (This was Watergate time: tapes were quite the thing!) It was a slow process, with long confrontations with the Russian and was never, I believe, completed. However, I thought I was doing something worthwhile. Ironically, nowadays the West is just about as keen as anyone else to appoint a Secretary General who won’t do his or her own thing.

It is also worth saying that the major powers tried to keep issues away from the UN, particularly the General Assembly, because the Non-Aligned movement, which had some 130 members and acted as a bloc, generally acted in opposition to the objectives of the West and of the Soviet Bloc. Outside the Security Council, not much happened if they didn’t approve of it. And if you had a good idea, you’d better give it to your friend from Malawi, because he might get it agreed, but you wouldn’t. Deeply politically incorrect, I fear, but the French had what we regarded as a very unfair secret weapon, namely a black member of their delegation, who could get into meetings of the Non-Aligned without being recognised and report back. This dominance of the Non-Aligned did not of course apply to the Security Council, where proceedings were stacked in favour of the Permanent members. As much then as today, the Middle East was a dominant issue there. I remember the day when Arafat addressed the General Assembly with a pistol in his belt.

We had an odd relationship with Russians and the Chinese because although we were adversaries, we shared an interest on subjects like disarmament, as I’ve mentioned, in ensuring that key interests were not dealt with in any substantive way at the UN. And my
Chinese counterpart, who later became the deputy foreign minister in charge of negotiating the handover of Hong Kong, would come up to me and say, ‘How can we make life difficult for the Russians today?’ Clearly, post-Cuba, the ways in which the Soviet Union and America handled their relationship developed very fast in order to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. One way was to avoid stationing nuclear weapons in close geographical proximity to each other. But another was to try to organise their relationship in a way in which the interests of third countries didn’t complicate this, as it might at the UN.

I had never previously worked somewhere where the great majority of member states viewed foreign relations through the single optic of poverty and un-development. They sent very good people to the United Nations, because here was an institution where their vote was worth the same as that of a superpower. These countries could combine their voices with those of other likeminded delegations and in this framework these able representatives could be disproportionately influential. When you advanced sophisticated British views on some political issue or other, you were often reminded how little this mattered to them. They came from countries where all that mattered was fighting the transactional imbalance between the developed world and their own, where the value of their raw materials, and often their production and sale, was controlled and manipulated by others.

We finally left New York in dramatic circumstances. We had with us Joanna, Matthew and James, then aged about one. Ivor Richard was also on the plane. Immediately after we had taken off one engine exploded and the one next to it caught fire. Smoke started coming in at the back and a few oxygen masks came down. The pilot said, ‘We’ve got to go back, but I’ve got to dump the fuel first.’ It was a bit depressing that the air crew clearly thought their last moment had come. We circled, dumped fuel all over Brooklyn, and landed with clouds of foam being sprayed over the runway by the fire crews. We had repositioned ourselves so that I sat with Joanna, and Judith was in the row in front with Matthew and baby James. Joanna was in the aisle seat and as she stepped out into the aisle, she disappeared. I instantaneously lost sight of her. We were quite near the bulkhead to the First Class so we went forward, to the exit there. I tried to open the port side door, which a crew member was struggling with, and failed. We jumped down the starboard side chute, Judith had James in her arms, but where was Joanna? I ran back and there she was standing on the wing of this burning airplane. Fortunately, it was a VC10 and the wings were not impossibly high, so I said, ‘Jump’. She jumped into my arms. We tumbled to the ground and then ran as fast as we could. There was a funny part. We stumbled into the terminal, without shoes or glasses.
which we had been told to take off. I couldn’t see where I was going. I thought I should ring up the Mission and say what had happened. I got through to David Brighty. He didn’t say, ‘How awful!’ But ‘Gosh, did you see Ivor coming down the chute?’ It must indeed have been a remarkable sight, because Ivor weighed more than twenty stone. Later we get a letter from BOAC saying they were sorry we had had a bad time and that they very much hoped we would fly with them again soon. Nowadays, I imagine that at least you’d get a few air miles.

INTERVIEW 2 WITH SIR DAVID LOGAN

Today is 7 April 2017. This is Catherine Manning recording the second interview with Sir David Logan for the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme.

FCO, Personnel Operations Department, 1977–80

CM: David, we tackled the first part of your career last time and now we have reached 1977. You’ve just come home from the UN in New York and you have been given the job in POD, that is Personnel Operations Department, as Area Officer 4. Would you like to fill us in with how POD worked in those days?

DL: Yes, of course. It was big and it had more A stream officers than any other department in the Foreign Office. It had a grade 4 Head, a grade 4 Deputy Head; it had two grade 5S Assistant Heads and then below that there were the four “Areas” ie geographical areas each headed by Grade 5s and then sections that dealt with grade 9s, clerical staff and others. It had some fifty members, much bigger than a geographical department. My first job was as Area Officer 4 which dealt with the Americas and Africa. I went on to be Area Officer 1 ie the Foreign Office staff. Then I became the A stream Assistant between 1979 and 1980. Each Area Officer had a grade 7 and a grade 9 assistant, who each handled different grades. Each of us in the Area needed to know by heart the files of about 300 people. So I needed to know all the grade 5s in my area and in less detail the grade 4s as well. The system worked on what was called the grid system. The grid was both a document and a meeting. The document was issued once a month and consisted of all the postings under review. Let’s use the grade 5 grid as an example. These are the people who have done two or three jobs already and now are desk officers or equivalent. The grid document would contain all the postings from two years in the future back to now, chronologically, with the current ones at the front and the ones two years in the future at the back. It would have on
each page the names of the posts, a description of the jobs, the names of the present
incumbents, who he/she was, the date when it was going to be vacant, and on the right hand
side a list of candidates for the job. Once a month someone came round with this list and
each area officer updated it. You would start at the back with those jobs which were a long
way in the future. The jobs were of course either going to be in your own area or in one of
the other three. You would start putting down at the back the people in your area whom you
thought might be suitable for those jobs in two years’ time. If you looked through this
document, there would be just a few names at the very back, and then more as you came
forward as Area Officers focussed on them more closely. But nearer the very front there’d
be progressively fewer names, as possible candidates had been taken for other jobs. The grid
meeting took place once a month and lasted half a day, say from two o’clock through to
seven. It operated as a market, because each area officer was trying to fill the jobs in his
Area and to ensure that those who were leaving his Area were getting the most suitable
appointment for the next stage of his/her career. You’d got to get down to a single candidate
on the document a year or so before the posting took place, because of course families have
to make plans. So the process was driven by the passage of time. I’ve got to fill this post
now, and I want the most appropriate person available to fill it. The other three are trying to
find the best possible posts for the people in their areas who are due to move on. I also want
to find the most appropriate jobs for people in my Area. The Grid meeting participants
would go through this document from the back, where we would just have a brief discussion
of the two or three names that had been entered. At about eighteen months out, these
discussions get more serious. Then you would reach the point a month or two later when
you’ve got to get down to two or three names. Then you finalise it. So each post, the
suitability of the candidates for filling it, and what should happen to the present incumbent
would be discussed over a period of some two years. At each grid meeting you would
finalise fifteen or twenty appointments which would be submitted to the Board, though we
still had to run them past the Chief Clerk first. Off they went to the Board, whose only
authority in those days was to say yes or no to the candidate who was submitted. The Boards
didn’t have a choice of candidates, except for the Number One Board.

CM: Did they ever say no?

DL: Yes, but not often. The Number One Board which handled what we used to call grades 1
to 3 had no grid. Possible candidates were discussed between the Head of the Department
and the Chief Clerk. The Board would get a choice, of three or four usually, and they could
choose any of them. One enormous advantage of the system for the lower Boards was that, unlike now, you could fill posts without disruption. If your planning assumption was that the Board would say yes to your candidate, you knew what gap that was going to cause, and you could process filling that gap as well. So we would construct what we would call chains. Certainly in grade 5, we were always below establishment, so we never actually had enough people to fill the jobs, and that sometimes showed up, for example in the length of training or leave people got. This meant that if you moved someone, there wasn’t somewhere in the system where there was a bit of slack to pick up. Each move started a chain reaction. We would often board a chain which was five or six appointments long. As I say, you could do that and thereby avoid disruption as far possible because the probability was that the Board would approve POD’s recommendation. Now, of course, if you go to a Board with six candidates, this becomes mathematically impossible because you don’t know which one is going to get chosen, and therefore you can’t plan beyond the first job in the chain. It is a system which works perfectly well for a company or an institution which is based in the UK. When someone changes jobs, all you’ve got to do is move them across the corridor. But you can’t do that if you’re moving people around the world: you’ve got to give substantial notice. So in the FCO now, having got one post filled, you’ve got to go through the whole process again for the next appointee. As a result, there are long gaps. So that was a great operational advantage of the old system.

CM: Presumably, the terms and conditions of service were different: that is, you were obliged to go wherever.

DL: I’m not sure that in principle there are any differences now. I remember one or two people actually being fired when I was first in POD, for not going where they were told to go. It was unusual because postings were highly consultative processes. People were given options and choices, and if they didn’t want to go somewhere, you could usually find somewhere else which was just as suitable for them. When I went back to POD in the late 1980s, I asked if anyone had been sacked, and everybody looked shocked at the idea. We were operating the same system, but this had become very unusual. There was a problem with running personnel in the Civil Service, which I am sure doesn’t exist in the private sector, and that is that you had no incentives available. If you wanted to send someone to a war zone, because after all someone had to go there, you’d got no way of making that more attractive. You couldn’t offer them more money; you couldn’t say they could go there on promotion. There were occasions when you could send someone on promotion, because
they were due for that, but you couldn’t incentivise by saying, ‘You’re not actually due for promotion, but we’ll promote you…’ and you certainly couldn’t say, ‘And what’s more there’s more money available.’ So this was a real operational constraint. We used to talk about DSR 3 (Diplomatic Service Regulations 3) which is the mobility obligation. But it was very rare to try to enforce it with respect to specific postings. People are presumably still bound by it in theory. In the two cases I remember from this earlier period, in one case the officer didn’t want to go to the post in question but didn’t particularly mind leaving the Foreign Office. The other officer was quite senior, a counsellor. We found a way round this; as a cooling off device, he was given the job of writing a report on why we failed to foresee the downfall of the Shah, an important requirement at the time. This took him a year, and then we found a job for him that everyone was happy with.

CM: If you couldn’t incentivise in that way, what techniques did you use to get people to go to places that weren’t let’s say comfortable?

DL: It wasn’t easy because first of all, you mustn’t discriminate. It’s no good saying, ‘We’ll send you to this tough place because you’re single,’ because then if you were single, you’d go to all the horrible places, and why should the married people not go? In later times, you shouldn’t say, ‘We can’t send you there, because you’re gay and they don’t like gays there,’ for the same sort of reason. And married couples with a spouse with a career, how do you handle that, both to fulfil their aspirations for both of them, but also to avoid discriminating against the people who are not in that situation? We could often find people who liked unusual places, so it was to some extent self-selecting. There were people who liked going to the Falkland Islands, which wouldn’t be everyone’s idea of fun, Rex Hunt, for example, at the time of the war. Additionally, you had no tool to get rid of people who are not up to standard, no golden handshakes and so on.

One thing that differentiates how things were done then from now was that POD was a powerful department and was able to run things in the overall interests of the Service. There was no such thing, I hope, as powerful ambassadors who were able to get hold of good people because they wanted them. Because we were more deeply engaged in officers’ careers than now, we were also able to plan these ahead to some extent. We had a scheme called the fliers’ scheme in which we identified people in their very early thirties whom we thought were going to do outstandingly well. By then they’d done two or three jobs and had demonstrated exceptional promise. Then we had reserve fliers whom we thought would get
to the top if things went well for them, or didn’t go well for some of the flyers. We would map out their careers a decade or so ahead, to try to ensure the right path for them. It didn’t always work, but I think it was useful career planning to prepare the people who were potential superstars a long way ahead, to ensure they had all the skills which they would need for very senior jobs. One interesting point was that I found that you could very often identify four or five people who you’d put in that category, but that the reserves were much more difficult. You only wanted about ten of them. By you’d find that you could identify twenty five whom you thought might to get to the top of the service if everything went well for them. So there were always a few real stars, no problem, but the next ten or so, much more difficult.

CM: Looking back over your time in Personnel, and over your subsequent career, how did your fliers and reserve fliers do?

DL: I don’t think we ever did a thorough study of that. People change. So I wouldn’t like to say that all those superstar Grade 5s became grade one ambassadors. I don’t have names enough in my head to produce counter examples, but I can think of plenty of people who became great ambassadors, who weren’t even in the reserve list. After his poor child was drowned, Nick Bain made a study of the relationship between high marks in the entry exam and subsequent success. In those days, it was marked out of 300 and you passed at 220. Nick certainly showed that some people who just scraped through later went to the top, and that people who got good marks didn’t always do so well.

CM: At one stage the marks in the exam were published and the two candidates who came in first and second were sent to the UN for the General Assembly as reporting officers, as a sort of prize. John Weston and Brian Fall came in first and second in their year.

DL: You’re quite right. I was at the UN and we had these reporting officers. Maybe those who came first and second were guaranteed this as a reward but there were quite a lot of them, and they weren’t all great. There was definitely a broad correlation between those who did really well in the exam and in their subsequent careers in Nick Bain’s study. In practice, you had to be tremendously careful of the halo being cast forward. You shouldn’t make assumptions about how well people would do in their next job, just because they’d done their previous one well. Or if you like, because they had a particular background and expertise. Terribly important, because people change all the time and people who haven’t done very well will suddenly flower and vice versa. Quite easy to miss.
CM: It’s Parkinson’s Law, isn’t it? When you’re promoted just beyond your level of competence.

DL: This isn’t quite the same point but I can think of a very few people when I was later in POD, of whom we thought, ‘Oh, God!’ This was typically someone struggling in grade 4. Getting rid of someone in grade 5 is a big blow, but there were people we should have got rid of at that stage, rather than promoting them to counsellor. And why do you not do it? Kind-heartedness, mainly, but it’s a mistake both for them and for everyone else in the end.

CM: Was there a tendency for the reporting officer to be reluctant to point out someone’s faults?

DL: It’s a very interesting area. Clearly when you get to the stage when, as now, you simply hand over the report to the person to read, there’s a risk of that. Back then, I used to think that if we did this a reporting officer would feel unable to make criticism and would gloss over it. He/she would then ring up POD and say, ‘Look, actually, I just couldn’t put this in the report, but ...’ This was allegedly a problem for the Scandinavians who were already giving reports to their subjects, with people being assessed and promoted on the basis of conversations in bar rooms which went along the lines of ‘So and so isn’t quite what I said he was.’ At the time we were trying to perfect a system which was very difficult to operate; we wanted the reporting officers to write reports which they didn’t actually hand over, but we also wanted what they said in discussion of the report to be as frank as it could possibly be. It was relatively easy to spot occasions when reporting officers pulled punches because officers would come into POD where we would go through their report in detail and they would say, ‘Oh, my reporting officer never told me that.’ We could then go back to the reporting officer and say, ‘Look, you’re not doing this properly.’ Reporting got better, I think, all the time. We made it a significant component of someone’s performance that they should report and manage well. This was introduced into the report form in my time. It was a long haul, but we were able to improve things steadily.

I tried to make management ability a key requirement for advancement. Eventually, when I was back in POD, I had a list of people that was seen by the Number One Board whose management was so bad that it ought to affect their progress. It rarely did. Able people can be tough on their juniors, and manage to conceal this from their seniors and peers.
What got to the Board in those days may have been less transparent than it is now and the Boars had less choice, but what they got was the product of a great deal more rigour in grids, for example, than is available to the Boards today. I think – I would say this wouldn’t I? – that it is mainly the people who subsequently changed the system who say that the old system was authoritarian, and that we just told people where to go. But that’s a caricature: it wasn’t like that at all. There were downsides, but I think there were a lot of upsides. Of course people always say they have been mishandled by POD if they don’t do well. Who else do you blame?

There is a lot that is special about the members of the Service; but there were also crooks, drug-takers, and drunks, just like the outside world. If you did a survey, you’d probably find that we were better than most, but in my time there were people who forged their reports. Quite hard to do. Do you remember that you used to get subsistence when you were serving somewhere temporarily? It was often pretty generous, because you were given money which allowed you to stay in what was called a marker hotel. And you were supposed to spend a certain amount of money on food and so on. But you could easily go and stay in a cheaper hotel. If you were on subsistence for a considerable period, you could save quite a lot of money. I had one case of someone who forged the visa for the country where he was doing this, to show that he had been there longer than he really had. Disciplinary proceedings were handed over to Personnel Policy Department. More importantly, there were people who had problems, who for some reason or other couldn’t cope: what were we going to do with them? Would they have to leave or could you somehow persevere, help and look after them or were you abusing the Service by being over-sympathetic? I think we probably veered in that direction, rather than the opposite.

CM: What about the famous case of the counsellors who were sacked? It was obviously before your time in POD. That way of dealing with an excess of counsellors was no longer considered viable?

DL: The twenty counsellors? From my point of view it was very difficult to get rid of people, because you needed to have a series of reports below a certain level before action could to be taken over someone who was inadequate. The number of overall performance boxes in the report form has changed over time, but suppose there were seven, which it was at one stage. An officer could be retired if she/he received a number of box 4s or worse over a period. They were given warnings if they received box 4 reports. But typically what
happened was that during this process, the person concerned would be posted somewhere else and his new reporting officer would give him the benefit of the doubt in the first year. He would then go up to box 3 and the whole process would have to start all over again. It was extremely difficult to sack people.

We spent – Personnel Policy Department primarily – a lot of time on structural modelling. The Service is a pyramid and you need to maintain it in a shape which incentivises people, so that they know that they’re going get promoted at a time that they feel gives them responsibility at a reasonable point, and which also provides the appropriate level of experience and ability all the way up. It’s terribly easy to distort the pyramid. We hardly ever took in people in mid-career for that reason. The most famous cases were David Gillmore and Nigel Broomfield, who did tremendously well. They joined as counsellors. But if you think of the Service structure as a toothpaste tube, you acquire a bulge in it by bringing people in in mid-career, which negatively affects the careers of people below them, because there are fewer vacancies into which they can be promoted. But both they and the mid-career intakes are eventually going to retire at the same age. Because they were so able, this didn’t matter for Broomfield or Gillmore, but in general we didn’t take on people in mid-career for that reason. A separate point is that if you promoted too many young officers too fast, you achieved the same negative effect. And also the Service was always getting smaller. I suspect that somehow these twenty counsellors, which is a lot, had formed a big bulge which had to be eliminated. Structural modelling, if it exists at all these days, must be very difficult because people enter and leave the Service very flexibly. Then it was a career for life, and modelling was very important. Separately, we were always trying to incentivise what we used to call the E stream. There were very few E stream counsellors. You wanted to incentivise the E stream by making more wherever possible. But how would this affect the A stream pyramid?

**FCO, Assistant to Defence Department, 1980-82**

CM: In 1980 you moved as Assistant to Defence Department, so this was quite a big change.

DL: Yes, I saw that this was coming up and thought it would be a good move.

CM: Was it your time in New York that got you interested in this area, or did you feel that you needed another string to your bow and defence was something that interested you?
DL: Pretty much that. It was in an era when of course the European Union existed, but when much political consultation, primarily the United States, was handled by Defence Department. There was a department called North America Department but it was not much more than a post box. It farmed things out to other departments dealing with important issues, like defence. Because we were a nuclear weapons state and our armed forces were taken seriously, and because the Americans were closely concerned with security policy, many of the trans-Atlantic policy issues were handled by Defence Department. So I thought that the work in Defence Department would be very interesting and important.

CM: And your personal background? Do you come from a military family?

DL: My father was in the Navy. I had done disarmament at the UN. I wasn’t particularly interested in the European Union and it would have been quite late to start on policy work there.

CM: What were the issues you were dealing with in Defence Department?

DL: The Head of Department was first of all David Gillmore and then John Weston. It was divided into two: a NATO section which I headed, and a non-NATO section. General NATO issues were handled by Francis Richards most of the time I was there. Robin Janvrin was the nuclear desk officer, dealing with both nuclear defence and arms control. We also handled MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions).

This is an area of issues where the responsibilities of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence overlap. Think of a wide foreign and security affairs spectrum with foreign relations, pure and simple, nothing to do with defence at one end, and the Ministry of Defence dealing with the nuts and bolts (sometimes literally!) of military activity at the other end. The Foreign Office deals with soft through to hard security issues; the same is true of the Ministry of Defence which handles security and defence policy, not just soldiering. So Defence Department overlapped with a number of MoD Defence Secretariats. The FCO led on arms control and the MoD on defence. However, in order to prosecute arms control policy, you had to understand defence policy fully. So we worked very closely with the MoD, which was very interesting.

On the defence side, i.e. the non-arms control side, the main issue was the acquisition of Trident. It represented an enormous jump in British capabilities. We first had a submarine-based missile system called Polaris. The Americans next moved to a system called Poseidon,
which we chose not to follow. Instead, we tried to improve our Polaris submarines with a system called Chevaline. Polaris missiles had three warheads which weren’t targetable. Chevaline reduced the number of warheads from three to two, which were now manoeuvrable in space while the third was reconfigured as a decoy scattering chaff. This was a very British story. The project was ambitious and inevitably subject to big time and cost overruns. Eventually, along came Trident. Phew, we could just do what the Americans were doing again. In defence terms it was clearly the sensible thing, though it represented a very large increment in missiles and warheads which it was difficult to justify to critics.

Nuclear defence is an area to which great intellectual rigour can be applied. Because nuclear weapons don’t evolve dramatically, it is possible to theorise about them in a way which doesn’t apply to international relations in general. I’m sometimes tempted to think that the work of international relations departments in universities and think tanks is not much more than high-class journalism, because there are always new developments. You’ve got to be absolutely up-to-date with whatever is happening in Myanmar or wherever. This doesn’t lend itself well to analysis and theory. But nuclear weapons are different. In the early years, the Americans funded a great deal of academic work on nuclear theory, above all at Rand.

In part based on this theoretical work, I had no doubts about the correctness of having our own independent deterrent, just as now I think it is a terrible mistake in the defence circumstances of today, which are entirely different. I give lectures and make speeches about that. But I had, and still have, no doubt that during the Cold War, it was justified. The grounds on which we justified it were perhaps not the obvious ones. It is the proposition that the British independent system represented a second centre for decision making. We weren’t saying that we were doing something that the Americans couldn’t do or that we had a totally independent deterrent. We were saying that the decision making process which might lead us to use our nuclear weapons was one which was distinct from that of the Americans, and that this complicated Soviet calculations in a way that made our possession of these nuclear weapons useful for deterrent purposes.

Trident acquisition coincided on the arms control side - and weapons side – with the acquisition of Cruise missiles which, you remember, was very controversial. In the mid-70s the Russians started to acquire an intermediate range ballistic missile called the SS-20, to which there was no Western equivalent. Deterrence theory said that you have to have escalation equivalence or dominance at every level. The crudest example is to ask yourself
whether you would be deterred by my possession of nuclear weapons if some of your soldiers
- say you’re East Germany - crossed the border into West Germany. Well, you wouldn’t be,
would you? I’m not going to destroy East Berlin because of an incursion like that. Indeed, if
you’ve invaded West Germany and got as far as occupying West Berlin and my only
potential recourse was to destroy Moscow, would you be deterred? Probably not. It’s not a
proportional response. As an intermediate range ballistic missile, the SS20 could threaten
Western Europe if deployed in Warsaw Pact territory, but not the United States. If the only
available American response was to threaten to destroy Moscow, the American bluff would
be called. We lacked a response to the SS20 threat which was proportionate and therefore
credible.

So the response envisaged was the deployment of intermediate range ground-launched cruise
missiles, and an intermediate range ballistic missile called Pershing II. These weapons would
be based in Western Europe. Of course, this looked to many like preparation for aggression.
There was a great deal of opposition and protest. The trouble about deterrence is that it has
to absolutely credible. So change and modernisation risks concern and alarm among the
public that preparations are being made to fight a war. What happened then was interesting
in a number of ways. Nowadays we don’t make much of a distinction between domestic and
foreign policy issues. What is happening in the Middle East, for example, we think of as
having domestic implications for us. We might get blown up by an ISIS terrorist. Or
finance: we are used to thinking of the UK’s financial fortunes as constantly vulnerable to
global developments. But until not very long ago foreign policy and domestic policy issues
were distinct. It was unusual for what happened abroad to have domestic impact. In my
time in the Foreign Office, these deployments were one of the first of these, as evidenced by
the wonderful Greenham Common women. In Defence Department, we certainly weren’t
used to letters pouring in from the public.

CM: Did Greenham Common and demonstrations like that play into the policy of your
department?

DL: Oh, yes. We took seriously the CND leaders like E. P. Thompson and Bruce Kent,
though unlike Thompson I thought Kent was intellectually dishonest. Another interesting
aspect was that in those days, policy was generally made by civil servants and ministers.
Nowadays it’s much more pluralist. There is the media; special interests groups, and NGOs
some of whom possess great expertise, all of whom impact on policy making. But policy
makers didn’t talk to people like that in those days. So in this new situation in which a foreign policy issue had become a domestic one as well, we set up a small group which brought in outsiders, in order to absorb their views and also to explain why we believed that the popular concern that what we were making the West more vulnerable to nuclear attack by installing these new weapons was misplaced. In the end, against my expectations, agreement was reached on what was called the zero option. We had certainly hoped that it would be possible to have an arms control agreement which heavily limited the number of SS-20s on the one hand, and Cruise missiles and Pershings on the other. But I did not believe that it would be possible to reach an agreement which prevented deployment of all these weapons. But that is what happened. Reagan had floated the idea it while I was still in the Department and we all thought this was just Reagan ... how was it ever going to work? I think that in the end the Russians felt that the threat of the Western deployments meant that it wasn’t worth proceeding with the SS-20s deployments. On our side, public opinion played a part, because it was very strong.

CM: This was before the time that Reagan met Gorbachev in Reykjavik and proposed the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, which as I understand it, completely appalled defence policy specialists?

DL: Well, and quite rightly. We were already in serious trouble in terms of deterrence credibility and had been for a long time, because our conventional forces did not match their Soviet counterparts. So we had to rely on the threat of nuclear weapons. If we had got rid of nuclear weapons completely, how could have prevented the Russians walking into Germany? That wasn’t one of Reagan’s best ideas. To make sense, it would have required an agreement on conventional forces as well. Of course, serious conventional arms control discussions came later and, as I’ve mentioned, MBFR negotiations were still in progress when I was in Defence Department, but they were clearly going nowhere.

I should also say we thought defence was important because it enabled us to get between the French and the Germans in Europe, who ran Europe. Were there any issues where the Brits mattered more in Europe than either of them? Yes, defence was an area in which we were of real importance to Europe and in which the French and Germans had to take us seriously.

We used occasionally to try to cooperate with the French on nuclear submarine deployment. Once, the French wanted to show us their SLBM base. If you go to Faslane, it’s rather unimpressive, with barbed wire apparently the main way of keeping people out.
The French equivalent is on Ile Longue in Brittany. So off we flew to Paris and got on board a French *Atlantique*, the French equivalent of a Hercules. The pilot started up his engines and the entire plane filled with smoke. It was quite frightening because there were no windows. There were a lot of *zut* and *merde*. Eventually the back went down and we all staggered out. The French said, ‘Ah, it was only an auxiliary engine.’ Another *Atlantique* had to be brought from Tours which took hours, but fortunately the French NAAFI was a lot better than ours. Off we went to Ile Longue and were met by a French Admiral who looked as though he had somehow been left over from the battle of Trafalgar, with wonderful gold braid. He took us down into the base which seemed straight out of James Bond, cut into the rock deep underground, with big flood lights, black submarines, and busy docks. We were duly impressed.

We used to envy Robin Janvrin because he was the nuclear desk officer and a member of the NATO nuclear planning group, one of the tools intended to bind the rest of the alliance into nuclear policy making. They used to have their meetings in agreeable places like Florida, Naples or Tromsö. The rest of us never got past Brussels or Washington.

CM: In your notes you have Gillmore and Quinlan.

DL: Yes, two very great people. David Gillmore was extremely hard-working; very acute; got on tremendously well with people. He had a very good relationship with the Americans, the French and the Germans, with whom we dealt constantly. He smoked all the time, and that was what killed him when he was only sixty. We personally got on very well with him and his wife Lucille and used to borrow their house in the South of France.

Quinlan, the God at whose feet we sat. He was Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, and the architect of British nuclear doctrine. A great intellectual, but also wonderfully lucid. This is an area which is tremendously jargon-ridden, full of obscurantist literature. Michael had an extraordinary capacity to write about difficult subjects in simple terms. He was also completely unassuming. What did I know about defence policy? I had been doing it for only a couple of years but I’d go along to meetings with Michael and he would listen and take me seriously. He was a conscientious Catholic. He wrote at some length about the conflict or otherwise between his religious beliefs and nuclear strategy-making. I recently engaged in exchanges with Rodric Braithwaite who doesn’t accept nuclear deterrence theory and furthermore doesn’t see how Quinlan could reconcile his contribution to this with his
religion. In fact Michael wrote a book called *The Just War*, part of the purpose of which was to address this manifest problem.

CM: You moved in 1982. Were you still in Defence Department for the Falklands War?

DL: Yes. But I was head of the NATO section. The Falklands was of course the responsibility of the non-NATO section of Defence Department, hitherto the Cinderella section. Who cared about what the rest of the world? And where were the Falklands anyway? Ironically, I do remember putting up a submission, only because the head of department was away, arguing that the scrapping of the Falklands guardship would lead the Argentines to believe that we were no longer interested in defending the Falkland Islands.

CM: Was the decision to scrap the guard ship an MoD decision because of money, or was it a joint decision with the Foreign Office?

DL: It was a consequence of the Nott Review, which is historically instructive. The British had for years salami-sliced their forces down and down, so that they all got progressively less capable. The new Conservative government decided that this could not continue and that we should focus our limited resources where they were most needed at the expense of the rest. The decision was taken that the key need was for land forces. We were no longer an imperial power; why did we need a big navy? The Russians were just over the border and that was a land-based threat, wasn’t it? As you can imagine, this was tremendously controversial. Nelson’s wooden walls; indignant admirals all over the place. But it seemed to me entirely rational. But what happens next? Not the Central Front but the Falkland Islands, because that guard ship was gone. Then only twenty years later the Soviet Union’s gone. You don’t need thousands of tanks in Central Europe now and it wouldn’t be a bad idea to have a proper navy. I’m caricaturing, but it is remarkable how such calculations can be rendered obsolete, really quite fast.

CM: Yet they are decisions that involve huge amounts of money and take a long time to implement.

DL: Absolutely. As you say, changes to defence policy and doctrine, which sometimes look pretty much like the re-invention of the wheel, have a deep and wide impact, not least because of the very long lead times involved in defence procurement, even when resources for this are available. Back to the Falklands. I vividly remember the shocking losses of the *Sheffield*, the *Antelope* and other ships. Quite early on when the Task Force sailed, John
Weston, the head of department, asked whether some of the warships had nuclear weapons on board. To which the Navy said yes, but we’re not going to use them, are we? So John said, ‘What if one of them is badly damaged and a nuclear weapon is detonated?’ ‘No, no, that’ll never happen.’ But he won that battle and the nuclear weapons were left behind.

Thanks above all to the Defense Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, we got great support from the Americans, which was vital politically and in material terms, intelligence and equipment.

I’d like to mention the tragic case when the troopship was sunk in San Carlos Bay with many soldiers on board. It was a dreadful but interesting example of how things can go wrong progressively even though it was the product of a series of decisions each of which looked rational and the right step to take at the time. These decisions progressively narrowed the choices available, eventually reaching a point at which no good options were left. A horrible story.

CM: Can I finish by asking you what was your personal attitude to the Falklands War? When war starts it’s because diplomacy has broken down. Did you feel that we had no choice, or that we could have talked our way through it?

DL: This may not exactly answer your question. First of all, a Labour government in the late 70s had negotiated an acceptable agreement with the Argentines. It was a version of leaseback: they would have sovereignty; we would have a permanent lease. Rowlands, the Foreign Office Minister who negotiated this, returned to London where the Falkland Islands lobby, which was tremendously influential, ensured that it was rejected. Some years later, the same thing happened to Nicholas Ridley under a Conservative government. So both Labour and Tory governments took the same view and in both cases were effectively defeated by the influence of the Falkland Islands Company. But something like that would have been the right answer. Having got to the point of occupation, a crisis which was engineered by the Argentinians for domestic political reasons, was there any alternative? Possession is nine tenths of the law. Could we in that situation have negotiated an acceptable arrangement? Probably not. I suppose that we should therefore applaud Mrs Thatcher for doing something that everyone else said wasn’t possible.

This was the period when I first became aware of the Quad process. Later when I became an Under Secretary it was an important part of life for me. The Quad was the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany. Although Germany was not a nuclear weapons state,
it was the place where most nuclear weapons were located. Important defence policy issues were particularly well handled by this group. The group was secret, but formalised and managed by the Planning Staff who operated a secret telegram distribution for Quad telegrams. Before any important multi-lateral meeting where the Quad’s interests were particularly at stake it would meet and agree how to handle the subsequent meeting. These were four significant countries with effective delegations and I am sure we achieved more than we would have done if we hadn’t tried to cook things up in advance in this way. The Italians endlessly spotted these meetings and complained. So we used to try to hold them in places where we would not be seen. My main concern then tended not to be that the Italians would find us, but that the Americans would choose a discreet but expensive restaurant which we couldn’t afford. If you talk about the Quad to FCO officials now, they look blank because circumstances have changed so much. European policy-making process has become more developed and the United States has become more detached. But in those days it was secret, important, and effective.

Counsellor, Head of Chancery and Consul-General, Oslo, 1982–86

CM: David, we’ve had a short break and now we’ve reached 1982 and you went off to be Deputy Head of Mission in Oslo.

DL: Yes, that was in principle a defence-related posting because Norway is the northern flank of NATO and we thought the third world war would be lost there, if it was going to be lost, because once the Russians had got control of northern Norway, they would have obtained an enormous advantage. At this time, the Norwegians were being difficult over GLCM and Pershing deployment. Although these would not be deployed in Norway, the Norwegians often dissented from NATO decisions, for the kinds of reasons we’ve been discussing earlier. There was a NATO headquarters outside Oslo called AFNorth (Allied Forces Northern Europe) which is a major NATO command assigned to the British as a sop because the Americans had the important ones - SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic) and SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe). We had a really nice time there - lots of skiing, lots of sailing. On the defence side, the Norwegians had a doctrine called ‘Low Tension in the North.’ The proposition was that if they did not deploy forces north of a certain point, not right up against the Soviet border, that was likely to be reciprocated by the Soviets. This would reduce tension because any military movements made would be physically a bit remote; there would be time to avoid bad judgements made in
too much haste. This was heretical as far as NATO was concerned, but of course your views differ when you are right on the spot. There is a parallel with the Cruise missile crisis; the Americans used to get impatient at European vacillation in the face of public protest. But the United States was not where these weapons were going to be deployed. Similarly, Low Tension in the North made good sense to the Norwegians. This didn’t mean that the Norwegians were not loyal NATO members. Every year there were big reinforcement exercises by British commandoes and American Marine Amphibious Brigades. Like the Yugoslavs, the Norwegians had a doctrine called Total Defence, which involved very serious national service and regular refresher assignments. If war broke out, you had your gun, your ammunition and your skis in your kitchen and off you went. In classical doctrine you need a ratio of three aggressors for every one defender, that’s a rule of thumb. But it was different in Norway. Because the terrain is so difficult, well-trained soldiers with rifles on their back who knew the terrain could, the theory went, defeat even a well-armed aggressor with larger forces which could not operate in this way. Our time in Norway coincided with a period when technology and military equipment were changing in a major way, so that Total Defence was becoming obsolete.

Norway in those days seemed remote from the rest of Europe and complacent about things that seemed to go wrong everywhere else but not in Norway. Norwegian agriculture was inefficient and small and the weather’s lousy. In order to keep their agriculture alive, there were very high tariffs and Norwegians were not allowed to buy nice fruit and vegetables from further south until all their own was finished. I just wonder whether post-Brexit, we will have to use up British agricultural produce, perhaps cabbages and swedes, until you can buy some nice foreign vegetables.

We had a super house, next door to the Nansen Institute and close to the water. The whole family are keen on sailing and the Royal Navy contingent had a Yacht Club with boats and staff. Matthew was the under-seventeen dinghy champion. And skiing. It’s mainly cross country skiing, which I thought when I was young was something that old people did in valleys, but it’s certainly not like that in Norway. Just in the environs of Oslo there are two hundred kilometres of flood-lit prepared trails, so you could go out after work.

CM: The stereotype of Scandinavians and Norwegians in particular is that they are rather gloomy. Did you find them so or were they quite jolly?
DL: They weren’t gloomy, but it took quite a long time getting to know them. I used to go out of the house every morning at the same time and there were two middle-aged ladies who walked their dogs past the house, and the first time I said good morning, they looked as if I had assaulted them. I think after a few years they did actually say good morning, but it was a slow process.

CM: Are they like the Swedes with very formal skoling at dinners?

DL: It’s formal and it’s highly systematised. You can get into a situation, if you’ve got a group of Danes and Swedes and Norwegians together, in which you can’t start, because in one country the oldest has to start and in another it’s the women and so on. So if you’ve only got old men, for example, you simply can’t start. At a dinner party, there are lots of skols. At the end of dinner the guest of honour has to say thank you. The first problem for guests in our house was deciding who the guest of honour was. In Norway it’s the person on the left of hostess and, of course, for us it is the person on the right. So the first thing would be a conversation behind Judith’s back about who they reckoned was the guest of honour. Whoever was chosen had to do a series of ritual things. He had to say how beautifully the table was laid; how delicious the food was; how attractive the flowers; how stimulating the conversation. And he had to tell a joke. All Norwegian jokes are anti-Swedish, like, ‘What’s the shortest book in the world?’ Answer, “The Swedish book of war heroes.” Or, “when the tribes came north from Central Europe, who went to Norway and who went to Sweden? Well, there was a signpost and the ones who could read went to Norway.”

In Norway, older people have to skol first. You’ve got to look into the eyes of the person you are skoling. You’ve got to do everyone present and in the right order. What else about Norwegians at dinner parties? First of all, they all arrive on the dot. If you say seven thirty they come at exactly seven thirty. You can see their cars driving up and down outside until the moment comes. For much of the year in Norway you come wearing boots, anoraks, puffa jackets, scarves. So twelve or sixteen people come through your door, all covered with an enormous amount of outer clothes which they then start taking off. So you need a big lobby, because in no time there are piles of coats and sweaters and boots in every direction. We had a really nice Norwegian teacher. We got quite worried because she and her husband were late for dinner one day. They eventually arrived and said, ‘We thought we’d do it the British way. We’ve come late and we haven’t brought you a present.’
You know how at Christmas we have turkey and plum pudding. You wouldn’t really choose to eat turkey, would you? It’s not a particularly nice fowl; chicken’s actually nicer, isn’t it? But anyway, it’s the tradition. The Norwegians’ equivalent of that is something called lutefisk. Lutefisk was a way of preserving cod in times before fridges. You soaked the cod in lye, a very strong alkali which reduces the cod to a sort of jelly, and then you buried it. When you wanted to eat it, you dug it up and heated it. They then try to make it remotely tolerable by putting bits of bacon on top and pouring on butter. It stank, as you might suppose, of rotten fish and was sort of jelly-like. There were lots of jokes about why the Vikings leave Norway. One answer was to get away from the lutefisk. Just very briefly, a nice thing about Norway – there are lots of nice things about Norway – was that when it became independent from Sweden in 1905, it was the poorest country in Europe. It was poorer than Ireland. It’s now the richest. Even when we were there, it was a lot rich than the UK. Norwegians had an expectation that everything was going to get better every year – because it usually did. That’s a very un-British attitude. You think of Norwegians as rather gloomy sort of people, but this made them pretty upbeat. So back to POD.

**Head of Personnel Operations Department, FCO, 1986–88**

CM: As Head of Department this time.

DL: Yes. The Chief Clerks were first Mark Russell and then John Whitehead. They were very different, but both very good. It was the job I enjoyed most. It was terrific when people’s careers went the right way and you could bring out the best in them. Of course you made mistakes. But it was tangible in a way that a lot of work in the Foreign Office isn’t. In Defence Department, for example, you couldn’t say how many missiles the Russians had got rid of last week as a result of your efforts. We’ve talked about a lot of the issues already in the context of the late 1970s. Later, we became increasingly sensitive to individual circumstances. However, as I’ve said, the other side of that coin was how to be fair to all, and it did make the mobility obligation increasingly difficult to enforce. The discrimination case which I mentioned is interesting. It involved Robin Janvrin who was the Deputy Head of the Department in charge of Grade 4s. It involved a female officer; they’d been having discussions about her next posting and the proposal was that she should go on promotion to Grade 4 as Head of Chancery in an African post. In those days, as well as getting an appointment through the Board, you had to propose the appointee to the Head of Post. In this case, the Head of Post reverted and said, ‘She sounds admirable, but my political section,
of which she will be head, is already otherwise female. If she is appointed, it will be entirely female. We are operating in a country where women are not taken as seriously as men. She won’t have the access or the influence which a man would have. If it wasn’t for the fact that the rest of the section is female, I would say yes, but in these circumstances it would make life operationally difficult for us.” So Robin told the officer that there were analogous jobs in other places. One was in a comparable African post; the other one was in Indonesia, so different part of the world, but similar job. While these discussions were still going on, she complained to the Equal Opportunities Commission that she was being discriminated against. It became really unpleasant. She employed one of those lawyers you read about in *Private Eye* and the affair got into *Private Eye*. I don’t think we were helped by the fact that the Equal Opportunities Commission was run then by the Secretary of State’s wife, Elspeth Howe. So he took a particular interest, which I suspect he probably wouldn’t have done otherwise. In the end we settled out of court. A part of the deal was that she could go wherever she liked. She chose to go to be a consul in Australia. So here was a person with an A stream political career ahead of her who goes off to a job of no relevance to her career. A year later she resigned. As often in such cases, there were personal issues besides the one at stake. Of course nowadays one would not dream of accepting the High Commissioner’s objections.

Homosexuality and drugs. I wanted, of course, to abandon the ludicrous prohibition on gays joining the service. The effect was that gays in the service concealed their sexuality, which apart from anything else rendered them vulnerable to Soviet blackmail. PPD and we mounted a serious case, but were turned down by Antony Acland, who was then the PUS. As far as I was concerned, the issue with drugs was the same. The penalties in the Service for using drugs were greater than they were for the man or woman in the street. So drug users were potentially vulnerable to blackmail. But we didn't win that one either.

As I’ve said, the requirement to be fair meant that you needed to have the tools to incentivise or to get rid of people but to compensate them properly. But these were not available.

CM: Perhaps this is the moment to speak about the pressures of the job in POD. I hadn’t realised until you mentioned it earlier that it was a department where there were considerable pressures. I suppose it was inevitable, because people’s hopes for their futures and their wishes for their next place to go were all focussed on you. You must have had people who felt that they should have been in Paris when they were posted to Fiji.
There were certainly people who thought that they should be doing grander jobs than what was proposed to them. That situation was first of all the fault of POD, because by mid-career, officers’ capabilities, potential and likely termination point ought to have become clear to them in the course of their career-long dialogue with POD. You ought not to have situations when people come and say, ‘I should be Sir Somebody by now.’ But the system wasn’t perfect, and also people can be insensitive to what they are told. In particular, there’s a risk that they only retain the positive parts of discussions of performance and potential. And people conducting interviews may play down the less good bits; that’s wrong, but it is human nature. There are certainly cases of people who feel that the Service has let them down. He or she might be saying this because they are transferring their own insufficiencies onto the system. But you shouldn’t assume this and the system didn’t always produce the right outcomes. Michael Alexander, who was briefly my boss in POD, used to say that 5% of the Service caused 95% of the problems. But even with the 5%, you’ve got to take each of them seriously and you also have to balance that with the fact that you’re looking after the whole Service. Inevitably you make mistakes, and you think, ‘I shouldn’t have done that.’ It was a job that some people found very stressful, but I never felt that it was too much for me. Of course, you took it home with you and you worried about whether you had done the right thing. That never happened with other kinds of work. I was fortunate to have two very supportive Chief Clerks and PUS. People sometimes used to come in to talk about other people they were worried about, which was nice. It was never ever like Plenty by David Hare.

Senior Associate Member, St Antony’s College, Oxford, 1988–89

It was a great posting, cut short. That was because Matthew died and I was allowed to go off to St Antony’s for a year. I was supposed to write about Soviet defence policy, which was something I thought I knew quite a lot about. But I had chosen the wrong year to do this because it coincided with the moment when the Soviet Union had come to the conclusion that for economic reasons it could no longer rely on a strategy which depended on the possession of overwhelming force. They had kit which in many areas was better than ours. You wouldn’t have wanted to be a Western tank commander on the eastern front up against a Russian tank, for example. But the expenditure was enormous and sustaining these forces was ruining the Soviet Union. So two people, Larionov and Kokoshin - did you meet Kokoshin in Moscow, a friend of ours? - were given the job of producing a new policy to solve this problem. The solution was called Defensive Sufficiency. The experience from
which Larionov and Kokoshin took their inspiration was the Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle ever fought. The Russians defeated the Germans in spite of having significantly inferior forces. They had better intelligence and used better tactics. Could this approach somehow be adapted to their defence posture more generally? So here was I, trying to write a paper about Soviet defence policy which was changing as I wrote, so I didn’t. Half way through this, POD asked if we would go to Moscow next. I said I don’t know anything about the Soviet Union and didn’t speak Russian. I was told things were changing; it wasn’t the same Soviet Union; you could actually talk to people; there was a role for a non-specialist DHM. So I acquired a text-book Russian teacher, who never, ever, said you’d done anything well but would always tell you what you’d done wrong. I worked hard, took the exam and was disappointed to fail the Intermediate level.

Minister and Deputy Head of Mission, Moscow, 1989–92

When we went to Moscow, the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union existed and when we left, they’d gone. So this was an extraordinary moment in history. On the ground there were, of course, moments of crisis and demonstrations. However, because little was reported in the local media, I doubt that a casual western observer, if there had been such a thing, would have had the sense of drama and excitement which he or she would have experienced in London observing these developments through Western coverage of it. The fall of the Berlin Wall, for example, received scant attention in the Soviet media. Media isolation must have made these times different again for the ordinary Soviet citizen, who would have experienced deprivation and upheaval, but with little understanding of why his world had been turned upside down.

The role of deputy meant that you had to identify work which wasn’t being done by your amazingly capable boss and the equally capable head of the political section. I focussed to some extent on the non-Russian republics, because power was drifting away from Moscow. All of a sudden it mattered what happened there. I can remember that there was only one person in the UK who knew anything about Central Asia. She was called Shirin Akiner. It’s a Turkic name. If you asked anybody about Kazakhstan in 1988, they said, ‘That’s the Soviet Union.’ That was about it. Suddenly, what happened in the other republics started to matter. So I visited central Asia quite a lot.

As for the Baltic States, there was a convention that the Baltic States had never been part of the Soviet Union; they still had eighty-year-old ambassadors in London. The Ambassador in
Moscow could not go to the Baltic States, because that was said to demonstrate that we recognised Soviet authority there. So it was my job to cover the Baltic States. I established relationships there, particularly with the Estonian Deputy Foreign Minister, who was a woman.

There was a memorably dramatic moment when Judith and I went there in January 1991. You remember you had to get permission to go more than twenty five miles outside Moscow. Since the previous summer Embassy staffs had applied to go to the Baltic States and were routinely turned down. We applied months before and on this occasion we weren’t turned down. I think in retrospect this was because someone in the Foreign Ministry thought that Brits should see what was going on there. Judith and I arrived in Riga, got off the train and we were met by two men in uniform, who said, ‘We are guards of the Latvian Republic. Come with us.’ This was entirely unexpected. Riga looked like what I imagine Budapest must have looked like in 1956. Every road was barred with barricades made of upturned buses, concrete and other debris. Everyone had gas masks. The churches had been turned into First Aid centres. There were Soviet military helicopters buzzing around overhead and the Russians had recently stormed two police stations on the edge of the city. We were led through all this, past a restaurant where we were told that the OMON (Soviet militia) came and shot up everyone the day before, installed in a hotel and then taken to see the Prime Minister. Of course, the problem throughout this trip – we only went to Riga and Vilnius – was that here was the Prime Minister of Latvia, as far as he was aware under attack by the Soviet forces, saying to the Brits, ‘What are you going to do to help us?’ To which there wasn’t a great deal you could say as reassurance. You did your best. We spent two nights there, and went on by train, an absolutely filthy train I remember, to Vilnius, where again we were met by people who said, ‘We are the free army of Lithuania.’ That was even more dramatic, because the Parliament building was surrounded by Russian tanks. We were led through these tanks by our Lithuanian friends to the Parliament building. It was filled with Molotov cocktails, which the Parliamentarians had made. All the banisters - this was a modern building and had metal balustrades – had all been taken out because they were going to be used as weapons. If any of those Molotov cocktails had gone off, you’d never have got out, because of all the encircling tanks. Strange that we were allowed to enter. We were taken up to see President Landsbergis, who was barricaded in his office and like his Latvian counterpart asked we were going to do to help. Four people had been killed at the television tower by the Russians about a month earlier. But this was of course an historic turning point
because Gorbachev didn’t use force to bring the Baltic states back into the Soviet fold. Their forces didn’t advance further. Along of course with the way he handled Honecker, this is what made Gorbachev great. Unlike all his predecessors, he didn’t use force to sustain the empire.

We also went to the other republics - Ukraine, Armenia, etc. to see how policy was being developed in these countries which were aspiring to independence. I suppose that if Gorbachev had gone to these countries himself, he would have seen that his ambition of sustaining a reformed Soviet Union was unrealistic. Hitherto, all of them had foreign ministries which looked imposing but in practice dealt with nothing except the organisation of visits and other ceremonial events. As the Union weakened this began to change. I made it my business to track the development of the Russian Foreign Ministry. When I started, it consisted of some five people in an office over a food store. The “minister” was Kozyrev who later became foreign minister of Russia after the demise of the Soviet Union. I was told that foreign policy was to be made democratically. Anyone would be able to come in and say what they thought Russia should do. As the role of the republics strengthened, however, the Russian ministry moved into offices in Stariy Ploshad, hitherto the offices of the Communist party. There was said to be a member of the Supreme Soviet from Brezhnev’s time still occupying his office there. More officials from the Soviet Foreign Ministry decamped to the Russian ministry with an eye on their future careers. The romantic days of policy being made by the people passed. You now needed an appointment to get into an institution which increasingly resembled the Soviet ministry itself. Finally, full independence came, and the Russian Ministry took over the Smolenskaya offices of the Soviet ministry. Many of the old Soviet faces were now Russian officials and in many ways a full circle had been turned; policy may have changed in some ways, but of course it would have been illusory to imagine that there had been a dramatic break with the past, as the office above the shop once might have suggested.

In the context of power ebbing from the centre to the republics, Rodric Braithwaite said, ‘We must find out about extremism in Uzbekistan, because there are religious extremists there who are clearly going to influence policy’. He was about forty years ahead of his time on this. So Tim Barrow and I went off to Tashkent. We knew that extremists lived up the Fergana Valley. We went to Tashkent and then took a little plane to Fergana. We got into town and we said to each other ‘How do you think you recognise an extremist? Do they have beards? Where will we find one? We sat down in a café and got talking to people and asked
“Do you often go to mosques?’ And they’d say, ‘Well, not much.’ ‘Do you have a copy of the Koran at home?’ So it was rather a fruitless day. We just had some nice conversations with people who thought we were asking faintly odd questions about their religious beliefs. So we decide to go to find someone at a medresseh and say that we were representatives of an English university, interested in ties. He said, ‘Do they teach religion in British universities?’ I think we said, ‘Not a lot. You can do theology.’ So that didn’t get very far. At that stage Tim developed the most terrible diarrhoea and we had to go back to Moscow. In any case, we had probably about exhausted this foray and had to go back to Rodric and say that we hadn’t found an extremist.

On an even lighter note, I remember that Konstantin, the Ambassador’s driver, had been a stunt driver in a previous career. Legendarily, he could do a handbrake turn in the Rolls in the small sweep in front of the Embassy. He was also a rally driver, and had an old Zhiguli with an anti-roll cage, four-point seatbelts, Halda Speedpilot, the lot. He somehow heard that I was interested in cars (the KGB?) and invited me to go rallying with him in the winter. The roads were entirely ice-covered, so we practised on frozen lakes, great fun and no other vehicles to hit. Come the day, the car had been painted with Konstantin’s and my name painted on the side, and also our blood groups, which was a bit depressing. All went reasonably well for some hours until we came to a speed trial section with television cameras trained on the start. “Carrying the flag for the free world here”, I thought and put my foot on the floor. I completely misjudged the power slide at the first corner and landed ignominiously in a field, from which a truck with a big winch was needed to extract us. Later on, our wipers broke, so that we had to operate them with pieces of string led through the quarter lights and in the end we were not far from the back of the field. So much for Western superiority. However, for some time there was a glossy FCO recruitment pamphlet featuring me with the rally car. “Join the Foreign Office and this could be you too”. I don’t think it showed the blood group side of the car.

While, as I said, history didn’t unroll dramatically before our eyes, it would be hard to exaggerate the depths and variety of our concerns in the office. It is a commonplace that no one knew when the Soviet Union would collapse. But more importantly, when this started, we had little idea of where it would finish. Would there be civil war? Would Russia itself break up? Would populations starve? What about nuclear weapons? These are just a few of the existential questions which absorbed our attention and with which it was essential to keep abreast; and for which we and other Western governments needed to plan. With hindsight, it
is clear that we could have tried to affect developments at the time in better ways. Retrospective agonising over that isn’t rewarding. But, even if history doesn’t repeat itself, and while these events are of historic significance unique to their time, I’m sure that an understanding of them should be part of the analytic armoury of any practitioner or student of international relations.

INTERVIEW 3 WITH SIR DAVID LOGAN

Today is 29 June 2017. This is the third interview with Sir David Logan for the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, Catherine Manning recording.

CM: David, at the end of our last interview we were talking about your time in Moscow which ended in 1992, just after the coup against Gorbachev and at the time of the ending of the Soviet Union. I wondered whether you had anything more you wanted to say about Moscow before we move on to your next posting.

DL: I want to say two things. One was something that might have been more apparent to me than to others dealing with the great events of the day, but which was in some ways a microcosm of the evolution from the Soviet Union to Russia, namely the development of a Russian Foreign Ministry. During the latter days of the Soviet Union, the republics were given progressively more autonomy. Gorbachev clearly anticipated a sustained Soviet Union in which, the republics would have a great deal of autonomy, but not total independence. The republics started to develop their own institutions. I used to travel a great deal to the republics because now what they said and did started to matter. In Moscow the Russian Federation set up its Foreign Ministry over a grocery shop. In the office upstairs were three people one of whom, I think, must have been Andrei Kozyrev. These were defectors, as it were, from the Soviet Foreign Ministry. They started to develop a new Russian foreign policy. At first they said, ‘This is going to be the people’s foreign policy. We will encourage people to come in and say what they think Russia should be doing. We will develop a truly democratic foreign policy.’ It was not long, however, before the Russian Foreign Ministry moved from the little room above the grocer’s to much grander offices in Stary Ploshad, which had been the old Communist Party Headquarters. Politburo members had had offices there. There was rumoured to be one still there from Khrushchev’s time. This was much grander and formal. No question of ordinary people making foreign policy. You needed a pass to get in. The Russian ministry grew more and more like an alternative to the Soviet ministry. Then when the Union finally broke up the Russian ministry moved back
into what been the Soviet ministry building. Many of those who had been sitting at their
desks in the Soviet Foreign Ministry now found themselves at the same desks, but in the
Russian Foreign Ministry. It illustrates the truth that moments of historical inflexion are
seldom complete.

A broader point which I would like to bring out was the belief that the main emphasis of the
West’s contribution to the development of post-Soviet Russia should be to try to achieve a
rapid transformation to a market economy, rather than to assist in the development of
democratic institutions. People like Richard Layard and Geoffrey Sachs made their
reputations advising on economic change. In the end Gorbachev complained bitterly that it
was the lack, not of advice, but of material support from the West which it had made it
impossible for him to sustain the revolution.

The economy deteriorated to such a point that the West started providing food aid. We
delivered beef. So here we were in the Embassy at the end of a policy chain devoted to the
transformation of the Russian economy, trying to set the price for British beef on the streets
of Moscow. Our guiding principle was to price it high enough for it to be unattractive to the
Mafia to buy it up and resell it; but not so low as to price out the Russian traders. I don’t
think we did too badly in an area in which our expertise was not exactly top notch, but what
the West didn’t do was to devote serious resources to the achievement of democratic change.

A small story from this time. We chartered Antonov 90s, the biggest cargo planes in the
world at the time, to bring in the beef. One day a plane load arrived and the Russians said,
“We’re not accepting it because of BSE.” Much indignation from the British. If it is good
enough for Mr. Gummer’s daughter, it’s good enough for you Russians. This was August
and the plane sat on the tarmac dripping gently, with the beef not improving. The issue
finally got to the two Prime Ministers, Major and Chubais, who spoke on the phone. In the
end the Russians said the plane could unload in Murmansk instead of Moscow.

CM: I remember that the point of going to Murmansk was to keep it frozen, because there the
ambient temperature was below freezing.

DL: Yes, indeed. Guy Spindler went on the plane. Half way along the pilot said, ‘I come
from Sverdlovsk, and they really need beef there. Let’s go there instead of Murmansk. Guy
stuck to his guns and they went to Murmansk, where everyone was delighted: not because
they were starving but because they could then process all the beef into sausages and sell them back to Moscow.

CM: On your point that not enough effort was put into building democracy, wouldn’t you say that at the time there was an attitude that democracy was the default position. Once you’d removed the autocrat, democracy would happen automatically.

DL: I infer that must have been the attitude. I think we also thought that democracy and a strong economy were inseparably linked. If you had one, you’d get the other. Now of course we have the example of China, which makes people in some parts of the world wonder whether democracy is such a good idea as people like you and me think it is. But after I left the Foreign Office, I ran a policy centre where our daily bread were projects funded by the Foreign Office to help construct democratic institutions, not market economies, in post-communist countries.

CM: I suppose people concentrated on the economy because it was so clear that it didn’t deliver what people wanted. We saw it: empty shops. And do you remember after the harvest in 1990 they had no system to distribute potatoes, so they just drove the lorries into the city and emptied the potatoes in piles on the corner of the street.

DL: I agree. And I remember that the value of the rouble on the black market sank so far that it became economical for the farmers in the Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan, to bring their produce every day by plane to the Moscow markets.

Assistant Under Secretary of State (Central and Eastern Europe), 1992–94

CM: You left Moscow in 1992 and went back to London and took over as Assistant Under Secretary for Central and Eastern Europe.

DL: Yes, and that included Russia and the former Soviet republics as well as the former Warsaw Pact members in Eastern Europe. Calling them all “Central and Eastern Europe” meant that the world really had changed.

CM: It was an enormous empire. What did your job involve?

DL: Linked to what we had been doing in Moscow in connection with the transformation of Russia, I and an Under Secretary from the ODA (Overseas Development Agency) supervised the Know How Fund (KHF). The KHF was an aid organisation but not a traditional one. It
was not about building dams in Africa, for example. It aimed to assist the transformation of Russia and the other formerly Communist countries into market economies. Hence its combined FCO and ODA parentage, rather than being purely an ODA operation. We devised a wide range of innovative projects ranging from the establishment of the Warsaw Stock Exchange to energy sources in Moldova and the bread supply in Moscow. Being British, the sums involved were not enormous, but it had a disproportionate impact, I think. This was also the first time in my career that I had come across the world of consultancies. The projects could not of course be developed by the FCO. What did we know about running a Stock Exchange? Typically three or four big advisory companies would tender and charge what seemed to us large amounts of money, though probably not as much as they notoriously did in later years for other outsourced work, and not, as far as I know, without doing what was asked of them.

CM: The Know How Fund is mentioned over and over again by people who were working in this area of the world at that period, whether you are talking about Uzbekistan or Russia or Eastern Europe. Clearly there was a lot of enthusiasm and good will. Did you visit some of the projects?

DL: Yes, indeed. I visited the Warsaw Stock Exchange, established in a country where hitherto the notion of a stock exchange had been entirely alien. Hungary of course had an economy which had been less than fully communist for many years. So for them, the KHF enabled them to realise what they had been doing for years more effectively with the aid of external expertise. For others, like Moldova, this was a new and alien world. I visited Moldova and had a bright idea. Moldova had a major energy problem, but it also has more pigs than people. So here, clearly, was the solution to the energy problem because you could generate methane from the pig poo. So consultants looked into my bright idea; they came back and said, ‘You’re right in theory. However, the pig poo is all over the place. Collecting it will be more expensive than processing it.’

Moldova, when it became independent, left behind an area called Transdniestria (it was on the other side of the Dniester) which was determined to remain Soviet. It was run by some former Soviet generals who took their armed forces with them there. I decided to visit. At the bridge across the Dniester there were couple of Russian tanks. You crossed over and entered a time warp. The public buildings were covered with wonderful Soviet paintings glorifying Stalin, labour, communism, farmers, and metal workers. It was the Soviet Union
in the good old days - not a restaurant or super market in sight! I went to call on the general in charge and then had an awful moment wondering whether the Transdniestrians were going to say that this meant that the British had recognised their independent country. Thankfully they didn’t. Not a lot has changed since then. They still have a hammer and sickle on their flag.

The job was terrific, I thought. The main task was to establish relations with my counterparts in these countries. They were generally deputy foreign ministers. They were young, post-communist and enthusiastic about the process of change on which their countries were embarking. So I was generally given a warm welcome because they believed that, via the KHF and in other ways, we could assist with the transformation of communist governance into pluralist democracies structures.

CM: How enthusiastic were your counterparts for the project? Presumably most of them were former Soviet and former Communist officials who had lived through a revolution and now were working for a new government.

DL: It’s true that not everyone was enthusiastic, but much changed as time passed. When I first went to Azerbaijan in my new job, the President was Mamedov. When I called on him, I thought this would be a good opportunity to use Turkish because Azerbaijani is very close to Turkish. But after about a minute or two, the President said, ‘You speak very good Turkish, Mr Logan. You don’t by any chance speak Russian, do you?’ Three or four years later it would have been inconceivable that an Azerbaijani president would say that to you. As I’ve mentioned, my counterparts in countries like Romania and Bulgaria, were extremely positive; they’d been given their jobs in order to promote change. In Romania, I once lunched with the President. I was just an official and was surprised that he even knew I was in town! But it certainly made me feel that I was doing something that not only we, but also these countries, felt was useful.

It was also the first time I had encountered the European Union as a motor for democratic change. The prospect of EU membership as a motor for change has been a commonplace for the last twenty five years or so. But this was 1992. A dispute had broken out between Slovakia and Hungary over the Gabčikovo Dam. The dam is on the border between the two countries on the Danube and the dispute, typical of those which arise when dams are being constructed was about where the water was going to flow, how it should be diverted etc. I remember summoning the ambassadors from these two countries, and saying, ‘If you don’t
sort this out you’re not going to get into the European Union.’ Of course, it wasn’t just me saying that, but the threat worked.

At the same time I became the British representative on the Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE (Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe). The first thing I encountered was the issue of membership. Before the break-up of the Soviet Union, there were 35 members of which the Soviet Union was one. Should all its former constituent republics now become members? It was one of a number of inheritance status issues which arise at the dissolution of the USSR. It was decided that all should become members, which raised the membership to 54. It was attractive to the former Soviet republics, and in particularly Russia, because they visualised it as a potential pan-European security structure, which brought together the former Warsaw Pact countries and NATO members on an equal footing. The relationship between Russia and NATO is one that we have failed to solve; the still Russians regard NATO as an intrusive victor which attempts to manipulate developments in Ukraine, for example. This underpins their continuing mistrust of the West, and Putin’s exploitation of this. Whether a strong CSCE would have helped to eliminate this problem, or was even conceivably viable without compromising the effectiveness of NATO, I don’t know. At the time, however, we were prepared to acquiesce in Russian enthusiasm for the CSCE to some extent, with our eyes wide open, because we didn’t entirely discount its usefulness. It also was potentially important because it developed intrusive mechanisms for examining member states’ performance on human rights. Fifty years ago, that was called interfering in the internal affairs of other states. The OSCE adopted a mechanism, known as the Moscow mechanism, which in certain circumstances formally permitted the despatch of a mission of member states’ representatives to inspect the situation on the ground of another member state.

CM: This was the legacy of Helsinki, was it? Human rights and basket three?

DL: Yes, ‘...and then the CSCE brought down the Soviet Union.’ There’s no doubt about the unforeseen impact of Basket three. In 1975, much controversy surrounded the fact that the Final Act gave legitimacy to the post-WW2 frontiers which were the consequence of Soviet occupation. But in the end what was more important was that it laid the foundation for the Helsinki monitoring system in Russia and other communist countries and that the resulting growth in media transparency and in human rights concerns in the East played a tangible part in the collapse of the system fifteen years later. In the early 1990s, the fundamental issues at
the CSCE were still the same, namely pan-European security and human rights. You see the legacy of that work a decade later in R2P (Responsibility to Protect) because the issue remains the same. We regard it as the responsibility of a country to look after its citizens properly. If it fails to do so, what are the rights and responsibilities of the rest of the global community in this regard?

We reached an inflexion point in the development of the CSCE (later OSCE) with the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the war there between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Should the OSCE send a peacekeeping force? It didn’t. One reason was that logistically getting forces to Nagorno-Karabakh would have been very difficult for a hitherto untested organisation. But the West was also concerned about the implications of this pan-European organisation deploying peacekeeping forces, which looked like a step too far in the fulfilment of Russian ambitions in this direction.

For better or for worse, the OSCE’s gathering credibility and significance was ended by its failure to send peace-keeping forces to Nagorno-Karabakh, though I would not want to denigrate the value of the work it now does on human rights and on election monitoring.

This 54-member organisation worked by consensus. In practice the CSO (Committee of Senior Officials) would start work on a Wednesday and work till well past midnight each day. The decisions were taken by the people who were still awake on Saturday morning. The first time I went, the Ambassador, with whom I was staying, said that I didn’t need a car to get to the top of Castle Hill, where the CSCE met because it was a maze of slow-moving little streets. “Walking is much easier. Whenever you get to a crossroads or a turning, just keep to your left.” So I did that, and got there with no trouble. So at three o’clock the following morning when the first meeting finished, I said to myself “All I’ve got to do now is to keep to the right.” I was still wandering round central Prague when daylight came.

CM: Did you get any pushback from the former Warsaw Pact countries about human rights?

DL: It varied. As I’ve said earlier, many of the newly non-communist Eastern European countries were enthusiastic about everything which democracy brought with it. But this wasn’t true of many, notably the states of the FSU itself. However, and more broadly, it is worth remembering that a post-Cold War failure was the inability of the West to establish a relationship with Russia, which didn’t characterise Russia as the vanquished. The OSCE might have provided that, to the benefit of us all, if it had developed further. But there were
justified Western concerns, primarily a fear that the Russians would manipulate the organisation in ways that diminished rather than enhanced our security. There was a fear that “pan-European security structures”, which the Russians advocated, was a way for a powerful and perhaps hostile state which was not a member of NATO to get a handle on European security. We went as far as establishing a NATO-Russia Council. Consultation took place, doctrines compared, joint exercises were undertaken and so on. But that didn’t disguise the fact that Russia was an outsider, not a member. Russian membership of NATO may have been impossible but only with a security institution in which it was on an equal footing with the United States might we have avoided the tensions and suspicions, rooted in fear of Western expansionism, manifested in the Ukraine and Georgia crises.

So I enjoyed and valued the OSCE. I was a reasonably senior official, not tremendously important, but it was my thing and I was allowed to get on with it. I had able colleagues, for example the Russians and Americans, and it was the first place I encountered Carl Bildt, whom I admired very much. He seemed to know more about the details of what we were doing than desk officers, but also had a tremendous overall grasp. You’d bump into him at some OSCE event and he’d say, ‘What do you think about this or that?’ often some detailed point about which I’d have to scratch my head.

I did the Central and Eastern Europe job for two years. I then moved on to defence. I don’t think I should have changed jobs after only two years. The relationships which I was establishing with my post-Communist counterparts were important and should have been sustained and developed.

**FCO, Assistant Under Secretary (Defence Policy), 1994–95**

CM: You became Assistant Under Secretary for Defence and Security in 1993. You’ve just said that perhaps you shouldn’t have changed jobs. But defence was very much your subject

DL: Yes, it was regarded as one of the more important AUS jobs, so it didn’t really occur to me at the time that I should not have moved. Retrospectively, I think that continuity in the previous job would have been the right thing, because I could have developed further the relationship with my post-Communist counterparts and perhaps contributed a little to the development of the new Eastern Europe.

However, it was an extremely interesting time in the defence field. I was not directly involved with Yugoslavia. From the side lines, and with the benefit of hindsight, I think the
way the crisis was handled was a European failure. UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) was a typical lightly armed UN peacekeeping force, not equipped for, or capable of, serious fighting, which was what was required to take on the Serbs. In spite of that, the Security Council imposed on it tasks, in particular the establishment of safe areas, which however it did not have the means to secure. Moreover, the Americans were not involved. They had stood aside when the Vance-Owen Plan was rejected by the Serbians. The situation then steadily deteriorated while the Europeans dithered around with UNPROFOR. Srebrenica and other tragedies occurred because of the disconnect between what politicians thought they could achieve by passing resolutions at the UN and UNPROFOR’s capabilities on the ground. “Safe areas” were declared with no way of making them safe. Then the Americans re-engaged. They advocated “Lift and strike”. “Lift” meant lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnians and “strike” meant attacking the Serbs. We had opposed this on the grounds that this would mean yet more arms pouring into the region. However, once the Americans enforced a more aggressive approach, the notion that the Serbs couldn’t be taken on simply crumbled away. The Emperor had a limited amount of clothes.

CM: You were dealing with NATO which was in its first stage of developing a post-Cold War rationale.

DL: To start with, reconfiguring our armed forces. They had been designed and deployed for defence against attack by the Warsaw Pact on the Central Front. For example, there were large numbers of main battle tanks (MBTs) the task of which was to defend against attack by a Soviet army, similarly configured. Now this threat had gone. Instead of area defence, countering new threats required a high degree of mobility. Heavy lift aircraft became more important than MBTs. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty - an attack on one is an attack on all - began to look questionable. Could we now conceive of a threat which all NATO members would regard as an attack on all? There seemed to be only one such, namely a Soviet invasion of Europe, and that had now gone.

There had always been a problem about the size of the European contribution to NATO, just as today. The EuroGroup had been established as long ago as 1968 to address this problem. Come the end of the Cold War, I among many others wondered whether the American commitment to Europe would continue. Its security seemed no longer such an important interest as the Pacific, the Far East and elsewhere. So the Europeans needed to do more and to have the capacity to do this at least autonomously. So we worked on the development of
CJTFs (Combined Joint Task Forces). In the jargon, they were detachable, but not detached, from the NATO structures. They would be coalitions of the willing within the NATO framework to be deployed when there was agreement that a threat existed, but when not all member states were prepared to commit forces to deal with it. They might even include forces from countries which weren’t members of NATO. There is a CJTF in operation at the moment in Syria; it’s called Inherent Resolve, and has non-NATO members taking part. But at the time it was particularly the European role which mattered to us in the context of new threats and potentially reduced US commitment. It was envisaged that, in certain circumstances, the Western European Union could take command of NATO CJTFs. So what was called European defence identity had become very important.

On the more political side, the Europeans were developing a common security and defence policy, which in those days was intended to be the basis for military deployments when needed. Since the EU did not itself have a military structure or capability, this required cooperation between the EU and NATO. An arrangement called “Berlin Plus” was developed. Under this, NATO became a toolbox on which the EU could draw in order to undertake operations. This seems almost incomprehensible these days, but at the time the European Union was developing in every respect and security was, for the post-Cold War reasons I’ve given, one of them. Neither the FCO nor the Ministry of Defence had problems with this. The United States was not opposed, generally thinking that the expected increment in European defence capabilities outweighed the risk that the Europeans might embark by themselves on operations of which the US didn’t necessarily approve.

There were, however, devoted Atlanticists who were opposed, fearing that European defence might weaken transatlantic ties, and at the same time John Major’s government was becoming increasingly divided over policy towards Europe. Just as in 2016, policy was sacrificed to Tory party unity. It became impossible to put “Europe” and “defence” in the same paragraph of anything you wrote. Ever since then, the British have tried to prevent the development of anything which smacks of European defence. With our impending departure from the EU, there are signs that this may change.

CM: Was this the period of decommissioning of the nuclear weapons of Russia and the Ukraine?

DL: Yes, that was a success. As far as weapons stationed in the former Soviet Union but outside Russia were concerned, the Russians regarded these as a threat as much for them as
for us. That was one reason it went well. The Americans put tremendous resources into that process.

CM: And was the enlargement of NATO already an issue? What was the general attitude to that idea?

DL: I think it is common ground that there was no formal agreement with Gorbachev that NATO would not expand. But the Russians clearly felt that this was what they had been told. At the time, I rather regarded this as post-Soviet bluster. I’m now more inclined to think the Russian sense of betrayal was genuine because of their profound historical fear of invasion from the west: why should this have deserted them just because the Cold War was over? The fear of still further enlargement is partly responsible for confrontation with Russia over Ukraine and Georgia.

CM: How far had the idea of new membership progressed in your time as AUS?

DL: Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the Visigrad Three, joined in 1997. On the military side a lot of work was done; advice and assistance on military planning, sharing of concepts etc. for their forces, which were generally pretty hopeless. This, rather than political input, was the first stage because they clearly couldn’t join NATO if their forces were totally incompatible.

I should earlier have mentioned the break-up of Czechoslovakia, which I observed from close hand. I got a strong impression that neither side really wanted this. Each side seemed to want to call the bluff of the other, but this never happened. Neither was prepared to say “Isn’t this enough?” and to draw back. In those days Slovakia was weak compared with the Czech Republic. I doubt that even Mečiar wanted complete independence, as distinct from greater autonomy within a federation.

CM: Were the fellow Europeans just watching in stunned amazement?

DL: I don’t think we wanted it to happen, but I don’t recall anything being done to try to stop it. As things turned out, of course, Slovakia has been a relative success story. In comparison with Ukraine, or even in some long-established countries like Romania, they’ve done all right.

CM: And on arms control during this period?
DL: During my time on defence policy, I had come to know a lot about, and in some cases made a minor contribution to, the great arms control agreements of the late Cold War period- SALT, SALT II and START. The last of those was the CFE Treaty (Conventional Forces in Europe). This was signed in 1992. It governed the ATTU area (Atlantic to the Urals) and was the first measure adopted to constrain conventional forces, as distinct from arsenals. The MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions) negotiations had failed to achieve this in the late ‘70s. The CFE Treaty was adopted in 1992, so implementation was under way while I was AUS. As I said, it was the last of these great arms control treaties. Their time passed with the end of the Cold War, and of the deterrence/arms control relationship between East and West. Secondly, it contained the final step in the steadily improving mechanisms of arms control verification. It put an absolute limit on numbers of troops deployed. It was eventually renounced by the Russians in 2005.

To start with, verification depended on what were called “National Technical Means” and there were inevitably disputes about what means were legitimate and which were not. Later on came measures to remove any ambiguity about the capability of a weapons system. An aircraft could, after all, be nuclear-capable or not. To clarify this, certain aircraft had “EODs” (externally observable differences) to make clear whether they were nuclear capable or not. Another development was the recognition that it was better if your opponent knew the capabilities of your new missile system than if he did not. At first sight, this seems counter-intuitive: surely you don’t want him to know what your brand new weapon can do? But that kind of surprise could cause a fear of a gap in capabilities and result in an arms race. You really want to avoid this kind of surprise. So, in the negotiation of START I there was much discussion of the benefits or otherwise of the encryption of telemetry when testing new missile systems. Experimental missiles transmit information about their performance. One’s first thought might be that this is the last thing one wants the other side to get hold of. Eventually, however, the new treaty provided that telemetry should not be encrypted so that both sides would understand new systems’ capabilities and surprises about these would be avoided. In a further development, the CFE Treaty contained arrangements for surprise inspections of Treaty parties’ forces to verify that they were adhering to their commitments. This requirement, that is, that if I say I want to come and look at forces located somewhere in Russia, the Russians must throw the base open for inspection reflected a deepening commitment to Reagan’s “Trust and verify” principle and the development of confidence and that was one of the things. We had moved from a position in which, crudely put, you sign a
treaty and “I’m committed to these obligations” and then don’t fulfil them to one in which the other side can tell whether you are indeed observing your obligations.

The immediate post-Cold War era was one of great change in terms of the equipment, strategy and tactics and at the policy level in organisation, institutions, and objectives. Weapon systems acquired for Cold War roles (MBTs, sophisticated fighters, anti-submarine frigates etc) would not be much use against Al-Qaida or ISIS. It was also, of course, a period of great optimism. Later came the failure of European defence, more generally the end of “The end of history”, and the world of globalised insecurity in which we now live.

I was going to talk about how NATO justified its existence after the end of the Cold War. Partly by going “out of area”. During the Cold War it was inconceivable that NATO would take military action outside the NATO area, which is defined geographically. But the “in area” threat, namely the Soviet Union, had gone. What was NATO to do? The search for a new role was partly driven by the fact that it was a highly developed and effective organisation, so that disbanding it might be short sighted, and partly by the recognition that there were crises erupting outside the NATO area which however directly affected the interests of its member states. In the Cold War the idea that NATO might have charged off to fight the Russians in Afghanistan would have been inconceivable. Post-Cold War, there could be Alliance-wide agreement that the situation in Afghanistan or Libya, for example, represented a threat to member states’ interests but willingness on the part of only a few to commit forces to address the threat. So the idea of NATO as a toolbox developed (just as NATO is a toolbox for the EU in the “Berlin plus” arrangements).

What should the NATO-Russia relationship be? A NATO-Russia Council was established: we’ll co-operate with them; we’ll do joint exercises with them; we’ll compare doctrine; we’ll have them round the table at this new Council, but they can’t be members. So, as I’ve said, in the Russian perception, the relationship was one between the victors and the vanquished. The objections to this are obvious enough. On the other hand expansion by the “victorious” allies was deeply resented and underlay the crises over the (largely American) hints at the desirability of Georgian and Ukrainian accession, which the Russians regard as interference in their “sphere of influence”.

CM: According to your notes, it was at this point that they suggested that you might become Secretary General of the OSCE. There was a choice, shall I become Secretary General of the OSCE or shall I go and be Minister in Washington. It was no contest?
DL: Yes. I might have felt differently if the OSCE had developed in the way in which I had hoped it would.

Minister, Washington, 1995–97

CM: You went to Washington in 1995 as Minister, the number two in the Embassy. And at that time Robin Renwick was Ambassador.

DL: Robin asked me to go. He was always tremendously kind to me throughout my career. I think I told you earlier that when I was a totally inexperienced Private Secretary, he told me what I should be doing. The main thing about Washington for us practitioners is that it is the place where foreign policy-making really matters. We like to think in the Foreign Office that the UK has foreign policy interests which we pursue and try to secure as powerfully as we can. But the United States is so powerful, that often they are not just influencing events, they’re determining them. And they carry the can. That is always worth remembering, for us medium-sized powers when we criticize the Americans. We often say that this or that must be done, but often it is the Americans to whom the responsibility for any action actually falls.

I used to go down to see Dennis Ross at State. He’d have Arafat on one phone and his secretary would come in and say the Prime Minister of Israel was on the other. It’s not quite like this for an Under Secretary in the Foreign Office. In any event, that’s why Washington is the place to be for any diplomat. The British think, probably correctly, that they operate there more effectively than anyone else with the possible exception of the Israelis. We had a bunch of extremely able people in the Embassy, all tremendously well plugged in, to the great envy of most of our allies. The British Embassy plays an important role in Washington. But it is easy to be deceived about the actual impact on US policy. Jeremy Greenstock’s book makes it very clear how seductive it is to be told by American officials that you are getting special treatment and that you are an insider. You get sucked in. When it comes to the point, however, the Americans are ruthless about pursuit of their own interests; you were deluding yourself if you thought your “special treatment” meant otherwise.

I knew Richard Holbrooke quite well; he was a force of nature. Warren Christopher was Secretary of State at this time. You could go to a meeting at which both were present and Holbrooke would say, ‘Well, in any normal administration we’d be doing something different.’ Warren Christopher would just take it without complaint. Richard Holbrooke
didn’t distinguish much between what was important and what wasn’t; everything mattered. He telephoned me one day ‘David, I want you to come down straightaway.’ I thought it must be Yugoslavia or something. So I go to his office and he’s got a pile of books on his desk. It was December. His wife, Kati Marton, had just written a book about Israel called ‘A Death in Jerusalem.’ He said, ‘David, could you get that one for Douglas Hurd. And there’s one for John Major and there’s one for you too.’ I said, ‘Of course. Was there anything else?’ He said, ‘No.’ My copy was inscribed “To David with respect and my thanks for being a superb courier”.

Warren Christopher didn’t actually wear pinstripes, but he was very old school East Coast. His office was on the seventh floor of the State Department where the walls are almost exclusively lined with pictures of British warships being sunk by American ones. You’d go for a meeting between Warren Christopher and Douglas Hurd. There was a certain similarity between them. Douglas would sit there doing this, swinging his leg up and down, as he does. Warren would say, ‘Welcome, Douglas.’ Douglas would say, ‘Well, there’s Bosnia.’ And Warren would then say, ‘Yes, there’s Bosnia. It’s not particularly good in Bosnia, is it?’ And Douglas would say, ‘No, it’s not good in Bosnia.’ ‘Shall we go on to Cyprus? What can we do about things there?’ Christopher would say ‘It’s not good at all. And then there is the Middle East. What about that?’ I used to wonder how our notes of the discussion compared with the American version. It reminded me of Kissinger’s complaint that in a policy discussion, his officials would always come up with the same three options, ‘Bomb ‘em, surrender or more of the same.’

I was in Washington a short time, two years; one year with Robin and one year with John Kerr. Robin was a tremendously forceful, able man and extremely good at his job. One problem was that you would be doing something and he would come in and say, ‘I think I’ll take over, if I may.’ It was difficult to be quite sure when he would home in on an issue. John Kerr, on the other hand, said, ‘I’ll do the Hill because that’s the most important and you do the Administration, ie the Pentagon, the State Department and the NSC (National Security Council).’ The National Security Adviser was Tony Lake, a cerebral, unostentatious man, very good to deal with. And his successor was the big, tough Sandy Berger. My daily bread was mostly NATO transformation and Yugoslavia. The core of the so-called special relationship was defence and intelligence, which distinguished us from other allies. The Embassy had a big section dealing just with military/scientific aspects of Trident because of the complexity and importance of this, which of course had political implications too.
I also looked after and visited the Consulates General. The really important ones were New York, Chicago and San Francisco, apart from New York. I once went to St Louis and then on a road trip down to Kansas City. In Jefferson City, I visited the State Legislature. I entered the strangers’ gallery. The house was in session, but the Speaker stopped the session and said ‘We have with us today the Deputy Ambassador from the British Embassy in Washington. Let us give him a big round of applause.’ Can you imagine that happening in England? And local Talk Radio. It runs twenty-four hours a day and they always need someone to fill the time. The anchor says ‘We’ve got Mister Logan who’s come all the way from Washington, any questions?’ The questions ranged from serious ones about the Falkland Islands to curiosity as to how I often saw the Queen. Some of them really difficult; some just fun.

Another of my issues was British off-shore tax havens, an issue which has continuing resonance. The Americans were very concerned about the tax havens in our jurisdictions in the Caribbean. To deal with this, I used to visit Miami, where their agencies dealt with the problem. They had serious and legitimate concerns. Notoriously, there was one island where you could land and use a bank with its counter airside, so that you didn’t even need to enter the country to launder your money.

We lived on Edgevale Terrace. The house was lovely and some ways nicer than a residence because it was built as a private house, rather than for official purposes. We had wonderful Filipino staff. I think we entertained about five thousand people a year. Judith has a story which says it all about them. One morning she said to Paulina, the housekeeper, that we needed to give a tea party for about a hundred people. Paulina, entirely unfazed, asked ‘This afternoon, madam?’

One other thing about Washington. First of all, there is this disjuncture between the tremendous intellectual resources available, particularly in the think tanks with their administration-by-administration revolving doors and really able people in the departments of state because of this, and US policy as implemented, which often seemed to fall short. One example was North Korea. I dealt with a lot was Bob Gallucci, who was the chief U.S. negotiator and the architect of a settlement with North Korea. It was a complex negotiation, involving the North Koreans shutting down their nuclear development facilities with complex trade-offs and confidence-building measures, the kind of deal that right-wing Republicans sneered at over Iran. You’re dealing with nasty people, but an agreement is going to be better
than the alternative. Along comes George Bush and it’s all gone, with negotiation replaced by confrontation and threats. So you witnessed able people who had as in Bob’s case, developed, with the help of a large team, serious ideas which he had taken a long way with the North Koreans which were then ditched by the incoming Administration.

CM: You only stayed two years in Washington because in 1997 you were appointed Ambassador to Turkey.

**Ambassador to Turkey, 1997–2001**

DL: Yes, Kieran Prendergast, my predecessor who hadn’t been there very long, was picked up by the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, with whom Kieran had worked.

CM: So he left Turkey unexpectedly early and you were there to fill in the breach. Did you go straight there?

DL: Not quite. We had some time for me to brush up my Turkish. The most striking thing about Turkey on coming back after a long time away was how it seemed to have got stuck in a political time warp. Back in the interwar period, Atatürk, one of the towering figures of the twentieth century, had re-invented Turkey in so many ways. He died with his revolution incomplete, but by the time when we were there in the ‘60s a multiparty democracy was in place and seemed to be maturing steadily. When we went back, we were struck immediately by how little development there had been in terms of greater pluralism, less deference and general democratic buy-in, as there has been in the West. In Turkey, there remained a rigid structure in which the state knew best. You don’t want to bother your little minds with these complicated things about which we, the government, know best. Just do what you’re told.

Externally Turks believed that they were surrounded by enemies. Greece, Russia, Iran, Syria: they were either crooked, unreliable or positively hostile. It never seemed to strike Turkish administrations that this might have something to do with their own policies. Part of the reason lay in the influence of the military over affairs of state, including foreign policy. So both Cyprus and the Kurdish issue were regarded as security, rather than political, issues. Perhaps most importantly, there was a paradox connected with Turkey’s western-looking elite. Atatürk had directed that Turkey’s destiny was Western: success meant being able to match the Europeans. So the bureaucratic elite were committed to this goal, but they hated Europe, because being European involved liberalisation and loss of control. So ministries were full of well-educated people, who behaved like westerners but were ambivalent about
European Union membership (which was the country’s political objective) because the rights and freedoms which this involved looked unattractive to them.

Atatürk converted a quarter of the population to becoming secular, modern, and western-looking but died young, and the rest were left behind. So the story of Turkish politics from the beginning of the multi-party state in 1948 to now is one of the gulf between the two. But those who were left behind became steadily better educated: many moved to the cities; made money; and become an alternative source of economic success to the old secularist establishment. Eventually, they developed their own political party, the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). Turkey had a highly developed proportional representation system in which members of Parliament were selected by the party central apparatus, had few links with the people they represented, and seldom visited their constituencies. The AKP, by contrast, went from door to door, developed relationships in the slums and tried to address people’s needs. And its leader, Erdoğan, had been a tremendous success as Mayor of Istanbul, an enormous city which was big, dysfunctional, and corrupt. He transformed it. That was how he’d made his name. The Turks went in for complicated coalition governments during the ‘90s. In 1997, the coalition of the day, led by a fairly explicitly Islamist party, National Salvation Party fell in what became known as the “Post-Modern Coup”. (The General Staff sent emails to the Prime Minister saying, ‘It’s time for you to go,’ and he went.) Soon after that, Erdoğan came rather formally to see my American colleague and me with his three co-founders to ask what the British government’s view would be if he were to form a new party. He explained that the party’s objective was to join the European Union, and that while it would be conservative and devout, it would also be secularist and democratic, not Islamist. Of course the new party would be in some ways the successor to the National Salvation Party, but the British government didn’t think much of parties being closed by email from the General Staff, and, besides, Erdoğan had made very clear the ways in which his new party would be different from its predecessor. So I said that we would have no objection, and I imagine that Mark Parris, my American opposite number, said the same. Erdoğan’s party didn’t come to power until after I had left, but I knew Abdul Gul - who later became the AKP President – well. And it was clear that the party was an entirely different phenomenon from other Turkish parties.

Unlike other Turkish parties, Erdoğan’s new party activists went out and worked with the people. Turkey has a proportional representation system in which the party central offices simply nominate parliamentary candidates. So unlike in the U.K., where the constituency
chooses its candidate, the candidate’s connection with the people he or she represents is often slight. In the case of the secularist parties, the MPs often barely left Ankara. By contrast, these new people tramped the streets of slums and suburbs, ‘Can we help? What do you need? Can we help with your housing, with your children’s schooling?’ in a way which was entirely new to Turkey. After my time, they were swept to power in 2002. Gradually, the strikingly secularist provisions of Turkish law, for example on headscarves and praying, have been relaxed, in some cases in highly charged circumstances. At one stage the European Court of Human Rights turned down an application by the Turkish government to allow people to wear headscarves in schools. Now it is commonplace. I don’t believe that Turkey is going to become an Islamic state, but Erdoğan, who is primarily interested in remaining in power, knows that religion has resonance with his supporters. Part of today’s problem is that the old secularist parties never caught up. They never understood what was required of them to win support on the streets and it is an important reason for their contemporary failure. The question now of how the secularist elite handle the new reality of their seemingly long-term displacement from power is an interesting one. Should they remain in their embattled fortress of old-time secularism or should they reform, recognising that Turkey will never again be the same as it been in the 20th century?

Back to the late 20th century, when I was there. A major difficulty for me was that Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, didn’t like Turkey. I don’t think this was anything to do with his brainchild, ethical foreign policy, because he didn’t appear to think that the Turks were particularly unethical. But it was government policy to get Turkey accepted as a full EU candidate and he didn’t want this government policy to succeed. At a critical moment during our EU the Presidency, he needed to visit Turkey in preparation for a decision by the Foreign Affairs Council. He didn’t want to come. But instead of relying on the advice of the ambassador, he sent out David Reddaway, who was then Head of Southern European Department, to see whether this would be safe for him or whether he would be attacked or stoned. David and the SPAD came out and reported that Turkey seemed to be safe. My problem was finding a way round Cook’s approach. I tried to deal with Blair and George Robertson, who was the Defence Secretary, both of whom were strongly in favour of starting the accession process. I even found myself in No. 10 one day at a moment that I was told that Cook was coming soon and so had to hide behind a pillar in the hall. But there was a limit to what Blair could achieve. Control of foreign policy had not moved so far across Downing Street as it did later, and besides he had more important things on his mind than the nitty-
gritty of Turkish accession. Cook resigned and Jack Straw came in almost the day I left and, of course, made it all happen. He, Jack Straw, has said that the start of the Turkish accession process was the thing he was most pleased about in his entire time as Foreign Secretary. He recognised that Turkey might be a mess, but it was a mess worth bothering about.

My spell as ambassador preceded the transformation of Turkish foreign policy under Erdoğan’s foreign minister, Davutoğlu. Turkey still regarded its neighbours as their enemies. A consequence of this was that they had no relations with the Arab world. There’d be some crisis in the Middle East and the Prime Minister of the day would say, ‘We’re a Middle Eastern power, we must do something about this.’ But they had no leverage at all, because they had no connections. I’ve continued to deal with Turkey, and nowadays know a certain amount about the Middle East, because what happens there closely affects Turkey; indeed Turkey is arguably part of the Middle East. But until 2002 you could say, ‘I am a Turkey expert,’ without knowing much about the Middle East, because for contemporary secular Turkey, that was the old backward Ottoman world. If they thought about the Arabs at all, they regarded them rather like old buffers in this country thought about the former British colonies in the fifties: inferior and disorganised.

CM: And what was happening over Cyprus during your time as Ambassador?

DL: This was a period when David Hannay was active. The challenge had always been: how can we influence the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots? What leverage do we have? After the end of the Cold War and the expansion of the EU, a new lever became available because both the government of Cyprus and the Turks – the Turks had been an Associate Member of the EU since 1963 – aspired to be members. So you could say to the government of Cyprus, ‘Fine, but you’re not going to get in until the country’s unified.’ And you could say to the Turks, ‘Fine, but unless you negotiate seriously, you’ll find that Cyprus gets in without the north.’ I’m caricaturing here, but, as you see, prospective membership became a political tool. So that enabled the work of the UN and Hannay until late one night at a European Council meeting, the Greeks said unless the EU admitted (South) Cyprus, they would veto the admission of the newly-democratic East European states. And the German Presidency caved in. So the leverage on the two Cypriot parties was broken, the unification negotiations, and the Turks rightly felt betrayed. In due course there was a referendum on what came to be called the Annan Plan for unification, which was supported by the Turkish
Cypriots and was vetoed by the Greek Cypriots. So this opening passed. As David Hannay always said, no one ever made money betting on a Cyprus solution.

CM: David, what about life as Ambassador? Ankara, Istanbul, travelling?

DL: Ankara had changed a lot. It’s an unremarkable modern city, but a not unattractive one. The Turks say that it has more trees than any capital in Europe: it’s green; it has a nice climate, dry, not too hot, not too cold. But for strategic reasons, Atatürk located his new capital in the middle of nowhere. It is a long drive or a flight to anywhere. With Istanbul, of course, it’s the New York/Washington relationship. Istanbul is where business and the media happens, so you need to go there a lot, once a week, once a fortnight. I think it’s also quite like New York and Washington in the sense that each community looks on the other as though it is a bit alien. The inhabitants of Istanbul say that the only good road in Ankara is the one which leads home to Istanbul. It was very important for the ambassador to have a good relationship with the Consul General in Istanbul, which hadn’t always been the case in the past. Legendarily, there had been a time in the past when the ambassador had a lot of the Consulate General building to himself, and the entrance to the ambassador’s quarters had a notice saying ‘No Dogs or Consuls General Beyond This Point’. It wasn’t always an easy job to be consul general in Istanbul, because grand people wanted their British contact to be the ambassador, so unless you handle the relationship sensitively, there is a risk of the ambassador sweeping in from Ankara and creaming off all the best contacts.

Here is a Foreign Office story the origins of which you will recognise. As you know, the Consulate is a vast building, dating from the days when the British only had five embassies, of which embassy to the Sublime Porte was one (places like Washington only rated a Legation). Upkeep was very expensive, and by about 1995 it had been decided that the state of the fabric had deteriorated so far, with radiators exploding and so on, that major refurbishment was needed. How much was that going to cost? Five million pounds. Had the Foreign Office got five million pounds? No, so we will add £250,000 to your running costs so that the work can be spread out and the immediate financial impact reduced. The result of that was that the Consulate was an interminable building site and unpleasant to work in. Much worse, there was a major fire from which Anne and Peter Hunt were fortunate to escape alive, caused by disturbance to old and brittle electrical cables. That is, of course, just the sort of risk to which an old building is exposed if it is subject to prolonged and slow building work. Three years later, Roger Short was killed by a terrorist bomb because his
office was in the Gatehouse. If the refurbishment of the main building, which had been
further delayed because of the fire, had been completed quickly, he wouldn’t have been there.

Here is a short reflection on national myths. We used to go to Gallipoli on ANZAC Day in
1960s and there was no one there at all. That changed with the making of the Australian film,
Gallipoli, in 1981, which stirred recognition in Australia and New Zealand of the importance
of what happened there to the development of their sense of nationhood. By the 1990s
attendance at the ceremonies there on ANZAC Day had become a rite of passage for young
Australians and New Zealanders, fifteen thousand or more would be there every year.
Because of the film (which I defensively hasten to say is not entirely accurate) most of them
thought either that we were responsible for their ancestors’ deaths, or, worse still, that we
were actually on the other side. It’s a very moving battle site. The hand to hand fighting
was in some places more intense that along the Western Front and in an important respect
worse than that. On the Western Front, whatever awful things happened in the trenches, you
eventually got some respite if you were still alive, back in your billet, a mile or so behind the
lines. There was no such refuge at Gallipoli; you were under fire all the time. The ANZAC
Day commemoration ceremonies start off with one to mark the dawn landing which was
where it all started badly because the British underestimated the current and so landed in the
wrong place. There are then ceremonies at the other major cemeteries, Turkish, British,
French, Australian and New Zealand. There’s a Turkish cemetery for the 57th Regiment
alone. On 25 April 1915 Atatürk issued an order "I am not ordering you to attack, I order you
to die. In the time which passes, reinforcements can take your place". And not one of them
survived.

There was other, rather less admirable, national myth-making besides that of the ANZACs.
The British objective of forcing the Dardanelles in order to capture Istanbul was a disaster:
they and the French naval forces suffered serious losses, mainly from mines. This was
reported in The Times, two days later, which said that the warships were sunk by floating
mines. The thrust of the story was that this wasn’t really the fault of the Navy; these mines
just happened to be floating in the wrong place. The Navy was just unlucky that day. In
fact, however, the Allies knew about the mines, but had been unable to sweep them earlier
because of the effectiveness of Ottoman shore batteries. So this was actually incompetence
rather than bad luck, but incompetence isn’t good for the national myth. But there is a
Turkish counterpart to this. It is part of the Turkish national myth that Armenians didn’t fight
in the Ottoman cause (that would have looked a bit awkward given what happened to the
Armenians soon afterwards). In fact two key batteries were commanded by Armenian majors. And there is another convenient myth about Gallipoli which served everyone well. This started with the Australian national war records. There was nothing the matter with our troops but how could we have won against such a superior commander (Atatürk)? You get something similar in Churchill’s histories, who was of course responsible for the whole disastrous venture. Finally, characterising Atatürk in this way suited the Turks who needed a legendary founder for their new Republic.

CM: Was there a particular highlight of your four years there? A visit, a cultural event?

DL: As I’ve said, dealing with the Turkish government at that time was not particularly easy. They were obsessed with the idea of Europe but also had an ambivalent attitude to the implications of EU membership. The Foreign Secretary was unhelpful. We ran a year of political, trade and cultural events called ”Britain-Turkey 2000” events, trade, culture, which significantly raised our profile. Best of all, of course, were the friendships we made in Turkey during our two stints there, and our happy memories of their company, their culture, their food and their remarkable country.

The worst moment was the murder of two Leeds United supporters after a European Cup match in 2000. Both sets of supporters were responsible for violence, but the Leeds supporters wiped their bottoms on a Turkish flag; an unforgivable insult. In the UK fights between rival supporters have a certain ritual about them: you may hurt each other, but there are limits to how far this goes. That culture doesn’t exist in Turkey. A fight started over the honour of the Turkish flag was bound to end in disaster. A number of Turkish fans were convicted and gaoled but it was a terrible tragedy which, for a time, was more important for the bilateral relationship at least at a popular level than the niceties of the Cyprus negotiations.

I finished in Ankara in 2001. John Kerr had asked me to run for the Chairmanship of the JIC a couple of years earlier. That’s not to say that I would have got it, but I said no because I was more interested in policy-making and implementation than in analysis. So I stayed on for a bit in Ankara and retired when I was 58. As it turned out, I would have had the JIC job through the Iraq War, so I am pretty glad I didn’t. You like to think you’d have done it differently, but I have asked Rodric Braithwaite, whom we both admire and who had been a Chairman of the JIC and he said, ‘You know, there are these great national endeavours, the whole government machine is devoted to succeeding. Are you going to stick your hand up
and say “hang on a minute; the available intelligence doesn’t justify this”? If even Rodric was uncertain about how he would have handled this, I am doubtful about what I would have done. I would have liked to have gone to NATO, but probably wouldn’t have got it. When you’re in POD, you come across people who have unrealistic estimations of their capabilities. I don’t think I have.

As a footnote, I was then asked to put my name forward to be the next Commandant of the RCDS (Royal College of Defence Studies). When there were four of us left in the field I asked about the pay. I was told that since I was a civil servant and this was a civil service appointment, my FCO pension would be deducted from the pay as Commandant, so my salary would be about £30,000 a year. This didn’t apply to Armed Forces candidates because they were not civil service members, so their pensions wouldn’t be an issue. So I withdrew. As it turned out, the late lamented Tim Garden got the job, and I’m sure he did it wonderfully well.